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A TRG President's

Foreword

The Air Transport Research
Group of the WCTR Society was formally launched as a special
interest group at the 7th Triennial WCTR in Sydney, Australia in 1995. Since then, our membership
base
has expanded rapidly, and includes nearly 600 active transportation
researchers, policy-makers,
industry
executives, major corporations
and research institutes from 28 countries. Our broad base of membership
and their strong enthusiasm have pushed the group forward, to continuously
initiate new events and
projects which will benefit aviation industry and research communities worldwide.
It became a tradition that the ATRG holds an international
conference at least once per year. As
you know, the 1997 conference was held in Vancouver, Canada.
Over 90 papers, panel discussions and
invited speeches were presented.
In 1998, the ATRG organized
a consecutive
stream of 14 aviation
sessions at the 8 'h Triennial WCTR Conference (July 12-17: Antwerp).
Again, on 19-21 July, 1998, the
ATRG Symposium was organized and executed every successfully
by Dr. Aisling Reynolds-Feighan
of
the University College of Dublin.
In 1999, the City University of Hong Kong has hosted the 3 rd Annual ATRG Conference. Despite
the delay in starting our conference sessions because of Typhoon Maggie, we were able to complete the
two-day conference sessions and presentation of all of the papers.
On behalf of the ATRG membership, I
would like to thank Dr. Anming Zhang who organized the conference and his associates and assistants for
their effort which were essential for the success of the conference.
Our special thanks go to Professor
Richard Ho, Dean of the School of Business and Economics of the University for the generous support
for the conference.
Many of us also enjoyed the technical visit to the new Hong Kong International
Airport (Chep Lok Kok).
As you know, Professor Jaap de Wit and I look forward
Amsterdam on July 2-4, 2000 for the 4th Annual ATRG Conference.

to welcoming

you to University

of

As in the past, the Aviation Institute of the University of Nebraska at Omaha (Dr. Brent Bowen,
Director of the Institute) has kindly agreed to publish the Proceedings
of the 1999 ATRG Hong Kong
Conference (being co-edited by Dr. Anming Zhang and Professor Brent Bowen). On behalf of the ATRG
members, I would like to express my sincere appreciation
to Professor Brent Bowen, Mary M. Schaffart
and the staff of the Aviation Institute of University of Nebraska at Omaha for the effort to publish these
ATRG proceedings.
Also, I would like to thank and congratulate
all authors of the papers for their fine
contribution
to the conferences
and the Proceedings.
Our special thanks are extended
to Boeing
Commercial Aviation - Marketing Group for the partial support for publication of this proceedings.
Finally, I would like to draw your attention to the ATRG
(www.commerce.ubc.ca/atrg/)
which will keep you informed of
events. On behalf of the ATRG Networking Committee, I would
suggest others to sign up the ATRG membership.
Thank you for
Tae H. Oum
President,

ATRG

ATRG

Prof.

c/o

Tae H. Oum

Faculty of Commerce
and Business Administration,
University
of British Columbia,
2053 Main Mall
Vancouver, B.C., V6T 1Z2Canada
E-mail: At rg(d_commerce.ubc.ca

newsletter and the ATRG website
the ATRG operations and forthcoming
appreciate it very much if you could
your attention.
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Abstract
High technology industry is a major user of air transport and many of the largest clusters
of high technology firms are located near to major international airports. This study looks
at the implications for the local economy of having good access to a particular form of
airport, namely those that provide hub services. It takes as its empirical base the situation
that has emerged in recent years in the US and explores at both the aggregate and case
study levels the impact on high technology employment of a community having access to
a major airport hub.

Introduction

Stimulating and maintaining economic prosperity in a region is a major challenge. Our understanding of
why some regions grow and prosper while others are less successful is far from complete. Increasingly
industries are 'footloose'
and relocate relatively rapidly and cheaply and this makes the challenge of
defining appropriateregional
policy strategies even more difficult.
There is evidence, however, that appropriate infrastructure is important in determining where and how
firms locate and expand. Simply building more infrastructure, however, is seldom by itself sufficient. The
infrastructure must be appropriate in its scale, form and design and its use must be effective and efficient.
Airports are an important form of modem infrastructure and, when carefully and thoughtfully developed,
can add to the economic potential of a region. As illustrated by a number of airports that have failed to
achieve their economic development
goals, however, it is clear that simply constructing a substantial
airport is not of itself a guarantee that it will be used nor that it will stimulate the local economy t.
This paper considers the role that airports can play in assisting in economic
quantification of the main effects.

The Impacts

development

and offers some

of Airports

The deregulation
of domestic US air transport in 1977 (cargo)and
1978 (passengers) together with the
US's pursuit of Open Skies policies internationally from the 1980s have generated considerable benefits for
the travelling public 2. The market driven nature of air transport has enhanced its overall efficiency and
added significantly to the overall contribution that it makes to the US economy. Equally, the growth in air
transport has led to an inevitable expansion in airport facilities and in the ways in which airports are now
used. In particular, there has been a growth in hub-and-spoke operations with a consequential increase in
the number of indirect journeys being undertaken.
The growth in air transport through its add-on demands for air transport infrastructure, especially airports,
has implications
for the scale and spatial distribution of economic development. An airport essentially has
four types of impact on the economy in its region.
Primary Effects.
These are the benefits to the region of the construction or expansion of the airport facility - the design of
the facility, the building of the runways, the construction of the terminals and hangers, the installation of air
traffic navigation systems and so on. The direct effects of this involve the local employment required in the
construction process and the work done by local contractors. Indirect, multiplier effects include the benefits
to the region of the wages and other incomes these workers and companies subsequent spend in the area
and the tax revenues available to local governments.
These are clear gains to the local community and the local economy but they
being limited largely to the time period of the construction activity, and may be
of magnitude.
It is a one-time effect. Also, airport construction involves a
manpower and equipment that may not be available locally but must be brought
leads to economic leakages away from the immediate area.

are essentially short
rather limited in their
degree of specialist
in from other regions.

term,
Order
skill,
This

The most dramatic examples of error in this context are found outside of the US in the case of Shannon
Airport in Ireland and Mirabel in Canada.
The deregulations have generated a small industry in producing academic studies of variable quality but work
at the Brooking Institution. for example, suggests a net annual benefit of S12.4 billion in 1992 prices from domestic
passenger deregulation alone (S. A. Morrison and C Winston. THE EVOLUTION OF THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY,
The Brookings Institution. Washington. 1995)
i
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for Regional Analysis, The Institute of Public Policy, George Mason Universit)',
local input-output analysis and also offers guidance to the b'pes of jobs that would
airport. There may be additional economic activities in this case because air traffic
this is irrelevant in terms of gaining a handle on the scale of the secondary effects
region.
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involve

RULES:

The Aviation Program, The Center
1998. The analysis was based on a
be most affected in the region of the
would divert to National Airport but
of having an airport in a particular

The form of the estimating equation using time series data for 1977 to 1997 was:
LnTE_ = -4.317 ÷ 0.723 LnTP, - 0.213LnTP,.I + 0.334TP,.:
R: = 0.99
where: TE, is employment
in )ear t and TP,. TP,._. TP,.: are passengers
.Although extrapolations
far outside of the data base used to develop
doing so _ ould suggest that the total secondar3 employment associated

in )'ears t, t-l, t-2 respecti_ el_.
an input-output
table is problematic,
in this case
_ ith Dulles is somcthin_ o_ cr 21,000 jobs.
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considerable use of transportation, high technology companies make particular use of air transportation. It
has been estimated that those employed in the high-technology
sector in the US fly over 1 6 times as much
as
.....general area conduct acttvmes requa'mg
"" considerable
• those in traditional industries 6• Corn p antes in t his
rater-personal
contacts. These contacts are only possible with high quality transport. From a local
development perspective it is often these types of firm that form the basis for economic growth because
they are usually geographically
mobile and represent a major growth sector•
One method of at least partly assessing the tertiary benefits of having a major airport is to directly
the economic performance of such cities with those that have smaller airports. One would expect,
factors taken into consideration,
that cities with large airports, and particularly
those with hub
would attract more of this geographically mobile industry as a result of the superior aviation
enjoyed by their business travelers.

contrast
all other
airports,
services

Additionally, some types of airport are likely to generate greater tertiary benefits than others of a similar
size. Major hub airports 7 in particular offer a number of benefits to business travelers that extend beyond
the simple size of a facility. These benefits include: more frequent flights; more direct flights (in 1996 hub
airports offered non-stop flights to nearly twice the number of cities as non-hub cities with 25% more daily
departures per city served');
more opportunities for same day return flights; greater likelihood of
international flights; services geared to local market needs; and the ability in many cases to send packages
on scheduled passenger services leaving after the major courier services have finished their daily pick-ups.
At the same time, residents of hub cities have the same opportunities of linking to other major hubs as do
those living in non-hubs.
To examine the benefits for any areas in terms of job creation in more dynamic
technology employment in large U.S. cities can be assessed against the provision
services. Defining high-technology
industries is not simple. Here a fairly broad,
is adopted 9. The index looks at clusterings of high-technology
employment.
distorted picture that can be drawn when reference is made to the role of a single
company in a region. From a longer term planning perspective there are also
"company town."

sectors, the trends in highof scheduled air transport
but widely used, det'mition
As a result, it avoids the
dominant high-technology
advantages of not being a

An econometric model is employed that takes variations in high-technology
employment across all 321 US
Metropolitan Statistical Areas in 1994 as the phenomenon
to be explained t°. The calculations enable a
rough estimation of the high-technologyjob
stimulus that proximity to a hub airport provides. In doing this
analysis, allowance was made for differences in the population sizes of the areas, number of Fortune 500
companies with headquarters,
housing values, highway density, per capita defense expenditure
and
percentage of employment in business services. It is found that proximity to a hub airport (as defined by the
Federal Aviation Administration,
there are 56 hubs in the US t_) has a positive impact on the amount of
high-technology
employment
in an area t2. Put into concrete, quantitative terms, the calculations indicate

6
Simat, Helliesen and Eichner Inc. ECONOMICS IMPACT OF DULLES INTERNATIONAL
AN UP-DATE, Washington, 1986

AIRPORT:

7 For practical purposes, when looking at concentration of airline activities, hubs are normally treated as airports that
have a large preponderance of flights operated as part of an essentially radial network by one carrier. In a few rareeases
sthereis a general recognition, that a hub has two main carriers but this only applies to a few major airports.
It was estimated that the disutility of having to make a transfer, irrespective of the additional overall duration
of an indirect flight, was about $22.5 in 1987 (T.H. Oum and M.W. Tretheway, Airline hub-and- spoke system,
TRANSPORTATION RESEARCH FORUM PROCEEDINGS Vo]. 30, pp. 380-393, 1990).
9
The measure is known as the Armington Index.
to
K.J. Button and R Stough with the assistance of S. Lall and M. Trice, THE BENEFITS OF BEING A HUB
AIRPORT CITY: CONVENIENT TRAVEL AND HIGH-TECH JOB GROWTH, The Aviation Program, The Center
for Regional Analysis, The Institute of Public Policy, George Mason Universib', 1998
t_
The FAA has classified communities into a four-class scheme depending on the total percentage of U.S.
passenger enplanements in all sets'ices and operated by U.S. certified carriers within the 50 states and other designated
areas (e.g. a large hub has 1.00% or more. a medium hub has 0.25% to 1.00%. and so on I.
_:
In detail the model was estimated using ordinary least-squares and the pret_rred spccifii:ation was:
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* denotes statistical significance at 990 confidence level; n = 303; R2 = 0.643.
13
For part of the period Nashville was a secondary American Airlines hub and this fact was allowed for in the
subsequent statistical analysis.
J_

In detail the model was estimated using ordinary least squares and the preferred specification
was:
Ln high-technology
employment
= -3.25 + 1.48 In per capita income * - 0.07 time* + 0.12 hub dummy* - 0.75
Nashville dummy*
* denotes statistical significance at 99% confidence level; n = 40; R" = 0.980. Cincinnati and Milwaukee was taken as
the base variable. The estimation adjusts for heteroscedastcity.
_s
The Granger (C. Granger, Investigating causal relations by econometric models and cross-spectral
methods,
ECONOMETRICA,
Vol. 37, pp. 424-38, 1969) approach to the question of whether x causes .v is to see how much of
the current y can be explained by past values of)' and then to see whether adding lagged values of x can improve the
explanation,
y is said to be Granger-caused
by x if x helps in the prediction of y, or equivalently if the coefficients on
the lagged xis are statistically significant.
It is important to note that the statement x Granger causes y does not imply
that y is the effect or the result of x. Granger causality measures precedence and information content but does not by
itself indicate causalib' in the more common use of the term. The test is to see if air traffic does NOT Granger cause
employment;
the resultant F-statistic for Cincinnati of 6.328, at a probabilit3' level of 0.0148, implies that this can be
rejected with 95% confidence. Indicating the causality is almost certainly the other _vav. Equally. the test is to see if air
traffic does NOT Granger cause employment
in Pittsburgh; the F-statistic of 6.419 and a probabilir3
of 0.07, implies
one can be 90°,0 confident the causality is the other _sa.v.

not so evident with the two-year time lags used to test for causality. In the short run, employment
are more evident than earnings or income effects. Similar results are found for Pittsburgh.

impacts

These findings that trace a link from the existence of a hub airport to high technology employment may
initially seem counter intuitive in terms of traditional transport economics. The latter views transport
provision as being derived from the final needs of consumers and producers and hence transport follows
demand rather than visa versa. In the case of hub airports this traditional view can be misleading. Airlines
offer networks of routes and select hubs in order to meet the overall demands for their services. Only a
relatively small amount of traffic actually originates or is destined for a hub airport, the vast majority of
traffic is transiting. A hub location is, therefore, chosen to meet this wider network criteria. The area around
the hub, however, benefits from the extensive network of services that are provided at the airport; a
network that is well in excess of that which would be offered if the airport were not a hub.
Perpetuity

Effects

There is an increasingly widely accepted school of thought arguing that economic growth, once started in a
region, becomes self-sustaining
and may accelerate )_. Linked to this, there is also empirical evidence that
infrastructure investment can act as a catalyst for higher economic growth in an area; essentially it can act
as a kick-start mechanism )_. The construction of a new airport or the major enlargement of an existing
facility may act, therefore, to set in progress a much larger and longer term development
process in a
region. This perpetuity effect is in addition to the tertiary effects that relate to the immediate migration of
firms to an area with good air transport services. It is longer term and affects the dynamics of an area. By
initially attracting undertakings to an area in sufficient numbers, airport development
can lead to the
crossing of important thresholds in terms of economies of scale, scope and density. In particular in the
context of high-technology
activities, an area can acquire a vital knowledge base that fosters local research
and development and makes the region quasi-independent of others. The regional economy can feed on this
to further its high-technology
activities and hence to accelerate its growth.
This type of dynamic economic impact of an airport is the most abstract and the most difficult to quantify.
It has been little researched. It is long term and involves the interaction of an airport with all other aspects
of the local economy. It is, nevertheless, potentially a very real and important benefit that may be enjoyed
by a region with high quality air services.

Summary

and Conclusions

Air transport is the fastest growing mode of transportation and by permitting the market to offer the
services industry and users demand, and by allowing competitive forces to act as a stimulus for efficient
supply, airline deregulation
has served to assist national economic grow'th. At the more local level, the
availability of air transport services can act as a stimulus to the economic growth of regions and cities. It
achieves this through the employment
and income generated in the construction
and enlargement
of
facilities (primary effects), through the on-going activities of the airport (secondary effects); through the air
services provided by the airport making the location attractive to mobile industry (tertiary effects); and
through its own long term momentum (perpetuity effects). In particular, there is empirical evidence that the
more mobile forms of modem industry, notably those associated with high-technology
activities, are often
attracted to areas offering high quality air transport services. There is also evidence that it is not simply the
availability of an airport that acts as a catalyst for economic growth but rather it is generally the types of
service offered at hub airports that are most important.

_
This is known as 'endogenous growth theotT.".
_"
D.A. Aschauer. Why is infrastructure imponan:?. In Munnell. P (ed.) IS THERE A SHORTFALL IN
PUBLIC CAPITAL INVESTMENT?. Conference Series. 34. Federal Reserve Bank of Boston. 1990
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Figure 1. Trends in High-Technology Employment at Case Study Locations
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Morrison and Winston (1989) also found that consumer willingness to pay for reductions in scheduled
delay was only about $5 per hour (in $1996). The low willingness to pay for reductions in scheduled delay
is plausible since travelers generally plan ahead and make productive use of their time when there is a
schedule delay.
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of time is a significant
competing
particularly

2

4

time

factors

of demand

Frequency

is particularly

to frequency

is more valuable

component

in Flight

important

and trip segments

to them.

As a general

or maintaining

on Demand
for certain

in markets
rule,

Morrison and Winston (1989) estimated
time was about $116 (in $1996).

consumer

willingness

whenever

a time advantage

modes of transportation
(e.g., short haul markets) is important,
sensitive to changes in frequency
and levels of direct service.

routes.

For

with more
the value

over

demand

to pay for a one hour reduction

is

in transfer

Knowledge
average

of how sensitive

demand

of trip segments

would

number

airlines

face in setting

fares

is to changes
allow

and in deciding

service between
city pairs. Understanding
determine
the dynamic
impact on demand
Conversely,

understanding

operations

on air traffic

The previous
service

levels

these
control

discussion

(frequency

for a better

the number

flight

frequency,

understanding
of flights

and the

of the tradeoff

and the level

of direct

these effects is also important
since they help
of any NAS infrastructure
improvements.

effects

help determine

(ATC)

the impact

infrastructure

and figures
and direct

in price,

helps

service)

of changes

in airline

requirements.

explain

the relationship

and increased

between

demand.

improved

However,

they do not

provide
demand

the precise causal relationship
needed to quantify,
estimate
and forecast
due to changes in those service levels.
The next section will.

Section

3

changes

in

Methodology
Traditional
methods of estimating
demand between city pairs use econometric
Econometric
analysis of aviation
demand involves determining,
based on historical

analysis.
data, a

quantitative

that

influence

relationship
the level

between

of traffic

commercial
passenger
income and a negative
Most
on demand.

With

determines

traffic

(e.g.,

aviation
function

econometric

(by passengers)

personal

however,

frequency,

income

part

instead

have

the effect

concentrated

that changes

on markets

where

in service
changes

sample

(1981)

estimated

of monopoly

flight

frequencies,

effect

shown

flight

segments.

demand

in Figure

2-2.

For domestic

the effect

is identifying

variables

in flight

the impact

fares).

levels

function

of service

the extent

(e.g.,

of personal

from

variables

to which

changes

frequency

in personal

For example,
in most markets
increases
in flight
or other factors.
Some studies,
however,
have

factors have a significant
effect on demand.
Ippolito (1981), and Eriksen
and Lin (1979).
Ippolito

variables

is a positive

not considered

in traffic

income)
determining
changes
in frequency.
frequency
reflect increased
personal
income
estimated

demand

of the problem
of changes

and explanatory

and average

between
city pairs,
of average fares.

studies,

levels

traffic

have

frequency

independent

The two seminal

that changes

Ippolito

had on demand.

found

increased

by .76 percent.

Eriksen

and Lin (1979)

pieces

in flight

These

studies

of changes
on the subject

frequency

in other
are

had on demand

that for each

one percent

increase

The increased

demand

is the same

studied

the impact

that changes

in a
in

in the

level of service had on demand.
They defined "service"
as the ratio of non-stop
jet flight
time to the sum of average passenger
travel time and time between
desired and actual
departure.

This measure

reflects

flight

frequency,

stops-and-connections,

and aircraft

speed.

Basedon a sampleof 15 long-haulmarketsover a six-yearperiod,they foundthat for each
onepercentchangein their servicevariable,demandincreasedby .43 percent.
This study usesmorerecent,precise,andbroadbaseddatato moreaccuratelyestimate
andforecastchangesin demanddueto changesin directflight frequencyandthe average
numberof trip segments.The samplefor the studyconsistsof 47 city pairsusingquarterly
datafrom 1984to 1996. The study estimatestheeffectthatchangesin direct flight
frequenciesandaveragenumberof trip segmentshaveon demand.The studyestimates
theseeffectsboth togetherandindependentof eachother.
The influenceof servicefactorsis moreimportanton certainroutes. Demandis more
sensitiveto frequencyin marketswith manybusinesstravelersandin marketswhere
competitionwith other modesof transportationis greater. Forthesereasons,it is important
to havea broad-basedsamplethat includesshort-andlong-haulmarkets,aswell asbusiness
andleisureorigins anddestinations.The effectof frequenciesandpoint-to-point serviceon
demandalsovariesby type of traveler. Businesstravelersmaybe moresensitiveto changes
in thesevariablesthan leisuretravelers. Forthesereasons,it is importantto studyall
passengertraffic, andto studythe breakdownof thetotal into businessandleisuretraffic.
To estimatedemand,the studyusesan ordinaryleastsquares(OLS) regressiontechnique.
Thestudy estimatedthe following threeregressionmodelsfor eachcity pair. 3

Forafewofthecitypairsthathaddirectservice
started
ordiscontinued
duringtheperiodstudied,
the
studyusedanother
modelinstead
ofthemodelwithFRQ.
InPax=constant
+bl InPI+ b2Infare+ b3InTS

+ b4 In DUM

where DUM = dummy variable set equal to one when direct service was available.

In Pax= constant+bl In PI + b2In fare+

b3 In TS

[I]

In Pax = constant

+ bl In PI + b2 In fare + b3 In FRQ

In Pax = constant

+ bl In PI + b2 In fare + b3 In FRQ

[2]
+b4 In TS

[3]

where:
In = natural

logarithm

Pax = the number

of origin

PI = the combined

personal

fare = average
TS = average
to-point

number

(U.S.)

BACK

average

The study
(defined
traveling);

in the city pair

per passenger

by route

(in constant

$1996)

(proxy

for the level

of direct,

and business

paying

non-stop

and one-stop

point-

4

is the source

of the data

Services

is the source

of the data

for passengers,

"OD 1A" database

number

of trip segments.

stubs.

It provides

provides

a unique

information

model

discounted

for three

different

passenger

frequent

flyers):

coach

fares purchased
as passengers

true

combining

OAG

data

Passenger

are a modified

categories.
leisure

The

travelers

at least two weeks
paying

fares,

for
of all

package,

These

(excludes
only (defined

10 percent

BACK's

the data for flight frequency.
Airlines Guide ®.

passengers

the data

for

OD 1A represents

OD 1A data covers

with data on fares and trip segments.

type travelers

direct)

Analysis

BACK's

carriers.

cases

of Economic

from ticket

uses each regression

are: all fare paying
as passengers

(in some

and average

gathered

of U.S. certified
statistics

Bureau

frequency.

fares,
data

flights

and Cargo Flight Statistics
provides
version of data found in the Official

categories

enplaned

$1996)

Information

and flight

origin-destination
passenger

passengers

of the two cities

of trip segments

of non-stop

States

income.

trip segments,

passengers

(O&D)

service)

The United

passengers,

incorrie

fare (in constant

FRQ = number

personal

and destination

fares

only
prior

to

for business,

The frequency variable does not include all available flights between a city pair. Non-direct flight
itineraries that use more than one ticket are not included. Consequently, the variable does not capture the
effects of increasing indirect flight frequency.
The all passenger category includes "mixed fare class" data not picked up in either the leisure or business
type categories. Consequently, the results for all passengers may be inconsistent with the sum of the other
categories.

7

first class, discounted
of traveling).6
Each

equation

business

measures

or first class,

the effect

or full fare coach

that changes

purchased

in personal

income

within

two weeks

and fares

have

on the

demand for aviation in that market.
The expected effect of increases
in personal
income
decreases
in fares is to increase
demand.
Equations
[1] and [3] measure
the effect that
changes
actual

in the average
number

number

of flights

of trip segments

per passenger

needed

have on demand.
to travel

between

Trip segments
the city pair.7

and

are the
A reduction

in the average number of trip segments
increases the average level of point-to-point
service.
The expected effect of decreases
in the average number of trip segments
is to increase
demand.
The quality
short-haul

of service

markets

offered

where

there

by an airline

is a vital competitive

is also competition

from surface

factor,

travel.

variable used in this study captures
the effect of an increase
in the quality
It does so by measuring
changes in the average number of flights needed

[2] and [3] measure

the effect

that changes

in flight

in

of current
capacity.
to travel between
an

O&D city pair market.
A reduction
in the average number of trip segments
city pair implies an increase
in the average level of point-to-point
service.
Equations

especially

The trip segment

between

frequency

have

an O&D

on

demand.
The flight frequency
variable measures
the number of non-stop
direct (or non-stop
and one-stop direct in some markets)
flights between the city pair. 8 The expected
effect of
an increase in direct flight frequency
is to increase demand.
The
this study captures the effect of an increase in direct point-to-point
The regression

coefficients

explanatory

variables

these

as constant

effects

affect

provide
the dependent

elasticities.

a framework
variable.

Elasticities

frequency
capacity.

variable

for estimating

how changes

The regression

coefficients

provide

a framework

for isolating

used in

in these
capture
the

change in the dependent
variable due to changes in the explanatory
variable.
The concept
elasticity
describes
the effect on demand of a one percent
change in the respective

of

The categories oversimplify actual purchase patterns. Business travelers often purchase tickets prior to two
weeks of traveling, and leisure travelers can purchase tickets at the last moment.
Number of flights with separate ticket coupons (actual change of planes). A direct flight with stops counts
as only one trip segment.
When a city has multiple airports, we include flights to all pertinent airports (e.g., Washington includes
both National and Dulles).

explanatoryvariable.9 For example,if thecoefficient for the fare variableis equalto -.7,
thena onepercentdecreasein faresresultsin nearlya .7percentincreasein demand.10
The studyusesa sampleof 47 city pairsusing quarterlydatafrom 1984to 1996.The
criterion usedto selectthe sampleis trip generationpurposes(generalbusiness,leisure,etc.),
trip length,andthe population of the MetropolitanStatisticalArea (MSA). Additionally,the
city pairsin the sampleare geographicallydistributedthroughoutthe continentalUnited
States.
Trip purposesincluded flights betweengeneralbusiness,manufacturingbusiness,and
leisurelocations. Generalbusinesslocationsarethosewhoseemploymentin the
combinationof"Service, Finance,andPublic Sectors"(SFP)is greaterthan 110percentof
the nationalaverage.Manufacturing businesslocationsarethosewhere manufacturing
employmentis greaterthan 108percentof the nationalaverage.Leisurelocationsarethose
with the following characteristics:employmentin SFPis greaterthan 110percentof the
nationalaverage;employment in manufacturingis lessthan 10percentof the total employed;
andthe percentageof SFPemployedin financeis lessthan90 percentof the nationalaverage
of financeemploymentin SFp.l 1 Additionally, the sampleincludeslocationsthatdidnot fit
into anyof the abovecategories. TheselocationsareAtlanta, Cincinnati,Houston,
Pittsburgh,andSacramento.Theseareeconomicallyimportantlocationsor oneswith
importanthubs. Nine of the city pairs in the sample included one of these Metropolitan
Statistical
MSAs

Areas

(MSAs).

are large

less than one million
There

are three

750-1499

include:
leisure

9

that

are five general
from general

to leisure;

from

on population.

Nine

than

MSAs

of the city pairs

for trip length.

and greater

in the sample

There

depending

are small.

categories

miles,

markets

or small

1500

in the sample

The categories
miles.

with a 1996 population

The sample

included
includes

included

small

of
MSAs.

less than 750 miles,
24, 13, and 10 city pair

fell into these categories.
categories

business
general

for city pair markets

to general
business

business;

from

to manufacturing

in this study.
general

These

business

business;

categories

to leisure;

and from

from

manufacturing

Elasticity = [(1.01) '_t_"°r_°'m_i'"'-1] * 100

10 Elasticity=

[(l.01) "7-I] * 100=-.694

11 The source for employment

data is the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS).

according to Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) categories.
to 1996.

BLS aggregates data

All population and employment data refer

business

to manufacturing

business.12

The numbers

of city pairs in each category

1, 5, and 4, respectively.
13 Within each category,
there are categories
distance
and by size. Table A- 1 in the appendix
shows the city pairs
categories.
Section

4

Results
4.1

are 31, 6,

for city pairs by
in their respective

and Discussions

Results

Table 4-1 shows the summary results for the coefficients
for the price and trip segment
variables
for the models ran with the trip segment variable (TS) only. 14 Table A-2 in the
appendix

(TS).

presents

the complete

results

for the models

ran with the trip segments

variable

12
These categories represent trip purpose as a function of relative employment
patterns.
within a category is for all the aforementioned
reasons.
Trade, industry, and academic
trip generation
category

purposes

are somewhat

like these to analyze
arbitrary,

markets.

they adequately

While the percentages

differentiate

between

Obviously, travel
sources often use

used here to define

each

trip purpose.

13
City pairs

with "other

Summary

results

cities" are included

in one of the five categories.

14
level of confidence
to capture

are only for the price and trip segment
or higher.

more markets

where

The 90 percent

confidence

the underlying

variables

variables in some of these markets,
higher, may still strongly influence

10

while not as strong
demand.

coefficients

that are significant

at a 90 percent

is used instead of the 95 or 99 percent
may be significant.
as in those si_ificant

confidence

The impact of the TS and fare
at a 95 percent

confidence

or

Table

Number

Passenger
Category and
Variable

4-1. Summary

Regression

Results

with TS (Equation

Median

Maximum

Minimum

1)

of

Significant
TS
Coefficients

Mean

All - fare

46

-.76

-.75

-.26

- 1.47

.26

All -TS

21

-1.68

-1.29

-.35

-5.11

1.25

Standard
Deviation

Leisure

- fare

35

-.88

-.81

-.39

-2.14

.39

Leisure

-TS

27

-4.34

-2.66

-.82

-29.09

5.91

Business

-

26

-.98

- 1.02

-.40

- TS

29

-4.17

-2.69

-.87

- 1.64

.35

fare 15
Business

-26.99

5.07

The estimated
regression
coefficients
provide a framework
for estimating
how changes
the explanatory
variables
affect the dependent
variable.
16 The regression
coefficients
capture these effects as a constant
elasticity.
As noted in Section 3, these elasticities
a framework
for isolating
the change the dependent
variable due to changes
in the
explanatory
variable.
The second
factor

in explaining

a significant
categories
47 markets

15

column

factor

in Table

demand

is significant

of markets

in fewer markets

respectively,

than the leisure

where the leisure fare is significant,

the business

show

and business
category.

The

fare elasticity.
elasticity

that TS is

passenger

out of a total

in the all passenger

provide

TS is a significant

The results

in the leisure

and business,

45 percent

where

categories.

of the markets

for leisure

and about

fare elasticity

across all the 35 markets
lower.
16

60 percent

(27 and 29 markets

The business

the number

in each of the respective

in about

in the sample),

4-1 shows

in

of
third and

If aggregated

would

be considerably

Most of the models have adjustments
for serial correlation.
A common finding in time series regression
is
the presence of serial Correlation (residuals are correlated with their own lagged values).
Serial correlation
is inconsistent

with the assumption

are not correlated
and unreliable

coefficients.

serial correlation.
estimated
variable's

in ordinary

least squares

with each other in any fashion.
Correcting

Econometricians

have developed

for serial correlation

(OLS) regression

The presence
provides

theory

of serial correlation
extensions

for statistically

standard errors. The adjusted coefficients provide more reliable
impact on the dependent
variable and on its significance
level.

of regression

that the disturbances
results

analysis

more reliable
estimates

in inefficient
to deal with

coefficients

and

of the independent

11

fourth columnsin Table4-1 showthemeanandmedianregressioncoefficientvaluesfor TS
in the marketswhereit is significant. In markets,whereit is a significant factor,a one
percentincreasein the averagenumberof trip segmentsreducesdemandby about
2.70 percentin boththe leisureandbusinesscategories(basedon the medianvalues).17 In
somecases,thecoefficientfor TS is very negative(e.g.,Pittsburgh-Philadelphiaat -14.96for
leisure). In thesample,the marketswith themostnegativecoefficientsfor the TS variable
areshort-haulmarketswherea moveawayfrom point-to-pointservicewouldresult in most
consumersdriving instead.
Table4-2 showsthe summaryresultsfor thecoefficientsfor the price andfrequency
variablesfor themodelsrun with the frequencyvariable(FRQ)only. 18Table A-3 in the
appendix
(FRQ).

presents

the complete

results

for the models

ran with the flight

frequency

variable

17 We use median values to reduce the impact of outliers.
18 Summary results are only for the price and frequency coefficients
of confidence or higher.

12

that are significant at a 90 percent level

Table

4-2.

Summary

Passenger

Number

Category
and

Significant

Regression

for

Models

with

FRQ

(Equation

2) 19

of

FRQ
Coefficients

Variable

Results

Standard
Mean

Median

Maximum

Minimum

Deviation

All - fare

46

-.80

-.79

-.20

- 1.52

.28

All - FRQ

18

.39

.35

.83

.06

.24

All - DUM

4

.30

.19

.11

.72

.29

Leisure
fare

-

34

-.84

-.78

-.33

-1.83

.33

Leisure

-

19

.53

.50

1.38

.13

.36

-

1

.42

FRQ
Leisure

............

-x.

DUM
Business

-

26

- 1.33

- 1.34

-.53

-2.70

.51

-

7

.85

.80

1.18

.51

.21

-

1

2.33

fare 20
Business
FRQ
Business
DUM

The

second

column

significant

factor

the models

show

some

19

markets.

2O

in explaining
that

direct

The impact

markets

in the all-passenger

demand

by between

The coefficient
probably

flight

shows

the

number

in each

of the

frequenc'y
factor

has five city pair markets

studied.

the absence

4-2
demand

It is a significant

The sample
period

in Table

............

respective

is a significant

in about

40 percent

where direct air service

of this effect is a significant
category.

of markets

In these markets,

where

FRQ

categories.

factor
of the

The

in explaining
markets

either started

is a
results

of

demand

in

leisure

and

in the

or was discontinued

factor in explaining

demand

the effect of having

direct air service

during the

in four of those
increased

11 and 72 percent.

for business

fares is higher than in the model

of the TS variable.

the result of changes

Some of the change
in the average

number

in demand

with the TS variable.
attributed

The difference

to fares in this model

is due to

are

of trip segments.

13

all passenger
categories,
third and fourth columns
values

for FRQ

factor,

a one percent

and .8 percent
median
two other
so high.

4.2

in the markets

it is significant.

in the number
and business

In four cases,

markets,

markets

where

increase

in the leisure

values).

two of those

but only about 15 percent in the business
in Table 4-2 show the mean and median

do not have

of direct

passenger

the coefficient

the average

capacity

In markets,

passenger
regression
where

flights increases
categories,

any characteristics

increased

demand

respectively

by about

(based

.5

on the

than one).

substantially.

that would explain

The

it is a significant

for FRQ is very high (greater
per plane

category.21
coefficient

In

However,

the

why the coeffÉcients

are

Discussion
While

the markets

TS variable
(more

than

markets
from

with

is significant
1,500

(less than

each general

miles)

the most

elastic

in markets
where

750 miles).
category.

trip segment

of all distances.

TS is significant
22 The

study

For example,

elasticity

are short-haul

The proportion

is not significantly

also compared
the summary

of long-haul
different

the summary
coefficient

markets,

the

markets

from short-haul

results

of price

to the results

for leisure

passengers
is compared
to the average coefficient
of price for leisure passengers
in the
general
business to leisure category.
There are not any statistically
significant
differences
between
the categories.23
The FRQ

variable

long-haul
markets
than in short-haul

is significant

in markets

of all distances.

However,

the proportion

(more than 1,500 miles) where FRQ is significant
is significantly
markets
(less than 750 miles). 24 As before, the study compared

of

higher
the

21
In many of the markets, increases in direct flight frequency were probably due to increases in personal
income. Changes in demand in these markets were probably the result of changes in personal income or
other factors. Consequently, the frequency variable is not significant in the majority of the markets.
22
The differences are not significantly different at a 95 percent level of confidence using a two-tailed test for
difference between proportions.
23
The differences are not significantly different at a 95 percent level of confidence in all but two of the
30 tests. In those two tests, the differences are not significantly different at a 99 percent level of
confidence.
24
The differences are significantly different at a 95 percent level of confidence using a two-tailed test for
difference between proportions.
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summary

results

statistically

significant

Table
with

4-3

both

number

to the results

which

and

of markets

All

750-1500

All

>1500

Leisure

<750

Leisure

750-1500

Leisure

> 1500

Business

<750

Business

750-1500

Business

>1500

third

column

factor

category.

variables

variables

are

significant

of Results

2

3

15

2

1

15

0

1

5

7

1

2

3

3

in Table

4-3

shows

demand

the

number

in each

of markets

of the

of markets

where

both

are

The differences
difference

across

all passenger

For short-haul
on demand.
long-haul
haul

This
markets
markets.

are not significantly

between

None

0

number

25

Both

4

the

in short

of Markets)

6

shows

than

total

3

column

impact

regressions

the

3

FRQ

For

the

show

5

only

impact

running

results

2

where

an

any

4

of markets

categories.

not

10

number

have

are

8

the

is not.

when
The

FRQ (or
DUM)

TS

in explaining

is significant

[3]).

(by Number

shows

frequency

there

significant.

column

variable

before,

25

(equation

are

Comparison

As

the categories.

together

Trip Distance
(miles)
<750

The

the

4-3.

All

significant

variables

where

general

between

of the two

FRQ

Table

Passenger
Class

each

differences

shows

the TS

from

markets

categories
(less

is especially

and

true

in the

When

running

different

significant

750

than

1500

trip distances,
miles),

TS

leisure

miles),

FRQ

TS

the

with

level of confidence

both

the
the

than

fifth

TS

variable

business

is likelier

fourth

and

While

is likelier

and

is a

The

factor,

factors.

the regressions

at a 95 percent

only

categories.

is a significant

than

(greater

where

respective

for
FRQ

to

passenger
to have
TS

and

an
FRQ,

using a two-tailed

the

test for

proportions.

15

proportion
short-haul
Section

of long-haul
markets where FRQ is significant
markets in all of the passenger
categories.26

higher

than in

5

Extensions
5.1

is significantly

and

Implications

Extensions

The results
of point-to-point
markets
percent

of the study show that the average number
of trip segments
(the average
service) has a significant
effect on demand
in about 60 percent
of the

in the leisure
decrease

2.7 percent

in the average

(based

whole country,
impacts. 28

and business

on median

then these

A reduction

passenger

traffic,

increases

demand

number
values).

elasticity

in the average

point-to-point
to service)
number of trip segments

passenger

categories.27

of trip segments
If the median

measures

number

In both of these
increases

results

may be useful

of trip segments

demand

markets,

a one

by about

of the sample

are applied

in estimating

NAS-wide

(an increase

level

in the average

to the

level

of

will have dynamic effects on demand.
If changes
in the average
also have a significant
impact on 60 percent
of all domestic

then a one percent
by about

reduction

1.62 percent

system

in the average
wide

number

(.6 multiplied

of trip segments
by an elasticity

Consequently,
a one percent reduction
in the system wide average number
will increase demand by about 6.9 billion revenue
passenger
miles (RPMs)
passenger
traffic).29

of 2.7).

of trip segments
(based on 1996

26
The differences are significantly different at a 95 percent level Of confidence using a two-tailed test for
difference between proportions.
27
The all passenger category includes "mixed fare class" data not picked up in either the leisure or business
type categories. Consequently, the results for all-passengers may appear inconsistent with the sum of the
other categories.

For consistency, we do not use the results from the all-passenger

category in this section.

28
This section uses the median value of elasticities in markets where the trip segment variable is significant
in a broad-based sample of 47 city pairs that is reasonably representative of the NAS. Trip segments are
more significant in some markets than in others, while in other markets they are not significant at all. The
results of this study also provide information on analyzing these specific markets.
29
Airlines are likelier to reduce the average number of trip segments in markets where it matters most (often
short-haul markets). Airlines are likely to reduce trip segments only in markets where changes in trip
segments have a significant impact on demand. Improvements in the NAS implemented system wide
should result in airlines trying to exploit potential gains to trade in all these markets. However, airlines
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The resultsof the study showthatchangesin direct flight frequency(point-to-point
capacity)havea significant effect on demandin about40 percentand 15percentof the
marketsin the leisureandbusinesspassenger
categories,respectively.In thesemarkets,a one
percentincreasein direct point-to-pointflight frequencyincreasesdemandby about.5 and.8
percent,respectively. If the medianresultsof the sampleareappliedto the wholecountry,
thentheseelasticitymeasuresmay alsobe usefulin estimatingNAS-wide impacts.a0
If changesin direct point-to-pointflight frequencyalsohavea significantimpacton
40 percentand 15percentof all leisureandbusinesspassengertraffic, thenaonepercent
increasein direct flight frequencyincreasesleisuredemandby about.20 percent(an
elasticityof .5 multiplied by .4) andbusinessdemandby about.12percent(anelasticityof .8
multiplied by. 15). Basedon estimatesof leisureandbusiness'sshareof total traffic, the
systemwide elasticityis about. 18percent.31 Consequently,a onepercentincreasein system
wide direct flight frequencyincreasesdemandby about750million RPMs (basedon 1996
passengertraffic).32
Increasedconsumersurplusis probablythemainbenefit to societyof improvedaviation
servicefactors. The increasedRPMsfrom the increasein flight frequencyandthereduction
in averagetrip segmentsincreaseconsumersurplussincethey increaseconsumerwillingness
to pay. Consumersurplusis the differencebetweenwhat consumerspay andwhatthey
would havebeenwilling to pay for the product. Federalguidelineson "bestpractices"for
regulatoryactionscall for the useof consumersurplusin anydecision-makingprocess.
Theseguidelinesalsostipulate thatconsumersurplusbegiven a monetaryvaluewherever
possible.Basedon roughestimatesof the consumersurplusfor domesticpassenger
aviation
(Homan1998)andconstantprices,the consumersurplusincreasesannuallyby about
mayputmoreemphasis
in higherelasticity
markets.
Consequently,
thesystem
wideincrease
indemand
of
1.62percent
isprobably
understated.
30

Thissection
usesthemedian
valueof elasticities

in markets where the flight frequency variable is

significant in a broad-based sample of 47 city pairs that is reasonably representative of the NAS. Flight
frequencies are more significant in some markets than in others, while in other markets they are not
significant at all. The results of this study also provide information on analyzing these specific markets.

31
32

The December 7, 1997 Washington Post reported that about 70 percent of all passengers are leisure
passengers and that about 30 percent are business related passengers.
Airlines are likelier to increase flight frequencies in markets where it matters most. Airlines are likely to
increase
demand.
potential
markets.

flight frequencies only in markets where changes in frequency have a significant impact on
Improvements in the NAS implemented system wide should result in airlines trying to exploit
gains to trade in all these markets. However, airlines may put more emphasis in higher elasticity
Consequently, the system wide elasticity of. 18 percent is probably understated.
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$390

million

following
5.2

following

a one percent

a one percent

reduction

increase

in flight

in average

frequency

and about

$3.3

billion

trip segments.

Implications
This study

(FAA's)

Office

on the NAS
system

of System

and its users.

moves

traffic

is part of a project

towards

management

fly more precisely

in support

Capacity

to better

One of these

satellite-based

(CNS/ATM).

understand

decisions

A purpose

is the extent

CNS/ATM
initiatives
can reduce
airport and en route congestion.

en route

efficiency

Administration's
of FAA

decisions

that the air transportation

navigation,

of the CNS/ATM

user-preferred

flight").
relieving

Aviation

the implications

communications,

as well as to fly more

and allow

of the Federal

and surveillance/air

initiative

is to help airplanes

or wind-optimal

routings

("free

the inefficiencies
of operating
in the NAS
These infrastructure
improvements
should

for increased

flight frequency

and more

direct

service

by
increase
between

city pairs. Future increases
in the number of direct flights and reductions
in the average
number of trip segments
will also occur due to changes in airline operations
and airport
improvements.
In all these cases, the results of the study
demand
will put an increased
burden on NAS capacity.
History
frequencies
deregulation

to an even

services.
between

market

performing

extent.

growth

size, long range

Atlantic

aircraft

greater

and new city pair

intermediate
North

that the dynamic

impact

on

has shown that airlines have usually chosen to accommodate
growth by adding
and inaugurating
new city pair services.
Over the last 20 years factors such as
and improvements
in airplane performance
have influenced
airline market

development
frequency

show

Consequently,

even

airplanes

demonstrates

extended

this effect.

range

The smaller capacities
new city pairs.

more fully.

favors

twin engine

of many

increased
frequencies
value for consumers.

stimulated

what

beyond

Here,

has occurred

have

For example,

new services

the advent

operations

been

able to employ

the availability

and greater

of

frequencies.

The

of fuel efficient

(ETOPS)

of these planesalso

As noted in this report,
destination
provide
greater
demand

airlines

twin jet

has encouraged

promotes

nonstop

new

services

and fewer trips between
trip origin
The more valuable
air service has
due to just increased

incomes

and

and lower

fares.

As airlines continue
to increase
flight frequency
and add point-to-point
service, this dynamic
effect on demand will continue.
The results of this study show that continued
increases
can
have a significant
impact on demand.
This impact on demand can result in additional
infrastructure
services

result

requirements
in a 10 percent

for the NAS.
increase

average number of trip segments,
on 1996 passenger
traffic).

For example,

in flight

then demand

if long term

frequency
would

improvements

and a 10 percent

increase

by nearly

reduction
20 percent

in
in the
(based

The results of the study also have implications
for studying airline decision-making
and
the effect of hubs. The extensive
use of hubs in the deregulatory
era has allowed
for an
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increase

in the potential

connections
between

allowed

new city pairs,

many O&D
de mand. 33

city pairs.

Currently,
face tradeoffs
travelers.
Knowledge
tradeoffs.

airlines
between

Airlines

number

price

being

in the average
have resulted

increased
service

of trip segments

between

in significant

offering

and service

decision-making

number

These

of point-to-point
dynamic

effects

on

improving
service and cutting costs.
Airlines
travelers
and more time sensitive
business

between

done in fiscal

by airlines.

the introduction

face tradeoffs
between
price sensitive leisure

a study of hubs and airline
those tradeoffs.

33

factors

also face tradeoffs
work

offered

frequencies,

and a reduction
These

of the underlying
Future

of connections

for increased

year

service

elasticities

from

can help in understanding

1999 that integrates

processes

hubs or bypassing

will provide

these
a better

hubs.
these

relationships

into

understanding

of

The hub system gives passengers from spokes and passengers from hubs more fi'equent service than would
be possible with single plane service (as often was the case before deregulation). Hubs also resulted in
fewer passengers changing airlines (interlining) when they changed planes. For more information,
Morrison and Winston (1995), pp. 19-28.

see
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Appendix

Sample

and Regression
Table

Results
A-1.

City

City Pair
Manufacturing

Pairs

in the

Sample

Size

Distance

to Manufacturing

_.:'_i:,i:._I' i

Charlotte - Milwaukee

large to large

<750 miles

Cincinnati - Charlotte

large to large

<750 miles

Cincinnati - Detroit

large to large

<750 miles

San Jose - Detroit

large to large

>1500

General

Business

Chicago

- Chattanooga

miles

to Manufacturing

_..-.
large to small

<750 miles

Denver - Dayton

large to small

750-1499

Boston - Cleveland

large to large

<750 miles

San Diego - Detroit

large to large

> 1500 miles

Wichita

small to small

<750 miles

Seattle - Reno

large to small

<750 miles

Tampa - New Orleans

large to large

<750 miles

large to large

750-1499

miles

large to large

750-1499

miles

El Paso - Tucson

small to small

<750 miles

Omaha

small to large

750-1499

large to large

<750 miles

- Birmingham

General

Business

miles

to Leisure

Las Vegas

- Kansas

Cincinnati

- Orlando

City

- Orlando

Leisure

to Leisure

Orlando

- New Orleans

miles

21

Table

A-1.

City

Pairs

City Pair
General

Business

Washington

to General

- Raleigh

in the

Sample

(Continued)

Distance

Size
Business
large to small

<750 miles

large to small

<750 miles

St. Louis - Albuquerque

large to small

750-1499

Phoenix

large to large

<750 miles

large to small

<750 miles

large to large

<750 miles

- San Diego

large to large

<750 miles

San Antonio - Dallas

large to large

<750 miles

Sacramento

large to large

<750 miles

large to large

<750 miles

large to large

<750 miles

large to large

<750 miles

large to large

<750 miles

large to large

<750 miles

Nashville

- Raleigh

- Salt Lake City

Cincinnati

- Omaha

Washington
Phoenix

Tampa

- Nashville

- Salt Lake City

- Atlanta

Washington
Chicago

- Jacksonville

- Buffalo

Denver

- Kansas City

Pittsburgh

- Philadelphia

miles

Boston

- Washington

large to large

<750 miles

Seattle

- Los Angeles

large to large

750-1499

miles

large to large

750-1499

miles

large to large

750-1499

miles

large to large

750-1499

miles

large to large

750-1499

miles

large to large

750-1499

miles

San Diego - Dallas
Houston
Austin

- Miami
- Chicago

New York - Miami
Denver

")9

- Atlanta

Table

A-1.

City

Pairs

City Pair
General

Business

to General

in the

Sample

(Concluded)

Size

Distance

Business

:

Philadelphia

- St. Louis

large to large

750-1499

miles

Los Angeles

- Denver

large to large

750-1499

miles

Washington

- San Francisco

large to large

>1500

miles

large to large

>1500

miles

New York - Phoenix

large to large

>1500

miles

Seattle

- St. Louis

large to large

>1500

miles

Miami

- San Francisco

large to large

>1500

miles

Seattle

- Chicago

large to large

> 1500 miles

- Boston

large to large

> 1500 miles

- Los Angeles

large to large

> 1500 miles

Boston

- Houston

San Francisco
Washington

i

. _

:

23

Table
City Pair

Passenger

Manufacturing

A-2.

Class

Regression

Results

PI (t-stat)

fare (t-stat)

3.15 (6.75) t

-..58
(-3.28)t

4.16 (5.24)t

-1.04 (-3.86)I

with TS Only
TS (t-stat)

R= &N

to Manufacturing

Charlotte

all

-.922

(-4.31 )'

.92

51

.91

43

.65

35

.90

51

Milwaukee
.°

leisure

-.87 (-2.48):

.o

business
Cincinnati

all

.68 (.36)
NA

.81 f1.00)
-.75(-3.60)j

-I.95

(-3.35)

_

-.29 (-.89)

Charlotte"
leisure
,o)

Cincinnati

business
all

1.80 (2.54)"
NA
2.3E-5

(3.12) I

.34 (1.17)

-4.38 (--6.29)
l

.49

49

-.97(-I.42)

-3.90(-6.27)l

.85

44

-,,50
(-2.27)"

-I.03 (-.60)

.83

51

-5.02(-I.22)

.49

45

-9.97 (-2.62)

.81

51

Detroit"

San Jose-Detroit

leisure

-2.26E-5 (1.57)

business

.0002 f4.1I)'

all

.38 (.81)
NA

t

1.06 (3.5I)'

-I.16 (-3.35)I

.65

52

leisure

2.91 (2.79)'

-1.75 (-3.34)I

business

i .66 ( I.I 8)

.67

45

-.06(-.09)

.37

44

.56 (.38)

.49

51

.°

.32 (1.01)

,,,General Businessto Manufacturing
Chicago

all

NA

-.85

(-3.26)
j

, Chauanoofa
leisure

3.13 (3.18)'

business

NA

-.55(-2.25)
2

Denver-Da_non

all
leisure

,,-

24

business

-.02(-.15)
.08 f.39)
NA

-5.73 (-2.53)_-

.64

45

.76

51

-I.16 (-6.85)I

.70

51

-1.36 f-4.96)t"

.72

45

,.°

.35 (.63)

.I3 (.71)

Table
City

Pair

A-2.

Passenger

Regression
Class

Results

PI (t-stat)

with

TS Only

fare (t-star)

(Continued)
R= & N

TS (t-stat)

General Business to Manufacturing
Boston

all

• 16 (,40)

-.79 (-7.17)

I

NA

.56

51

-.54(-.46)

.41

45

Cleveland"
""

leisure

-.77 (-I.18)

-.89(-4.79)_

business

1.25 (.37)

-.38(-I.01)

all

,30 (I.14)

-1.23 (-I0.09)=

"

leisure

.82 (2.92)z

-1.35 (-I1.78)'

"

business

.57(38)

-.72(-3.34)'

all

.79 (1.33)

-.51(-2.21)"

""
San Diego

-2.74 (-2.95)_
.20 (.83)

.56 45
.69

52

-.02(-.09)

.77

49

-.15(-.35)

.34

51

.39

50

Detroit

Wichita

-1.80(-1.67)_

Birmingham"
leisure

4.03 (4.45)'

business

NA

-.38(-I.19)
NA

-.29(-.30)

.58 43

NA

NA

General Business to Leisure
Seattle-Reno"

all

1.72 (3.33)'

-.43f-2.13)
2

-3.23 (-5.86)'

.91

51

leisure

1.96(3.86)l

-.22(-I.01)

-3.21 (-5.88):

.90

45

business

1.85 (1.14)

-I.31 (-4.02)I

-2.68(-I.67)3

.74

51

all

.26 (.43)

-I.02 (-8.01):

-.54(-2.08)-"

.g7

51

,,o

"'"
Tampa
New

Orleans"
""

Kansas

leisure

I.I0 (.32)

""

business

12.27 t.99)

City

all

.74 0.97)"

-.57(-2.43)"

-.82f-1.65)3

.76 45

-I.14 (-4.28)t

-.87(-1.94)
_

.85

51

.22 (.50)

.78

51

.25 f.35)

,71

45

.89

51

-.48 (-2.75)'

Las Ve[as"
""
""

leisure
business

-I.04 f-.80)
.69 (.66)

-1.21 (-3.13)'
-1.34

(-2.96)l

-2.97(-6.03)_
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Table

A-2.

Regression

CitvP=ir [ Passenger
ClassI

Results

Vl(,-stat)

with TS Only

(Continued)

fare ft-stat)

TS (t-stat)

R= & N

-.61(-3.30)'

-1.77 (-.4.53f

.86

51

.90

45

General Business to Leisure
I

Cincinnati

all

1.50 (4.g9) I

Orlando"
u.

14.

El Paso-Tucson"

Omaha-Orlando"
i.

leisure

3.86 (5.32)I

-.22(-.64)

-3.31

(-5.89)

business

-.48f-.22)

-.40(-I.91)3

-2.19

(-2.96) 1

all

NA

-.82(-3.56)
i

leisure

-.75f-.86)

-I.07f-3.67)'

business

NA

NA

all

2.60 (6.10)l

-.54(-1.89f

_

.81

51

-.17 (-.55)

.84

51

-.2, (-.52)

.76

45

NA

NA

-1.29(-4.27)i

.85

47

leisure

2.86 (14.80)=

-.77f-6.14)
I

.02 (.03)

.87

49

business

4.16 (2.05)2

-1.27(-5.27)
I

-2.23 (--4.12)'

.93

40

-.75(-8.48f

-1.99(-I0.06)'

.93

51

-.13(-.66)

-2.26 (-7.22)I

.75

45

-.59(-2.04)'

-3.24(-6.03)'

.91

51

-.45 (-4.19)'

-.4 (-.14)

.52

46

-3.07(-I.07)

.78

40

NA

N_

Leisure to Leisure
Orlando

all

.42 (1.28)

New Orleans"
""

leisure

2.89 (4.12) i

""

business

13.63 ("1.33)

General Business to General Business
Washington

all

.38 (1.42)

""

leisure

.07 (.03)

""

business

Raleish"

26

NA

-.44(-1.69)
3
NA

Table
City

Pair

A-2.

I Passenger

Regression

Class

Results

PI (t-stat)

with TS Only
fare (t-star)

(Continued)

TS (t-stat

1

R'

& N

General Business to General Business
Nashville

all

.81 (7.24) t

-.59 (-3.95) I

leisure

!.58 (9.50) I

-.73 (-2.82)

business

-.77 (-.81)

all

2.10 (3.1 I) I

leisure

5.59

-.35 (-2.04)-"

.92

51

-I.93 (-5.92)t

.91

45

-1.39 (-2.43)_"

.71

51

-.37(-1.09)

.89

52

NA

-.04 (-.08)

.78

49

--56 (-I .77) 3

-.14 (-.30)

.87

49

-.44(--56)

.92

51

-2.80 (-2.37)"

.74

45

-2.77 (-2.26)2

.88

51

Raleigh"
6,'

L,*

St. Louis

I

.52 (.85)
-.78 (-4.88) I

Albuquerque

business

(10.49) I

10.94 (2.75) t

all

.80 (I.55)

-.91 (-4.97)

""

leisure

1.51 (2.20)"

-.16(-.52)

""

business

-1.25 (-62)

-I.64 (-5.48)i

all

NA

-I.08 (-4.07)
I

-55(.70)

.55

51

-.73 (-2. I 1)"

.91 (.94)

.39

45

Salt Lake City

I

Phoenix"

Cincinnati
Omaha"

Washington

leisure

-.78 f-.74)

business

-5. I I (-1.44)

.26(.58)

all

.77 (3.63) I

-.26 (-1.72) _

-.05 (-.29)

.43 {.53)

.59

49

-.38(-.89)

.42

51

-.80

Nashville"
,,,

Phoenix

leisure

1.12 (3.73) I

business

.85 (I.53)

all

.91 (3.65) t

.06 (.21)
-1.14

(-4.34)

_

.51

45

-2.58 (-8.48)I

(-1.39)

.77

51

-14.04(-1.13)

.65

52

-I 2.67

.74

45

.90

45

San Diego
,.,

leisure

NA

business

3.79

.30 (.67)

(-2.64)'

,°°

(3.26) I

-1.41 (-3.15)

I

30.54

(.84)
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Table
City

Pair

A-2.

Passenger

Regression
Class

Pl (t-star)

Results
[

with TS Only
fare {t-stat)

(Continued)
R = &N

TS (t-stat)

General Business to Genera] Business
San Antonio

all

.20 (2.96/

-.54(-4.08)'

-4.55 (-.82)

.44

52

-.96(-4.68)l

-29.09 (-5.42)j

.81

45

Dallas
leisure

NA

business
Salt Lake City

-1.18

all

(-8.54)_

-.98(-7.35)'

-26.99 (-I.90)_
.53 (.83)

.93

49

.92

51

Sacramento"

""
Tampa-Atlanta"

Washington

leisure

1.50 (1.67) ]

business

-1.80 (-I.44)

all

.29 (1.43)

-.65(-2.31)2

-3.05 (-2.48)

2

.84

45

1.18(1.52)

191

32

-.76 (-8.70)
t

51

-I.03 (-5.31)'

-I.31 (-.82)

.94

leisure

3.46 (5.51 )=

-.46(-2.12):

-2.91 (-1.68)_

.94

45

business

NA

-.48(-2.17)*"

-I0.07 (-3.12)I

.81

51

-.59(-2.90)I

.69

52

all

.95 (6.61) I

-.90(-7.29)l

leisure

1.66 (3.I I )'

-.02(-.II)

-I.22 (-2.87)'

.65

45

business

.50 (.72)

-.93(-2.84)t

-1.57 (-2.44)2

.40

51

-.30 (-.53)

-.69 (-I 1.74) =

-.O2(-.08)

.80

48

.65 (.66)

-.63(-2.48)z

Jacksonville

Chicago

all

Buffalo"
leisure
business
Denver

all

-2.46 f-1.38)
.84 (5.14) =

-1.83 (-2.1I):

.52

45

-3.33(-5.59)'

.82

47

-.64(-I0.29)'

-5.11 (-3.52/

.90

52

-.54(-5.95)'

-4.77 (-2.58)'*

.84

49

-.95(-3.23)'

-7.58(-3.19)i

7_

_1

.58 (.98)

Kansas City
leisure
business

2S

Table
City Pair

A-2.

Passenger

Regression
Class

Results

with

TS Only

fare (t-star)

PI (t-star)

I

(Continued)

TS (t-star}

R2 & N

General Business to General Business
Pittsburgh

all

1.00 (6.74) _

-.70 (-12.00)

t

-2.27 (-I.24)

.89

52

I

.76

45

-8.44(-I0.89)n

.91

51

.66

51

-I.81(-1.73)3

.71

45

.08 (.17)

-3.15(-1.22)

.58

51

Philadelphia

o,*

Boston

leisure

2.28 (.87)

-.93 (-I.97)"

business

-I .47 (.54)

.60 ( 1.347

all

1.07 (8.07) j

-14.96

-.74 (-11.20)

t

(-3.52)

.28 (.53)

Washington"

""
Seattle

leisure

2.84 (8.37) n

business

NA

all

3.27 (4.43) t

-.02 (-.19)

-4.61(-3.00)
I

.63

51

leisure

3.62 f3.78}_

-.04 (-.36)

-3.18 (-2.0I)"

.64

45

business

12.66 ('I
.69)3

-.25(-1.20)

-.84 (-.51
)

.81

51

all

.83 (4.00} I

-.83(-6.48)t

-.34(-1.51)

.80

51

leisure

2.24 (3.62) n

-.64 f-2.44)-"

-.34 (-.80)

.80

45

business

NA

all

NA

-.76 (-6.42)

.83

51

leisure

.22 f.18}

-.39(-I.70)_

-2.66 t-2.25}"

.77

45

-2.23(-3.47)I

.91

51

-.84

(-4.52)

u

Los Angeles"
.,

""

San Diego
Dallas"

Houston-Miami"

Austin-Chica_o

NA

NA
t

-1.47

NA
(-1.85) J

all

-2.91 (-I.09)

-.69(-2.90)t

all

2.32 (9.70)i

-.56 (-5.39)

-.60t-1.44)

.90

52

leisure

2.64 (10.12)a

-.52 (-4.08} I

-1.36(-4.10)*

.91

49

business

1.65 (2.82)i

-.41 (-I.90) l

-I.31

.33

52

I

f-3,45) T
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Table
City

Pair

A-2.

Passenger

Regression
Class

Results

P[ (t-stat1

with

TS Only

fare (t-stat)

(Continued)

TS (t-stat)

R z &N

General Business to Genera] Business
New York

all

.15 (.60)

-.46 (-3.44) I

-2.32 (-2.72)l

.49

52

Miami
"*

leisure

1.78{3.30)l

-.46(-2.27)
z

-2.36 (-I.68)3

.79

45

""

business

NA

-.85(-3.34)*

-5.60(-7.31)l

.92

51

all

1.02(7.52)i

-I.12f-6.07)*

-.29 (-.56)

.81

52

-I,09 (-3.42)
t

-.31 (-.46)

.88

45

-.60f-1.88)
3

-1.47 (-1.527

.83

48

-I.I0(-5.19)l

-1.55 (-2.5I)"

.52

51

-.98(-3.76)l

-2.39(-3.39)I

.73

45

-I .57 (-2.65)l

.83

5I

.85

52

Denver-Atlanta
""

leisure

"*

business

Philadelphia

all

1.36(I.69)3

St. Louis"
""

leisure

3.48 (5.07)l

"*

business

-I.57(*.l
3)

all

1.13(4.95)_

-.71 (-13.37)I

-.48(-.93)

discount

3.09 (3.47)*

-.81 (-,4.95)
i

-.26 (-.24)

.82

45

business

-7.29(-.81
)

-.06(-.13)

.20 (.24)

.91

51

-.42(-.50)

-.34(-2.34)"

-I .29 (-4.10)*

.67

47

.87

44

.77

50

.62

52

.61

45

Los Angeles

-I.37

(-2.94)l

Denver
4**

Washington

all

San Francisco"

,o •

Boston -HOUStOn

leisure

1.95(4.08)'

-I.08(..4.90)
I

NA

business

1.09 f6.53)l

-I.02 (-3.38)I

-I.25

all

1.18(4.25)_

-.73(-7.01)
_

leisure

1.28(1.57)

-.69f-3.50)I

-I.58

(-3.02)

I

-I.08 (-4.44)a

-3.35

(-7.20)

I

business

30

-.05(-.04)

(-2.16):

-.73 (- 1.9173

R7

_I

Table A-2.
Cit_' Pair

Passenger

Class

Regression
I

Results

PI (t-stat)

with TS Only
fare (t-stat)

I

(Concluded)

TS (t-stat)

R2 & N

General Business to General Business
New

York

all

.83 (4.42) ]

-.57(-5.21)t

-1.15(-3.45)I

.76

52

discount

1.65 (5.64)l

-.60(-3.50)l

-I.60 (-4.07)l

.86

45

business

NA

-.66(-3.33)i

-2.83(-6.36)

.73

5l

,,Phoenix

,jl

Seattle-St.

Louis

Miami

all

.51(.97)

-1.47 (-5.86)
l

leisure

1.40 (2.75)l

-l.71(-5.70)_

business

-I.73 f-.52)

-1.05f-3.30)l

all

NA

-1.07 (-5.93)l

-.14(-.47)

-.76(-390) I
-.27(-.92)

I

-I.08 f-1.66)
3

.68

52

-.54(-.84)

.73

49

.34 (.51)

.68

51

.71

51

-.06t-.t5)

.67

45

-.41f-l.01)

.92

51

-.24(-.42)

.61

52

.71

45

San Francisco"
leisure
**°

Seattle-Chica_zo
6,"

°*°

San Francisco

business
all

1.28(3.18) I

-I.17(-5.43)l

leisure

2.08 t2.18)2

-2.14 (-7.23)

1

1.15 tl.225

business

-2.74t-1.265

-1.23

I

-I .79 (-2.28):

all

.80(2.73)l

(-3.05)

-.77(-5.45)
I

.70

51

-1.58 (-3.31)

I

.58

52

I

.67

49

Boston
*°

,L •

Washington

leisure

2.21 (6.955 I

-2.74 (-3.995

business

NA

NA

NA

-.44(-I.4-4)

.73

48

.74

45

all

1.56 (2.41)"

-.44 (-4.34)I

Los Angeles'"
L° o

leisure
business

-1.16(-5.11)I
-I.47(-5.9851

.73 (I.01)
-2.30f-5.93)_

RS

_1

Legend:
1. Significant at a 99 percent level of conference
2. Significant at a 95 percent level of confidence
3. Significant at a 90 percent level of confidence
* Adjusted for first order serial correlation
** Adjusted for fourth order serial correlation
NA. Adequate data not available or spurious correlation results when variable included
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Table
City

Pair

Passenger

Manufacturing
Charlotte

A-3.

Regression

Class

Results

PI (t-stat)

with FRQ

fare (t-stat)

(t-slat)

all

3.75

(4.02f

-.82 (-4.09)

I

.57 (1.79f

.83

26

-.96 (-2.76)

I

.56(I.17)

.80

26

.20 (.23)

.31

26

-.35(-I•36)

.90

51

leisure

6.60

(3.09) t

business

-3.47

(-1.42)

all

-3.43 (-i.52)

-.79 (-3.8 I)'

leisure

2.97 (.80)

-.36 (-.95)

business

NA

,,.

-I.51

(-I .46)

Charlotte"

Cincinnati

all

-2.70

2.7E-5 (3.44f

(-3.07) I

-.54 (-2.50)"

Detroit"
leisure
business
San Jose-Detroit

R _ &N

to Manufacturing

Milwaukee"

Cincinnati

FRQ

Only

all

-I.69E-5

(-I.I

.000 i (3.41 )l
.97 (16.60f

3)

.06 (.12)
NA
-.98 (-7.63f

-.84(-1.31)

.55

45

-.04f-.07)

.69

44

.16(1.06)

.83

51

1.32 (2.34)"-

.53

45

-.76 f-.69)

.78

51

.24 (3.56) ]

.65

52

.57

49

NA

.53

44

• I 1 (1.93) 3

.52

51

.59

45

.76

51

(DUM)
"'

leisure

1.92 (4.75f

-.75(-4.40)_

,,.

business
Genera]
Chicago

.42 (4.74f
(DUM)

Business

1.50 ( 1.33)

.36 f1.35)

to Manufacturing
aJI

NA

-.81 (-3.40f

Chattanoo[a"
(DUIVI)
leisure

3.19

(3.37f

-.69(-I .53)

13 (1.14)
(DUM)

business

NA

.48 (.87)

.14 (1.13)
(DIIM_
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Table
City

Pair

A-3.

Passenger

Regression
Class

Results

with

Pi It-stat)

FRQ

Only

fare (t-star)

(Continued)

FRQ (t-slat)

Rz & N

General Business to Manufacturing
Denver-Dayton"

all

-.13 (-.89)

-I.15 (-6.41)
I

.13 (2.35):

.69

51

.72

45

.72

51

-.13(-I.01)

.55

51

-.05(-.32)

.40

45

(DUM5
,.°

leisure

.07 (.35)

-1.38(-5.20)*

.06 (.87)
fDUM)

.o

business

-.86 (-1.52)

-.01 (-.05)

.01 (.06)
(DUM5

Bor4on

all

• 10 (.20)

-.80 (-6.37/

Cleveland'
.-

.o

San Diego

leisure

-.83 (-1.225

-.92(-4.715'

business

4.40 ( 1.545

-.56(-I.215

all

.02 (.03)

-1.19

leisure

.53 (1.95) 3

-1.30 f-I0.245'

business

.60(.72)

-.g8 (-3,785j

all

.75 (1.20)

-.52(-2.19)"

(-7.46)
t

-.51 (-.89)
.17 (I.94)

.48 45
J

.68

51

.22 (3.11)'

.76

44

-.02(-.II5

.33

46

.06 (31 )

.35

50

.58

43

Detroit"

Wichita
Birminfham"

(DUM)
leisure

4.01 (4.48)]

-.35(-I.16)

-.04 (-.25)
(DUM)

"

business

NA

NA

NA

NA

.58 f1.82)_

-.36f-2.23)"

.70 (9.61/

.92

51

.96 (3.17)I

-.12f-.77)

.72 (11.277'

.92

45

-.63 (-I 33)

74

_;I

General Businessto Leisure
Seattle-Reno"
""
""

all
leisure
business

2.35 fl.70)_

-1.64 (-4.86)
_ "
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Table A-3.
City Pair

Passenger

Regression

Class

with FRQ

PI (t-stat)

General Business to Leisure
Tampa

Results

all

fare (t-staQ

.29 (39)

Only (Continued)
[

FRQ

-I .15 (-7.86)'

Kansas

1.13 (.40)

business

.71 (.11)

all

City

-.45 (-I .81 )J
-I .50 (-5.37)

.65 (2.13) 2

I

-.88 (-3.68)

I

L Las Vegas'

Cincinnati

.86

51

•16 fl.13)

.75

45

-.27(-1.38)

.85

51

-.01(-.09)

.80

51

45

leisure

-.47(-.48)

-I.13(-2.99)I

-.36f-1.32)

.71

business

3.17 (1.52)

-I.51 (-2.74)'

-.04(-.07)

.82 51

all

1.52 (7.22)'

-I.17(-6.96f

.09 (1.20)

.81

52

-.94 (-I .98) 2

-.20(-I.08)

.80

45

-.53 (-2.44)

.12(.68)

.77

51

•20 (3.47)'

.86

46

•27 (3.58)i

.82

40

Orlando
leisure

4.41 (4.16)t

business
El Paso-Tucson"

Omaha

R2 & N

-.01 (-.15)

New Orleans"
leisure

(t-star)

.84 (.30)

all

NA

leisure

-.73(-.78)

2

-.94 ¢-4.35) _
-I.II

(-4.29)

j

business

NA

NA

all

1.37(3.53)'

-.58(-2.I 0)"

NA

Orlando"

NA

.72 (5.64)_

.84

51

(DUM)
leisure

2.88 (12.13)'

-.78(-6.05)t

-.01 (-16)

.87

49

.94

40

(DUM)
business

1.80(1.09)

-I,05

(-4.08)

I

fDUM)

Leisure to Leisure
Orlando

all

-.48(-.93)

-.90(-5.02)
l

.33 (2.51)"

.80

51

-.20(-.42)

.50 {2.01 )-"

.56

45

New Orleans"
"'"

leisure

""

business

2.33 (5.30)_

-2.47(-.64)
-3.16(-I.48)

-I.87 (-5.82)
j

-.22 (-.63)

,84

51

-.46(-4.51 )1

-.03(-.22)

.52

46

-.45(-I.68)3

.17 (,53)

.77

4O

General Business to General Business
Washington

all

.47 (.94)

Raleigh"
leisure
business
Nashville

all

.78(-,23)
NA
.79 (5.83f

NA

NA

-.55(-3.71)'

.09 (I.43)

.2

.50 (3.30)

NA

Raleigh"
leisure
business

34

f.80)

.55 (.84)

-.26 ¢- _ol

_

.92

51

.88

45

,_-r

_,

Table
City

Pair

A-3.

I Passenger

Regression
Class

Results

with FRQ

PI lt-statt

fare (t-stat)

Only
[

FRQ

(Continued)
(t-star)

[

Rl & N

General Business to General Business
St, Louis

all

1.93 (3.1 I) I

-.68(-4.21)'

.24 (2.19)2

.89

52

.22(1.41)

.79

49

Albuquerque
leisure

4.99

business

8.50 (2.18)"

all

""
""

"'"
Salt Lake

f7.69) I

NA
-.66(-2.12)"

,75 (I.76)I

.88

49

.17 (.32)

-.85(-6.06)t

.45 (3.90)i

.93

51

leisure

1.01 (1.09)

-.48f-1.39)

.22 (.64)

business

1.43 (2.71)t

City

Phoenix"

Cincinnati

all

NA

-I.72 (-5.37)'

.71

45

-.23(-.29)

.87

51

.09 (1.42)

.56

51

-I.13 (-4.40)
t

Omaha"
(DUM)
""

leisure

-1.59 (-I.54)

-.74 (-2.I8)'

.10 (I.01)

.39 45

(DUM)
""

business

NA

.32 (.89)

.19 (.83)

.57

49

.43

51

(DUM)
Washington

all

.82(3.60)t

-.30(-1.93)
-_

.14(1.33)

Nashville"
,,,

Phoenix

leisure

1,23 f3.74)_

business

.97£65)

all

.78 (3.96)l

-.06(-.29)

.27 (1.54)

.52

45

.36 (.64)

.44 (1.09)

.43

51

•68 (4.18)t

.74

52

1.38(1.67)I

.72

45

-.58(-2.17)z

San Diego

San Antonio

leisure

NA

business

3,81 (3,89) _

all

.65 (1.44)

.21 (2.60) I

-I.40 (-3.03)
l

.43(.59)

.90

45

_

-.03(-.23)

.44

52

-.41f-l.51)

-.49f-l.15)

.83

45

.92

49

.93

51

-.01(-.03)

.82

45

NA

.91

32

-.58 (-4.48)

Dallas
leisure

Salt Lake City

NA

business

.94 (7.21 )l

-1.25(-I0.86)z

all

.19 (.29)

-.97(-7.79)t

leisure

1.49 fl.21)

-.90 (-3 10) I

business

.17 (.10)

-I.41 (-5.41) _

.09 t51 )
.37 (1.74)_

Sacramento"
.°

Tampa-Atlanta"

all

.47 (2.28)"

-.75(-9.49)'

.07 (I.10)

.94

51

-.68f-2.62)i

-.18 f-.81)

.93

45

-.91 (-4.03)

-.38 (-I.13)

77

ql

°.,

3.31
leisure
business

NA

(446)

t

I

35

Table

A-3.

Regression

Results

with FRQ

Only

(Continued)
&N

General Business to General Business
Washington

all
.7l (5.37)u

-.93(-7.30)I

Jacksonville

.06(2.19)"

.67

52

•I.._..33
(2.02)"

.61

45

,° °

leisure
(-.06)
.°

business
Chicago

(.01)

all

-.31(-.56)

Buffalo"
1,°

leisure

j,I

-.70(-13.02)t

.14 (i.32)

(.43)

business

(I.33)

1.23 (4.42) j

-.72(-I1.45)_

Seattle

all

49

.70

51

.89

52

.71

45
5I

.66

51

.71

45

NA

NA

NA

NA

-1.28 (-.79)

-.09 (-.81)

.83 (2.92) =

.60

51

.65

45

.83

51

-.05(-.26)

.79

51

-.43 (-1.08)

.80

45

pusiness
I-.74)
all

.I l (2.15)2

Dallas'
leisure
business
all

f3.0,4)
I
NA

-.79 (-5.60) n

-.62 (-2.37):
NA

NA

NA
(-8.20) J

,,-

leisure

(.02)

NA

.24 (1.39)

.83

51

.75

45

(-.89)

.90

51

.15 (I36) 3

96)

all
f-3.03)'
all
-5.84)*
leisure
business

36

.82

(2.23) 2

3 (-.24)

Houston-Miami"

52

leisure

,,°

San Diego

.87

.69
-.05 (-.71)

(1.49)
business

47

(.30)

leisure

,,°

i, °

1.70) s
NA

.96 (6.69) I

leisure

,,°

48

.68

.04 (.40)

NA

all

all

-.78(-I1.55) i

(8.20)*

business

Pittsburgh

(-.42)

.75 (3.48)j

leisure

,,°

51

.80

45
(-.96)

all

,°

.34

-.21)

business

Denver

.08(.64)

-.67(-9.49)=

:84 (9.95)r
06 (.02)

.91

52

'2.51)z

.89

49

!5 (-A.4)

.28

51

Table

A-3.

,-----_______

Regression

Results

with FRQ

Only

(Continued)

_(t-stat)

essto Genera/

I

I_R 9(t-sta_

all
-.56 (-1.13)

-.69 (-5.72)

f
•09 (.56)

ISure
51/'less

.42

52

l
45
51
52
,15
48
•03 (/5)

.46

5!

45
51
-.71(-15.67)J

• 16 (2.35)"

.86

52

45
-.20 (-l.ll)

51
.12 (I.32)

.57

47

44
-.21 (-.42)
•36 (2.65)

_1.31)

50
_

46

I

46

37

Table

A-3.

Business
New York

Regression

Results

with

FRQ

Only

(Concluded)

to General

all
-.35(-3.27)I

Phoenix

.26 (3.39)i

.76

52

leisure
business

51

all
'4

45

NA
E.54)
'.96)

leisure
business

Miami

52

.66) _

.74

49
51

all

NA

-I.09(-6.17)i

-.07
(-I,14)

.72

51

leisure
-.96)
NA
all

NA

NA

NA

12)
I)l

.it

leisure

7

5i
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Legend:
I. Significant

at a 99 percent

level of conference"

2. Significant

at a 95 percent

level of confidence

3. Significant
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level of confidence
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for first order

** Adjusted
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serial correlation

for fourth order serial correlation
data not available

or spurious

correlation

results

when variable

included
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Aviation

Administration

(NCAA)

is responsible

Conference

for

building

and

operation of the Norwegian
airport system, and the air traffic management
systems. The airport network for scheduled transport consists of 26 short take-off and landing airports, and 15
full length runway airports. The number of passengers
arrived/departed
on domestic routes
amounts to approx 19 millions per year for a population of 4.5 millions, placing Norwegians
among the most frequent flyers in Europe.
In 1998, the Ministry of Transport and Communications
initiated a national transport planning
process, encompassing
all the transport sectors. The report from this work will be launched in
late autumn 1999. To be able to select profitable projects across sectors, the need for an instrument for economic appraisal in the aviation sector has emerged.
In the autumn '98, the Standing Advisory Committee
(SAC) for Cost-Benefit
Analysis (CBA)
in the Norwegian
public sector launched a final report, giving methodological
advice to future
CBA work. Simultaneously,
Molde College and the Institute of Transport Economics
were
commissioned
by the NCAA
to develop methods for-economic
appraisal
in the aviation
sector. This work was supposed to be developed with reference to the recommendations
from
the SAC report, and the experiences
sector, the road sector in particular.
This

paper

presents

the

main

from CBA work carried out in other parts of the transport

contents

addressed,
such as the handling
of project
dency, and the methodology
for analysing

of this

dents. The CBA methodology
in the aviation
the arguments
for some important divergences
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work.
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risk and uncertainty,
projects influencing

sector is also compared
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problems

will

be
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Introduction:
Economic
NCAA 2. Decision-making
sea ?

and financial
analysis
within
between the devil and the deep

the
blue

The NCAA has a somewhat special role in the Norwegian
transport sector compared to other
authorities
like e.g. the Public Roads Directorate
(NPRD) and the Railtrack
administration
(NSB). NCAA's
role is special due to the fact that the framework
for the economic activities
is given by revenues from aviation taxes and commercial
activities
These revenues amounted to approximately
NOK 2.7 billions in 1997.
Although
majority

toll financing
has become very popular
of road projects
are financed by public

on Norwegian
funding.
When

related

public
public

to the airports.

roads, the
investments

vast
are

considered,
the natural question is: How will this project serve the community?
What are the
total costs, and the total benefits of the project? Only projects where the total benefits exceed
the total costs (and where equity problems
are acceptable)
should be recommended
for
implementation.
Because
this is such a natural setting for investments
based on public
funding, the NPRD has developed
tools for economic
impact assessment
over the past 30
years. Any proposed
road project is now subject to a thorough
and broad analysis that
includes external effects (time, accidents, environment),
aimed at visualising
the true economic costs and benefits to society.
Whereas politicians
have demanded broad and thorough
analysis from the NPRD for years,
the NCA.A may seem to have been left alone with their prioritising,
because they "do not
demand public funding". The picture is not quite as simple as that: For larger investments,
like new airports et cetera, politicians have engaged in the debate. The general picture is still
the same: Almost any road investment is subject to public scrutiny, whereas the NCAA has a
more autonomous
position because they are exempted from the annual public debate on the
use of scarce public funds.
Investments

in the

Norwegian

financial
cashflow
analysis
guidelines and requirements

aviation

sector

have

therefore

been

made

alone. Still, a lot of investments
are effectively
established by institutions
like ICAO and ECAC.

on the

basis

determined

of
by

The fact that investment
decisions made by the NCAA affect other parties, should indicate
that there is a need for a broader perspective in the analysis of such projects. In its efforts to
optimise the transport system as a whole, the Ministry of Transport
has called for actions to
improve cross modal planning in recent years. This also means that the methodology
with
respect to analysis procedures
should be harmonised.
This is the reason why the NCAA wants
to develop a tool for incorporating
impacts for passengers,
operators and the environment
into
their analysis.
Making

priorities

subject

to a full economic

impact

analysis

instead

of a more

narrow

financial
cashflow
approach,
may significantly
alter the portfolio
of projects
that reaches
implementation.
Many investments
may very often represent a financial loss for the NCAA,
but still be good projects when benefits for the operators
or the passengers
are taken into
account.

Typical

: Nor_egian

Civil Aviation

benefits

AuthoriD'

that may justify

such projects

are:

•

Reductions

in travel time

•

Reductions

in accident

•

Reductions

in environmental

The

dilemma

through
funding.

risk

of the NCAA

hazards
is, however,

still present:

It still has

revenues from user charges and other commercial
This must be combined
with the "public service

passengers

and operators

into account

when

deciding

to finance

activities,
obligation"

its activities

rather than from public
to take the welfare of

on how to spend

this revenue.

As a

result of this, the NCAA may very well face decision dilemmas where the financial
says one thing, while the economic impact analysis give other recommendations.

analysis

Many

role is a

other civil aviation

authorities

are in the same,

- or similar,

situations.

Their

mixture of running
a business and carrying
out the responsibilities
of providing
public
services. Whereas the road administrations
around the world have done a lot of development
work to establish a good methodology
for a broad impact assessment,
the work that is done in
the aviation

sector

is far more limited.

The next three

sections

present

some

such an effort. Section 2 gives a brief overview of cost benefit analyses
sector. Section 3 discuss some important
factor prices used in CBA.

issues related

some methodological
topics, and in section 5 we give some brief examples to illustrate
the broader view of the impact analysis is necessary. Section 6 provides some conclusions.

2

Cost-Benefit
overview

CBA is a systematic

analysis

attempt

(CBA) in the aviation

to measure,

value and weight

sector-

together

to

(CBA) in the aviation
Section 4 deals with
why

an

all the costs and benefits

with respect to whether the project is profitable
or not. One main purpose with CBA is to
provide a basis for the choice and the ranking of projects. Therefore,
it is important that the
analyses are comparable
across different projects. CBA gives the net changes in the use of
real resources,
measured
in monetary
terms. The most important
economic
effects to be
analysed within the aviation sector are:

•

Changes in generalised
travel costs, often in terms of changes
changes in air ticket costs and transport costs to/from airports
consideration.

•

Environmental

•

Effects

•

Investments

Network

effects,

like noise and emissions.

on safety.

effects

and operating

costs.

are relevant

when

effects on the generalised
for different operators.
Figure

in time costs. If present,
should also be taken into

2.1 illustrates

flight

corridors

travel costs for passengers

the flow of resources

and routes

are

affected.

These

in other parts of the network,

in the aviation

sector that is relevant

include

as well as

in CBA.
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2.1

The resource

flow in the aviation

j

sector

Figure 2.1 presents the flow of economic resources between agents in the aviation sector. The
upper part of the figure describes
the present flows in the Norwegian
aviation
sector. The
system is driven by the passengers willingness to pay (WTP). One part of the total WTP is the
actual payments made through the air tickets. These payments constitute
the revenue side for
the airlines. The cost side for the airlines consists of various charges for the NCAA's
services,
taxes to the government,
and costs concerning operations
and capital. The air charges constitute the revenue side for the NCAA, to cover the costs of different services. The revenues for
the State consist of taxes for CO2, and a seat tax. The PSO tax is in brackets because taxes to
cover the expenses

for operation

of routes under Public

Service

Obligation

are still not levied.

The lower part of the figure shows the situation when a project is implemented
that alter the
travel costs. The changes in generalised travel costs is the main factor on the benefit side, and
should be calculated
against the costs for airlines and the NCAA, where the external effects
are also taken into consideration.

Eventual

network

effects

should

also be a part of the picture.

A CBA should be considered because frequently there are no reason to expect that changes in
air ticket prices will be able to capture the changes in consumer surplus that is caused by the
project. To illustrate this, figure 2.2 shows a situation where the changes in air ticket revenues
do not reflect the changes in economic benefits for the passengers.
Consider two airports with different demand elasticity. A reduction in generalised
from Go to Gl gives an increase in consumer surplus 03) and increased air ticket
The difference in R does not coincide with the difference
in B.

travel costs
revenues R.

Price,

costs

Price, costs

J

r

°°Ira

GI

GI

D

XO

Figure

2.2

X 1

Revenues

In the aviation
ries:

sector,

Traffic

Xo

(X)

and consumer

XI

Traffic

surplus

CBA is recommended

for

the following

1. Projects motivated from standards or regulations.
ween the project and standards/regulations,
there

most common

Projects

with

environmental

parties that are not included
environmental
externalities

effects.

CBA

should

project

catego-

If there is an unambiguous
link betis no point in doing a CBA. A cost-

efficiency
analysis should in most cases be sufficient. However,
CBA if there are alternatives
with different effects for the benefit
side.
2.

(X)

there may be a case for
side or the external cost

be done if there

are effects

for third

in the NCAAs financial analyses. These effects may be either
or travel costs. If the environmental
effects are internalised

through procedures
for recycling/disposal,
or the implicit costs of choosing
a more
environmental-friendly
design are captured in the financial analysis, then a CBA may be
omitted. The underlying assumption
is that there are no effects in the traffic market.
3.

CNA/ATM/1LS-services.
When
considering
improved
equipment
for
navigation,
communication
and instnmaent landing, a CBA may be carried out if alternative routing of
flights affect travel time, or if accident risk or the environment
is affected. If standards or
regulations demand such items, refer to point 1 above.

4.

Terminals. A CBA is relevant if the travel time is affected or if there are changes in airline
costs (from e.g. delays or operating hours) that are not internalised.
Small projects are
normally subject to a financial analysis only.

5.

Extended

runways.

These

projects

normally

affect

regularity,

the size of aircraft

to be

served, and possibly the accident risk (however, one should be aware of "risk compensation" here). As a main rule, CBA should be carried out for such measures.
So far, the CBA within

the aviation

sector in the future

seem to be carried out comparable

to

what is actually done in e.g. the road sector. However, there are some methodological
issues
which become apparent when analysing projects within the aviation sector. A couple of these
issues are addressed
in section 4. The next section discusses
a bundle of important
factor
prices concerning intangibles in the CBA.

3

Factor

prices

3.1

Genera/

To evaluate all consequences
of planned investments
in the air sector in money terms, we will
find that in many cases there are no markets for the effects that we want to include in the
analysis. In other cases we do not recognise the market price as a measure
the consequences.
This may be due to monopolies
or other market failures.

of the real value of

The methods

borders.

to evaluate

factor

prices

should

be consistent

not mean that prices should be the same all over,
prices should be consistent across sector borders.

across

sector

but that the principles

This does

for calculation

of

The main methods of assessing these unit prices are in some way or another based upon the
society's
willingness
to pay for reducing or increasing
certain variables.
These methods are
mainly:
•

Willingness-to-pay

•
•

Damage cost analyses.
lndirect valuation

Normally,
necessary

3.2

(WTP) surveys

damage
cost analyses
will include
an element
of WTP, because
to take into account also the costs of statistical lives and reduced health.

Value

it is often

of time

The value of travel time savings is frequently the largest element in CBAs for projects in the
transport sector. The purpose of the trip is an important criterion when calculating
this effect.
Here we have chosen to concentrate
only on private travel and business travel. Commonly
the
value of travelling
time that alternatively
might be spent working,
has been calculated
by
applying gross wage costs. For leisure travel the common approach has been to apply the net
wage rate, since that is the amount that the wage earner must sacrifice
to have additional
leisure time.
In recent years there have been several attempts to estimate the value of time (VOT). Among
these is the Norwegian
value of time study (Ramjerdi
et al 1997). The main purpose of the
study was to produce VOT estimates for CBAs in the transport sector. The scope of the study
was to estimate the VOT for travel with cars, buses, ferries, trains and aircraft. Several travel
purposes

are analysed,

but we will only focus on business

and private

travel.

The methodology
applied is two approaches
to WTP analysis,
Stated Preference
(SP) and
Transfer Price (TP). Private travel demand may be expressed
as a function of generalised
travel cost and analysed by means of a logit model. For business travels, attempts were made
to estimate VOT by means of a revised version of"Hensher's
formula" (Hensher
1977). This
formula is founded on the assumption
that both employer
and employee
will benefit from
shorter travelling time.
The estimate
found for business travel by air turned out to be higher than the marginal
productivity
of labour (the gross wage rate). Therefore
it is recommended
in the Norwegian
VOT study that a conservative
estimate should be applied till further analyses are carried out,

meaningthatfor the time beingthe estimatefor businesstravelby air is the averagegross
wageratefor thisgroup.
In table3.1theactualvaluesof VOT for theair sectorareshown.
Private
Travel

time

Waiting

time

Table

travel

Business

173
between

3.1

departures

travel

213

19

71

Value of time for air travel (NOK)

The VOT for delays are from the equivalent
Swedish
to be 50 % higher than the VOT for travelling time.
The methodological

approach

in the Norwegian

study (Algers

study has formerly

& al 1995), and assumed

been

applied

in similar

studies in Britain (Bates & al 1987), The Netherlands
(HCG 1990) and Sweden (Algers et al
1995). It is fair to say that the results of these analyses, including the Norwegian
one, have
been discussed
a great deal for methodological
weaknesses.
However,
they are the most
updated estimates we have so far, but they should of course be applied with care.

3.3.

Accident

costs

Accidents
luckily occur very rarely in regulated air traffic.
consequences
usually are of huge dimensions.
We therefore
frequencies
as well as accident
economic appraisals.
Accident

costs,

to be able to include

When they occur, however, the
will have to look into accident
changes

in accident

risk into the

frequencies

NCAA has performed
an analysis of accident risks in Norwegian
commercial aviation, both
route and charter traffic as well as other commercial
traffic. From a data set consisting of all
flights within the Norwegian
territory for the period 1985 - 1994, accident risks are estimated
(Fugleberg
1999). The effects of certain security, measures are estimated. These are precision
landing system, radar control and rows of landing lights > 720m. In addition the effects of
terrain factors like hills or peaks
the effects of scheduled 3 versus
total risk of having an accident
On average 16% of all accidents

are analysed.
non-scheduled

Additional estimations
are performed to isolate
flights on accident risk and to adjust for the

during the whole leg, including
for scheduled flights are fatal.

take-off,

cruise

and landing.

The results show that accident risk for scheduled flights, varies between 1.05 per million legs
and 3.6 per million legs, depending
upon combinations
of the above mentioned
security
measures. The effect of introducing
e.g. radar control (ILS not being used) is a reduction of
accident risk from 3.0 per million to 1.5 per million. For non-scheduled
flights the accident
risk varies between 2.1 per million and 62.9 per million. Introducing
e.g. radar is estimated to
reduce risk from 49.6 per million to 2.1 per million (without ILS).
Costs of accidents
The costs per accident are assumed to consist of loss of statistical lives, injury costs, material
costs and administration
costs. However,
injury costs are omitted because they are found to

Route and charter

flights

7

be of little importancein the aviation sector4. From Elvik (1993) and in analogywith
calculationsfor the railway sector,the cost of a statisticallife in an aviationaccidentis
estimatedto beNOK 17.0millions,which is about2.0 mill Euro.Materialcostsareassumed
to be 100%of aircraftvaluefor fatal accidents.For non-fatalaccidentsthe materialcostis
assumed
to be 50% of aircraftmarketvalue.Averagematerialaccidentsforscheduledflights
are found to be NOK 44 millions. Averageadministrativecostsare foundto be NOK 4
millions.
Foranaverageaccidentweassumeanaveragenumberof 60 passengers
in theaircraft,a risk
of fatalaccidentof 0.16anda mortalityrateof 0.9.The materialandadministrative
costsare
asstatedabove.Wemaythenconstructanexampleof thecostsof oneaccident:
Lossof statisticallives:
Materialcosts:
Administrativecosts:
Total:

NOK 147millions
NOK 44 millions
NOK 4 millions
NOK 195millions

Theaveragecostof oneaccidentmustbecalculatedseparatelyfor eachairport.To calculate
the expectedreductionor increasein accidentcosts,the cost of one accidentmust be
multipliedwith theactualaccidentrisk or by the changein risk dueto the investmentor the
measures
taken.
3.4

Environment

costs

Environment
costs in the aviation sector consist of noise and emissions
(local, regional and
global effects). In addition we have pollution of ground and water from de-icing of aircrafts
and nmway. This is taken into account by adding the fully satisfying remedy costs to the cost
side of the analysis.
Noise
As one of the biggest sources of environment
disturbance
on and close to airfields, noise is
treated in a detailed way in the CBA manual for the aviation sector. The basis is a WTP
analysis performed in 1994 at Fornebu airport close to Oslo, where noise problems have been
substantial over a long period
analysis (CA) in combination

of time (Thune-Larsen
1995). The applied method was conjoint
with contingent valuation
(CV). This was used to estimate the

people's willingness
to pay for a reduction of subjective
noise disturbance
by 50%. Within
each noise zone of 5 dBA EFN (which mean that noise is weighted differently
over the day)
the WTP for noise reduction is measured.
We then calculated
noise within each
disturbance
of NOK
or more). Assuming

the WTP for noise reductions for people that are much annoyed by airport
noise zone. This leads us to a WTP for a reduction
to 50 % of noise
3600 per year for much annoyed persons within the noise zones (50 dBA
for practical purposes that this value is constant per percent change, we

may derive that a change
percent reduction.
This goes
believe

for noise

increases

that the percentage

' For fatal accidents

in subjective

the risk of losing

as well

change

noise

disturbance

as decreases.

in cost is bigger

ones life is found

to be about 0.9.

is worth

In reality,

NOK

however,

for deterioration

72 per year

there

is reason

than for improvement

per

to
in

the environment
factor
error made by applying

(Sa*lensminde
& Hammer 1994). The bigger
a linear approximation
is.

the change,

the bigger the

For the whole country, inside zone 50 - 55 dBA there are 5% of the population
that feel
<<much annoyed_) by air-traffic
noise, increasing
gradually
to 31% for zone 65 dBA and
above. The change in noise disturbance
that people perceive (subjective
noise) is assumed to
be proportional
to the logarithm of the noise pressure measured
by dBA EFN. A map of the
assumed noise zones before and after the planned project is effectuated,
must be derived from
measurements.
Then the change
in number
of people
that are much annoyed
may be
calculated
for each noise zone. The total WTP from <<much annoyed>) people may then be
calculated.
Local and regional
Local

emissions

Emissions
emissions.

emissions
are connected

from aircraft

under

to take-off
an altitude

and

landing

of 1000 meters

under

the

altitude

are usually

of 100 meters.

classified

as regional

The combustion of aircraft fuel leads to the emission of a lot of substances
that may influence
the environment
in several ways. Since some of these substances
are proportional
to fuel
consumption
and others are not, we have chosen to evaluate
only a small number. Our
calculations
therefore
only include NOx, VOC (volatile organic components)
and particles.
Since there seems to be no WTP-analyses
or other recent relevant studies for Norway, we
have chosen to apply values that are recommended
in a meta-analysis
from ECMT 5. The
authors have analysed numerous
European studies of indirect (shadow)
cost of emission of
NOx, VOC and particles. Other emission costs are reviewed as well. But emissions of these
substances are small from air transport, or the costs are considered
to be taken care of by other
components. The valuation of VOC is assumed to reflect the cost of other substances as well.
There is a need to separate
between
densely
and sparsely
populated
areas since the
concentration
of the substances
is important for the damage effect. We have not considered
the possibility
that the emission of these substances
may have other effects, e.g. on the
production
of ozone or greenhouse
effects. The numbers are in the form of cost per kilogram
emission and transformed
from ECU.

Densely
70
70
615

NOX
VOC
Particles

Table 3.2

populated

areas

Sparsely
35
35
0

populated

areas

Costs in NOK per kilogram from local and regional emission to air.

For the airports in question,
fleet that uses the airport.

the average emissions
The emission factors

are calculated
from composition
of the air
of each category
of aircraft are assumed

known from special tables calculated by NILU 6 that should be updated regularly in the future.
The average length of a leg by the most common aircraft to and from the airport is calculated,
and the average emission costs per leg may be found. From this the change in emission costs
per year may be calculated.

The council of transport ministers in the OECD, ECMT (199g).
Knudsen & Stromso¢ (1990), Nonvegian
Institute for Air Research.

Global emissions
Global emissions are understood as having an impact on the global environment,
the location of the emissions.
Such problems
are the depletion
of the ozone

regardless of
layer and the

greenhouse
effect. Here we will concentrate
on the latter. Among the gases that contribute to
the greenhouse
effect, carbon dioxide (CO2) is the most important one. We will consider CO2
as a representative
for all climate gases and place all climate costs on this gas.
We are aware that some gases
under suspicion
of contributing

that are emitted
more to climate

in the higher
changes than

layers of the atmosphere
are
gases that are emitted on the

ground level. Among these are NOx and VOC, and we assume
regional emissions to some extent will compensate
for that.
It seems

that neither

damage

costs

that the price

nor WTP will give a satisfactory

answer

for local and

to what the best

way of assessing the cost of CO2 emissions will be. We have chosen to use _dndirect political
willingness
to pay)), i.e. to take the Kyoto agreement
as a "constraint".
We then calculate the
price or tax on CO2 that will be necessary to fulfil the Kyoto-agreement
for Norway's
part.
This means that CO2 emissions should be stabilised on the 1990-level from 2010 on. Calculations are made by means of the macro-economic
model GODMOD
(Jensen 1998). The
calculations
show that it will be necessary
to charge NOK 740 per tonne CO2 in 2010 to
stabilise on the 1990-level. The main underlying assumption
is that an international
agreement
forces all industrialised
countries to charge CO2-emissions
to fulfil their part of the Kyoto
agreement.
If we assume that the charge is 0 in 1990, with a linear increment,
the charge in
year 2000 will be NOK 370. This may be seen as a compromise
between the presence and the
future, not letting either of them take all the costs.
The

consumption

of fuel per

minute

on a standard

flight

can be found

from

the

above

mentioned
tables. The burning
of one kilogram
jet-fuel
produces
3.15 kilograms
CO2.
Knowing the average additional flight-time produced by the planned project makes it possible
to calculate the CO2-cost connected to a specific investment.
In the next section, some methodological
topics
when doing CBA within the aviation sector.

will be discussed

that frequently

4

CBA for aviation

projects

4.1

The interdependency

problem

Within
project

the NCA.A's
will depend

it will quite frequently
be the case that the value of a single
other projects are implemented
or not. When working with

jurisdiction,
on whether

- some methodological

emerges

topics

economic analyses of specific interdependent
projects, it is necessary to ensure that adequate
limitations are made so that only projects with a strong case for mutual interdependency
are
considered.
Otherwise,
one may end up calculating
the economic
benefit of an entire airport
system, because there is almost always a possibility
to identify more or less significant
interdependency
with other projects, within the project's economic life span. When doing analytic
work, one important
challenge
is to define and deal with this kind of interdependency
in a
practical
way. This problem
will now be assessed
in two ways. First, the nature of
interdependency
The discussion

will be examined.
is limited to projects

Thereafter,
some practical guidelines
with sequential
interdependence.

will be developed.

Passengers

One indicator
of mutual
dependency
impacts
in the traffic
market.
Figure
illustrates
the problem
of sequential
dependency,
illustrated by the impacts

TI

is
4.1

interfrom a

stepwise upgrading
of an airport. "I"3represents the traffic growth in a 30 year span,
without
any capacity
constraints
on the
airport.
In year 5, the lack of terminal
throughput
capacity
to To. If the capacity
rate will
constraint

follow
occur,

gates available.

limits the traffic growth
is expanded, the growth

T3 until the next capacity
for instance
the number of
Without

expansion,

the traffic

i
30
Ter-..;asl

Figure 4.1

buiMin

I

Ne. ef |atu

I_,way

Traffic growth - sequential dependency

growth is limited to Tl. Correspondingly,
if
the need for extra runway length in year 18 is
not met, the growth is limited to T2. The
figure
shows
that the benefits
from the

expanded
terminal
building
in year 5 are
limited if the number of gates remain unchanged
after year 10. The traffic is assumed to be
growing, but with an annually declining growth rate. This is so because even if there are no
excess capacity during peak hours, the assumption
is that there are capacity
peak hours to be used by people who are able to change travel behaviour.
The NCAA

operates

with guidelines

for capacity

expansion.

If these

available

guidelines

between

take the form

of mandatory regulations,
then it can be said that a project A in year X will entail project B in
year Y and project C in year Z. A strong sequential interdependency
is established,
implementing project B before project A is meaningless.
This is a case for designing
a package
of
projects, where the net present value for the entire package is calculated.
However,
1.

there are several

Sequential

project

points to be made when it is necessary

packages

may

be designed

from standards

to design
that

project

represent

packages:
constraints

considering
the planning and decision-making
process. When the demand side is given,
criteria are established
to define the timing and sequence of the various measures to be
taken. The projects in the package are resolved simultaneously.
2.

If such constraints
the most profitable

are not defined,
one.

3.

With respect to the financial side of the story, project packages makes it difficult to assess
the financial profitability
of single projects. This may be in conflict with a financial framework that deals with the profitability

one should

assess

of single projects

different

packages,

and implement

(as in the NCAA).

Figure 4.2 illustrates the investment
costs and armual revenues from the project package in
figure 4.1. The situation is simplified in the sense that the annual revenues are constant when
the capacity constraint is effective. The annual operating costs are omitted.

IJSD

The area D is the revenues in the base
case. The area C is the additional revenues when the terminal
year 5, area B is added

is upgraded in
revenues when

the number of gates is increased in year
10, and C is added when the runway is
upgraded
in year 18. The Is are the
different
investments
and R is the

T2
T!

TO

residual

0

value

of the investments

year 30 (the economic

after

life span).

This illustration
applies
for both the
financial
revenues and the passengers'
benefits
I1

I

12

J

S
Terminal

I0
buiidin|

in a cost-benefit

perspective.
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30

pendence

problems,

the following

gui-

Runway

delines
NCAA:

Figure 4.2 Costs and revenues - sequential dependency

A. The case of uncertain

To design a framework
for a practical
approach to solve this kind of interde-

dependency:

If there are reasons

have been

recommended

to be in doubt whether

to the

the projects

T2 and "1"3will actually be carried out, then the recommendation
is to consider the projects
as separate
and independent.
The consequence
is that the projects are analysed
with
respect to declining
traffic due to capacity constraints occurring
at a later stage. Thus, the
traffic volume that constitutes the market for e.g. project T_ is defined by the area between
the curves TI and T2 in figure 4.1.
•
If Tl is a profitable project on its own,
it may be implemented
independently.
Area C in fig. 4.2 is the relevant revenue
area.

i
i
inplemeattliou

Implementation,
I
i
NO

_

/

i _

A
if

10

YES

pro fita b 1e_"_
B is imple-

given

a

d,

....

cisi

and

slmltltaneous

A +B

A and
proJTlable

YES
_

o /

,

A

pro

i

if

B

i

is

implemented

•

fileble
and

a

•
If profitability
of T_ over the life cycle
is dependent
of the implementation
of T2
and/or
T3, then
a strong
connection
through binding decisions
on implementation of the entire
profitable
package
must be established.

C
_

NO

years

Figure 4.3 Decision tree - sequential dependency

However,

linking

of projects

is not

recommended
if profitability
of the package is dependent
of projects to be implemented
more than 10 years from now.
Most often, it is not possible to make meaningful binding decisions
for a long time
span. The decision tree in figure 4.3 illustrates this situation.

1"3

B.

The case of certain dependency:
If there is no doubt about the strong dependency,
projects should be considered as a package within the following framework:
1.

.

Projects that are linked within a time span of 10 years are considered
package.
For projects

to be implemented

more than

that the interdependency
is linked
not be included in the analysis.

4.2

The network

problem

10 years

with such a degree

of uncertainty

_

mn ,,_aut

affecting

services

that they should

appraisal of projects
as follows:

for airlines

for e.g.

and passengers.

Point B will be commented
upon here.
The effects on other transport modes are
mainly
connected
to traffic spill-over.
When capacity
constraints
are reached

tan_ct _

t0ao

during peak hours, several
adjustments
may take place. Some traffic will divert

4,m

o,

is

and the value of time.

within the airport network,
on other transport modes.
Tramcgn_,

within the

from now, the recommendation

Network considerations emerge frequently when doing economic
increased airport capacity. The network effects can be categorised
A. Effects
B. Effects

then the

lj_

to less attractive slots. Other parts of the
traffic
market
will either
be deterred

i

because
of higher generalised
transport
costs, or change to other modes. These
effects
may
seem
trivial
from
a
theoretical viewpoint,
but there are some

i,m

practical matters
examined:

Figure 4.4 Traffic growth with andwithout
constraints

that should

be carefully

1. Traffic forecasts.
The forecasts
mine the traffic
diversion
and
deterrence
constitute

from capacity constraints.
Figure 4.4 illustrate the number
the market
for improvements
in airport
infrastructure.

detertraffic

of passengers that
The lower curve

represents
the anticipated
traffic volumes that will use the airport under the capacity
constraint,
while the upper one indicates the forecasted
number of passengers
without the
constraint. The distance between the two curves gives the forecasted amount of traffic that
will be served by the extended airport capacity, but which will either be diverted to other
modes
.

or deterred

from travelling,

Alternative
transport
reaches the capacity

without

airport

capacity

expansion.

modes, traffic deterrence
and the travellers'
constraint,
transport costs increase abruptly.

benefits.
Figure

As an airport
4.5 illustrates

this situation.
The marginal
generalised
travel costs for using the existing airport
infrastructure
is given by MCA I. As capacity
problems
emerge (at volume X0), MC
increases towards infinity as the capacity constraint
is reached (somewhere
near XI). The
MCR curve is the generalised
travel costs of using alternative
transport modes, e.g. road
transport

combined

with the use of a nearby

airport.

This curve

makes

the generalised

reservationcostsfor the air passenger.
If the generalised
travelcostsby air exceedthis
level,somepassenger
will switchto the competingmode(hereX2- Xl), otherswill give
up travelling.
Cast
The curve

D,

MCA

2

is the

generalised

transport

cost if the capacity is increased. For simplicity,
this
cost is represented
as constant.
The
benefits from this capacity
increase are given
by the shaded and the hatched area. The shaded

i MC^,
'

area represents
the benefits
for those who
switch to competing
modes, while the hatched
area illustrates the benefits for the traffic that is

t,,E^2

I

Figure
capacity

deterred
because
of the
more
expensive
alternative
mode, compared
to the travel costs
after the capacity is expanded.
In addition to

Trmic('x these areas, there
x,
x_ x_
x,
from cost reduction
4.5 Benefits of increased airport

will of course be benefits
for the traffic XI - X0.

3. The value of time in transport
chains. The
value of time for a typical
air passenger
is
significantly
higher than for various surface transport modes (see section 3.2), especially
for leisure travels. Most VOT studies are directed towards partial analyses of travellers in
different
sectors, without studying
the consumer's
VOT through
a chain of various

modes. When using the recommended
VOTs of different transport modes in an analysis
which includes diversion of traffic from one mode to another, one might face a rather
dramatic
change in VOTs which raises questions
about the rationale
for this big
difference.
After all, the same group
of travellers
is considered,
although
some
differences
may be explained
from the characteristics
of the transport
mode. These
questions are important when considering
multi-modal
passenger transport.

4.3

Defining

the base

case and different

projects.

Defining the project's
main objective is the point of departure
for the CBA. It is important
that the description
of the objective does not include any specific means. As an example, if
the take-off
and landing routines
on a given airport create unacceptable
noise for the
surrounding
dwellings,
the objective
should be "reduce the noise by xx EFN" and not e.g.
"build a mound to reduce aircraft noise by xx EFN). In this way, no relevant means to meet
this objective are excluded.
The definition of the base case is also a vital prerequisite
for the CBA, because the projects or
project alternatives
are compared to the base case. The list of possible projects that meet the
objectives
should be complete.
unprofitable,
leaving the base
projects should be implemented.

The CBA may well show that all the projects turn out to be
case as the most profitable
one. In such cases, none of the

The base case should represent the expected situation during the economic
life span without
any changes,
i.e. without any project being implemented.
However,
one point has to be
stressed. The base case has to include projects that are approved for implementation.
Thus, the
base case is not necessarily
a 'do nothing' alternative,
but should include the expected effects
from approved, but not yet implemented
projects. Correspondingly,
optimising
the use of the

1,4

existing infrastructure
should be included in the base case. Another
aspect that should be
taken into consideration,
is the technological
development.
As an example,
the number of
aircraft movements
on a given airport may represent a constraint
which may be desirable to
relax. An eventual
trend towards
larger aircraft
will influence
the forecasted
aircraft
movements
and thus the need for increased capacity of this kind.

4.4

NCAA

as a corporation.

Up to now, NCAA

has mainly

operated

dual airport is the financial unit. There
where e.g. the entire network of airports
the traffic volume on airport 2, this may
represented
by financial analyses at the
section

4.2, capacity

constraints

on the basis

of financial

analyses,

has been a weak tradition for
is considered.
If the situation
give a net financial effect for
airport level. As an example

on airport

1 may transfer

passengers

where

the indivi-

consolidated
account,
of airport 1 influences
the NCAA that is not
and as commented
in
to airport

2 which

is

situated in the vicinity. The revenue effect for the NCAA from this transfer effect may be
practically zero, because the transferred passengers
generate revenue to the NCAA via airport
2 with connected routes. The CBAs are in essence "global"
analyses
where such network
effects should be taken into account. Financial analyses must include the entire influence area
to be able to capture

4.5

Project

all the financial

without

double

counting.

risk and uncertainty

Dealing with project
regardless of whether
dealing with future
uncertainty.
probabilities

effects

risk and uncertainty
has always been a major challenge
for investors,
the project is financed with private or public funds. The fact that we are
effects makes our estimates
just that - estimates
with an inherent

This brings us over to a stochastic
world
and expected values rather than deterministic

where we should
figures.

be dealing

with

Traditionally,
the treatment of project risk and uncertainty
has been on a very crude level in
most impact assessments.
In the Norwegian
public roads sector the only treatment of risk has
been to carry out a simple sensitivity
analysis of alternative
figures for investment
costs and
traffic forecasts. Recently,
a national standing advisory committee
on cost benefit analyses
(SAC) has given its recommendations
on "good practice" for economic impact assessments in
the Norwegian
public sector. One of the main suggestions
for improvements
was related to
the treatment of project risk and uncertainty.
The previous debate on this issue has to a large
extent been related to the level of the discount rate in the calculations
of the net present
values.

Returns

on private

investments

are usually

a composite

of two

factors:

A risk free rate of

return plus a compensation
for the risks of that investment.
The last part is commonly denoted
"the risk premium".
There have been some disagreements
about whether or not (or to what
extent) one should include such a risk premium
in the discount rate for public investment
analysis. In order to discuss this question we need to divide the risk premium into two further
components:
Non-systematic
risk
project in question, and systematic
cycles,

fluctuations

which is risk connected
to the outcome
of the specific
risk which is due to "macro-factors"
like general business

in the oil prices

etc. The latter

kind of risk is unavoidable

and genuine

even to a whole public sector. The former kind is, some argue, not relevant when analysing
public projects
because
it is diversible,
meaning
that a negative
surprise
in one project
eventually
will balance with a positive surprise in another.
Additionally,
the risk will be

distributedover
budget

for public

SAC argued,

all taxpayers,
and because any project will be small compared
spending, the effect of a possible "surprise" can be ignored.

partly

on this basis, that if all figures

were calculated

as expected

to the total

values

(based

on some information
on relevant probability distributions),
the only relevant risk premium to
include into the discount rate was the systematic
risk component.
The size of this component
would in turn depend on to what extent the returns from the project had a (positive
or
negative) correlation
to the National income. The concrete recommendation
was to categorise
typical public investments
into risk-groups
with different discount rates, on the basis of such
information.
In this work for the NCAA,
issue, partly on a fundamental

we have chosen not to follow SAC's recommendations
background
and partly on a more practical one:

on this

Thefimdamental
counter-argument
is, as we see it, that the assumed diversity of project
specific risk is not plausible when we are talking of only a part of the "public" budget (i.e.
the budget of the NCAA). There is no precedence
that should support an assumption
that a
bad outcome in a NCAA project would be compensated
e.g. from the health budget, - not
even from the budget for the public roads. As seen from our point of view, this project
specific risk is therefore highly relevant to the decision-maker.
The more practical problem emerged when we were seeking empirical evidence on the
relevant risk premiums
for typical NCAA projects. Trying to extract such information
from the stock exchange
proved impossible.
There was no information
available
that
could enable us to assign a "market value" for the risk premium to the relevant project
categories.
There is, however, no fundamental
reason why this information
should not be
obtained at a later stage through further analysis. The job that needs to be done is to find
"market copies" of the different public investment
projects, - and then extract the risk
premium on the stock exchange for this group of market copies.
So, does this leave us with "business as usual" as
risk and uncertainty?
Not quite. We have found
approach of using one single discount rate with
projects. However, we have made some important

our only option for the treatment of project
it necessary to stick with the rather crude
no risk-dependent
discrimination
between
steps in the right direction towards a more

satisfying
treatment
of project risk: First, we have recommended
that the use of expected
values should replace the use of most probable
outcome. This is an important
step forward
because it forces the analyst to thoroughly
assess the range of possible outcomes
and the
connected
probabilities
for these outcomes.
We realise that one rarely will have a formal
probability
distribution
as a platform for the calculation
of expected values, but even the use
of subjective probabilities
will be an improvement.
Second, we have advocated that the use of
sensitivity

analysis

should

be extended

and improved.

By stressing

•
•

Only factors that effectively
are affected by risk and uncertainty
The range for variation is within plausible limits

•

Factors

that typically

would

be correlated,

the fact that
should be altered

also should be altered together

in a scenario,

there are reasons to expect that the information
value of the sensitivity analyses will improve.
The last bullet-point
above moves the sensitivity
analysis over to a scenario analysis where
one e.g. can illustrate the effects of general business cycles and create one scenario under a
cycle peak, and another under a cycle trough.
estimate for investment costs and a low traffic

The latter would
forecast.

then typically

include

a lower

5

The use of CBA in the aviation

sector-

two examples

In our report to the NCAA, the CBA methodology
is implemented
on a couple of projects, to
show how CBA should be carded out in practice. This section presents briefly two cases that
represent important parts of the NCAA's jurisdiction.

5.1

Terminal

building

5.1.1

The setting

at Stavanger

TitD

airport,

•

Sola

The setting
medium-sized

for

the first example
airport
at
Sola

is a
near

Stavanger
(SVG)
where
the capacity
constraints in terminal capacity is assumed
to be the limiting growth constraint in the
near future. Without
one segment
of the
passengers
is able
attractive
slots until

BGO

This example
focuses on
segment
which
in stead

HAU

KII$
Tr|me
Ffe_

5.1

rrem
SVG

SVG
with

vl= HAU
|,trace

Alternative

nd

KR$

trsa=perl

routes,

the remaining
will use the

services
of
neighbouring
airports,
resulting
in more
expensive
transport
OSL
mainly because surface transport have to
be used
between
these
airports.
This
situation
is described
more formally
in
section 4.2. The increase in transport costs
entails
deterrence
effects
in this traffic

_

Figure

expanded
capacity,
growing
number of
to adapt
to less
these slots are full.

travels

from

SVG

market. Figure 5.1 shows the SVG airport
and
the neighbouring
airports.
Without
extended
capacity, people
use car to the
airports in Kristiansand
(KRS) and Haugesund
(HAU), and air transport from there. Bergen
(BGO) is situated too far to serve as an alternative
airport. Passengers
with Bergen as their
final destination will go there by car.
In this example, the main benefit of extended terminal capacity will be the travel time savings
(TTS) of travelling
from SVG instead of using HAU and KRS as altemative
airports. In
addition, TTS for travellers with KR.S and BGO as final destinations
are taken into consideration. To be able to calculate these benefits,
following factors have to be assessed:
•
•

The travel purposes (business
The destinations
from SVG.

•

The level of diverted

•

Time costs and other costs for surface

•

The share of travels

traffic,

travels

traffic

have to be made.

between

HAU and KRS.

In addition,

the

and others).

and the distribution

that are deterred

forecasts

transport.
because

of higher transport

costs.

I"7

In addition, there are reasons to expect some delays for passengers and operators during peak
hours. The benefits of avoiding delays may be significant,
and should be object to careful
attention. The details in the forecasts of traffic and delays are not examined in this paper.
These

benefits

are calculated

against

the investment

costs

and operating

costs

for both the

NCAA and the operators.
Environmental
effects and the eventual value of changes in accident
risks are also to be included. The accident risk assessment
is done by comparing
the changes
in accident risk when transferring
passengers
from air to surface transport. Especially
when
the actual surface transport is by car, a significant
rise in accident risk in terms of expected
loss of statistical lives has to be included in the calculations.
All the economic effects within
the project's
life span is discounted,
appropriate discount rate.

5.1.2

The project:

New passenger

and

the

terminal

net

present

value

is calculated,

using

an

building

The main objective is to increase the passenger capacity at SVG airport. The main obstacle is
the terminal building. Various solutions have been assessed, and the most convenient
project
is a new terminal building, which is submitted to a full economic assessment.
The investment

costs have a discounted

value

of NOK 275 millions.

value of the investment
after 30 years is NOK 7 millions.
NOK 170 millions, discounted
over a 25 year span.
These kinds of projects

within the NCAA

The residual

The increased

have up to now been assessed

operating

by means

discounted
costs are

of financial

analyses. If the project has proven positive financial NPV, then the project has been approved
for implementation.
It is worth noting that the financial analysis do not comprise the benefits
or costs from travel time savings, environmental
external effects and changes in accident risk.
It may well turn out that a financially
unprofitable
project may prove clearly profitable in the
economic
sense, when these intangible
factors are taken into consideration.
In this case, the
surface transport to nearby airports takes between 2 and 3 hours, resulting in extra time costs,
vehicle operating costs and accident costs as the most significant effects.

5.1.3

The analysis:

Costs and benefits.

The various costs and benefits
for this projects are calculated over the project's
economic
lifetime. In addition to the net present value (NPV), the most important effects are presented
for various
agents
like the NCAA,
the State, the passengers,
the operators
and the
environment.
The presentation
method is chosen to inform the decision-makers
of both the
economic and the financial
effects. Table 5.1 illustrate
the real economic
effects, including
external effects and excluding
fiscal taxes. The financial
cashflow
is also illustrated.
The
resource

flows and cashflows

from figure 2.1 are recognised.

The benefits adds up to NOK 582 millions, exceeding
the costs of 541 millions. Thus, the net
present value is NOK 41 millions, This indicates that the project should be carried out from an
economic perspective.
The NPV/Cost
ratio should be > 0, and is approximately
0.1 here. This
ratio is a pure ranking criterion. The cost side in the NPV/C ratio is the payable costs for the
NCAA, and gives NPV with respect to the use of NCAA's
budget. However,
the main
decision criteria should
use of the NVP/C ratio.

be the NPV

> 0. Project

ranking

under budget

constraints

is done by
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Costs and benefits

Economic
Benefits

SVG example
CI. l Business
C 1.2 Others

travels

impacts
Costs

Financia_

Rev-C_'_nuc
i

370
0
54

C 1.3 Delays
C1.4 Ticket costs
SI Accident costs

137
n.a.')

S1.2 Injuries
S 1.3 Material damage and administration
E I The cnvinmmcnt

n.a.
n.a.

ETTI L_-'-_ _--dreg_on_ ¢mis-fffffns (NOx, VOC, particles)
El.2 Global emissions (COz)
?1 The Statc/gcm:ral
PTTf Yis-_l _Vt_s

6
36

taxes

P 1.2 VAT on NCAA investments

92
62

and operating costs

:; ,opcra_.ors_unnes"
F27g
P2.2
P2.3
P2.4

Ug6-_g
costs
Aviation charges to the NCAA
Fiscal aviation taxes
Ticket revenues

122

P2.5 Delay costs
!SUMfinancial
camhfloe operatorx/airlines

21

.i

['4 NCAA
P_.-g "1
e--C'dT't_Tnts
nv
P4.2 Residual value

122

95

1

92

1550

I

21

i

!5 71
n.a.

l
i
I

309 _"22

i

275

223
-7
161

P4.3 Maintenance and operations
P4.4 Revenues from aviation taxes
P4.5 Other commercial activities

l

!

I

i

95
22

171

[
i
1

SUM financial camhflow NCAd
SUM economic impacts
Net present value (NPV)
NPV/CosI ratio

Table

5.1.4

5.1

SVG

economic

viability vs. financial

terminal

!

446

541

41/446 _ 0,I

SVG example,

Economic

The new

117
.. 582
....
' ..41

seems

impacts

and financial

cashflow

(mill. NOK).

cashflow.

to be economic

profitable.

However,

the financial

cash_flow

gives a negative result of NOK 329 millions, meaning that this project would not have passed
a simple cashflow analysis. It is the travel time savings and the increase in accident costs that
give

the

most

significant

contribution

to the

difference

between

the

economic

and the

financial assessment
here. As pointed out in section 1, this kind of difference
gives reasons to
discuss NCAA's role as a self financing agent in markets where elements of intangible goods
constitute
a significant
share of the economic
impacts. This example represents
an obvious
case for focusing on the role of economic vs. financial analysis as basis for decisions within
the NCAA.

10

5.2

Instrumentation

5.2.1

for precision

landing

(ILS)

The setting

The setting for this example

is a small local airport

(MOL)

that is served

by two air services:

One following a triangular route from the national hub (OSL) via MOL and the neighbouring
town to the north (KSU) and back to OSL. This route is serviced by Boeing 737 aircrafts at a
frequency
of five flights per day. The other service is a coastal route between the regional
hubs BGO and TRD, which is servicing MOL and KSU both on the northbound
and the
southbound
route. This coastal service is serviced by Fokker FS0 aircrafts. The situation is
illustrated in Figure 5. I.

N

(,.oH,)
)/

\
_

Fagemes

...................
Planned

ILS-project

(NDB)
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Figure

5.1 Illustration

Currently

of the flight connections

MOL has an ILS system

for landing

servicing

MOL

(non scale)

from the west. When western

m/s the approach is done by a circulating
manoeuvre
from the west,
from the east. Westem winds totally dominate the weather-conditions
that the vast majority of landings is currently done from the east.

5.2.2

The project:

winds

exceed

5

followed by a landing
in the area, meaning

ILS from the east

The NCAA wants to carry out an impact analysis of building an ILS system for landings from
the east. The necessary
initial investment
for such a system (partly based on components
transferred
from another airport) is estimated to be NOK 5 millions and the system is likely to
have a economic life of 15 years. Within a planning horizon of 25 years this gives a discounted (7% discount rate) total investment of NOK 6.4 millions. The investment
will after 25
year have a residual value of NOK 0.3 millions. Discounted
maintenance
are estimated to amount to a total figure of NOK 2.4 millions.

and operating

costs

The establishment
of ILS systems is usually motivated
through their anticipated
effect on
flight safety. However, in this case the system will also have other important
effects on both
the user benefit

side, and on the operator

side.

Apart

from the northbound

approaching
the airport from the west represents
a detour
means that passengers
currently
face an estimated
travel
minutes

compared

to a direct approach

BGO-MOL

leg,

from all connected
airports. This
time loss of between 2.5 and 5

from the east. Equivalently

the operators

would

save

aircraftoperatingcostsfrom a shorteraverageleg, andconsequentlytherewouldalsobea
positiveenvironmental
impactdueto lessfuel consumption.
5.2.3

The analysis:

Costs and benefits

Based on the method for economic
impact assessment
established
through this project, we
have carried out an analysis of the overall economic
viability of this ILS system. We have
divided the impacts into effects for the NCAA, for the operators,
for the passengers,
for the
operators
and effects for the environment.
In order to illustrate
the financial
cash/low
implications,
we have included figures that illustrate the cashflow
NCAA. In table 5.2, the columns representing
economic impacts
impact, including external effects and excluding fiscal taxes.
Costs & Benefits

Economic

impacts

for the operators and for the
illustrate the real economic

Financial

cashflow

ILS example
•1 Passenger

Ben-h"_-_
_

bcnclits

Cq71-13_T_e ss journey
C 1.2 Other journeys
Accident costs
S'ITI S_VhV6

s

0.3

SI.2 Injuries
Si .3 Material
:;I lhe

damage and administrative

costs

0. I

environment

E'rT__
_-dTe_t on-6_l_(NOx,VOC,Part.)
E 1.2 Global emissions (CO2)
'l

Ihc State/general

taLXCS

P77]" "flse'/'g_'_
avi'ation taxes
PI.2 VAT on NCAA investments and operating costs
'20pcralorstairlincs

1.3

Fz.-l" Ope-T_-Fffgcosts
'4

13.6

NCAA

.[

13.6

P"47.1_ts

4.9

P4.2 Residual

value

P4.3 Maintenance

0.2

Net present wlu¢(NPV)..
NPV/Cost

Table

ratio,

._-

The benefit
totals NOK

2.2

, •_,., ' '

,:%i__'._
....

example,

side amounts
7.2 millions.

2.4

. .., :'.........
..... _r._."
,::_z._.._
'_':

_;. _ ,," ....

5.2 ILS system

6.1
0.3

and operations

SUM
.........
economic impacts _ ._;_..,

0.1

-, _,5¢,

economic

impacts

and financial

cashflow

to NOK 49.2 millions, and the costs (maintenance
and investments)
Thus, the project has a net present value of NOK 42 millions, and a

net benefit/cost-ratio
of almost 5. This should indicate that the project should be carried out,
and that it probably also would be ranked among the top projects in comparison
with other
projects within a budget constraint.
5.2.4

Economic

viability

vs. financial

cashflow

If we consider the financial cashflow figures for the NCA.A, the project does not seem to pass
a simple cashflow analysis. The project does only cause extra investment
and maintenance
costs

for the NCAA.

However.

if we include

the effects

for the operators

into the cash_flow

analysis,the total savingsin operatingcostsexceedthecostsof the NCAA, andthe project
seemsviablealsofroma cashflowviewpoint.
Thevastmajorityof the benefitin theeconomicimpactanalysisstemsfrom benefitsin the
intangiblescategory;i.e.the passengers
andthe environment.Althoughthe establishment
of
ILS systemsis mainlydoneasa safetymeasure,
this is a casewherethemajorbenefitsfrom
theprojectcomesfroma reductionin traveltimeandlessenvironmental
damage.
In otherwords:Thiscasegivesa rationalefor theextensionof thescopeof impactassessment
in the aviationsectorfrom a purefinancialcashflowanalysistowardsthe broaderviewof a
full economicimpactanalysis.
6

Conclusions

The NCAA

is an agent that is responsible

for its own financial

viability.

At the same time, the

NCAA's
role in the Norwegian
transport
sector calls for a broader economic
appraisal
of
projects within its jurisdiction.
Making priorities
subject to a full economic impact analysis
instead of a more narrow financial cashflow approach, may significantly
alter the portfolio of
projects that reaches implementation.
The dilemma for the NCAA is obvious: One may very
well face situations where the fmancial
analysis
gives other recommendations.

analysis says one thing, while the economic
The financial
source for NCAA's
activities

revenues
from user charges
and other commercial
activities.
intangibles
may call for some kind of public-private
partnership,
effects properly into account.
In this paper, we have briefly

described

impact
is the

The significant
elements
of
to be able to take the welfare

the CBA tool that is developed

for the NCAA.

Even if

there are still problems
to be solved, like e.g. the value of time in multi-modal
passenger
transport,
the method is applicable to most projects. The two examples included in the paper
illustrate the decision dilemma where unprofitable
financial results are achieved on one hand,
and profitable economic outcomes on the other.
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A behavior of inter-city traveler such as air and/or high speed rail passenger
is affected by
relatively lower frequency
services. This paper proposes
a disaggregate
modal choice model
which can evaluate the reduction of utility caused by low frequency of services. The model adopts
arrival margin time as an index of influence of a destination arrival time. A questionnaire
surveys
were carried out for the travelers between Akita and Tokyo both at the airport and the railway
station. The results show that line-hole time, egress time, and arrival margin time are the major
choice factors of transportation
mode for a long distance travel. It is clarified that an estrangement
between a desirable trip schedule and service schedule makes negative utility for a passenger.
Keywords:

Air traveler

t s behavior,

Arrival

margin

time,

Disaggregate

iogit model

1.Introduction
Most of inter-city
air transportation
network
in Japan has low frequency
service,
while
competitive
railway network has much more frequent services.
If the timetable of a transportation
service
doesn't
fit for passenger's
desirable
itinerary,
a traveler
will choose
an alternative
transportation
mode whose schedule is closer to his desirable time. Air passenger demand in Japan
has been estimated
by using the departure
airport
choice
models
and/or
trip generation
models.(Morichi
and et. AI. 1994). The previous models take account of flight schedule as for an
expected waiting time. For example, a half of average flight time span is added into the travel time
for a modal choice behavior model.
Since popular local inter-city air services in Japan have only
two, three or four flights in a day, the assumed waiting time must be 2, 3 or four hours which is
apparently different from actual waiting time.
This paper discusses
the mode choice behavior
of inter-city traveler and proposes
the arrival
margin time that will play a center role of traveler's
timetable valuation
and directly affect to the
transportation
mode choice.
Traveler's evaluation is formulated as a linear utility function with the
variable of the arrival margin time. Then, traveler 's modal choice behavior
is modeled by a popular
disaggregate
logit model.
2. Traveler's

Modal

Choice

Behavior

(1) Factors of Modal Choice
Time-related
factors and monetary

cost factors must influence

traveler

's modal

choice

behavior.

Previous modal choice models deal with line-haul time, egress time, access time, and the expected
waiting time as time-related
factors.
In addition to these factors, this paper proposes
an arrival
margin time for the most important
index of traveler's
mode choice.
A definition
of the arrival
margin time is shown in the following section.
The alternative,
which maximizes
traveler's
utility, should be chosen through the model.
If a
transportation
service whose schedule
does not match with a traveler's
desirable
itinerary, the
traveler feels some sort of disutility to use that transportation
mode.
A desirable
arrival time is

definedas

the time, which realize the maximum utility and must also include some amount of
margin time from the time deadline for a certain trip purpose.
Unnecessary
time difference between
a desirable arrival time and an actual arrival time must decrease a traveler _s utility. Actual arrival
time at a destination,
shown in Fig-l.

which

is automatically

fixed by the timetable,

Utility

will influence

traveler

_sutility as

Function

p,,_.

Arrival
early

'_
Desirable

Figure

Time

late
Arrival

1 The General

•

Time

Concept

of a Utility Function

(2) Definition of Arrival Margin Time
This paper defines arrival margin time as the time difference

between

desirable

destination

arrival

time and actual destination arrival time (either plus or minus) as shown Figure-2 (1) and-2 (2).
Time difference between traveler's
itinerary and the timetable, that is, arrival margin time must
bring disutility.
If actual arrival time is earlier than desirable arrival time, arrival margin time is
positive
value. The disutility
is brought
by the unnecessary
early departure
time or by the
unnecessary
idle time at the destination.
If actual arrival time is later than the desirable arrival time,
arrival margin time is negative value. The disutility
is brought by the late arrival time at the
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For the sake of convenient calculation, time difference between actual node arrival
time deducted egress time from desirable destination arrival time is regarded as arrival
It is assumed that those values (Fig-2 (I) and Fig-3) are equivalent.
Evaluation of disutility is possible by adopting arrival margin time as an index.
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(3) Model Design
Time
related
factors
and monetary
factors
influence
traveler's
modal
choice
behavior.
Disaggregate
Iogit model s) is introduced
as the modal choice model. It is assumed that utility
function is linear in the parameters. Systematic component of utility is shown as follows.
K

vo,=Zo, x,,,
k=l

Where
n: traveler
i: alternative
A,,: set of alternatives

(i)

V,: systematic components
of the utility of/
X,,k: characteristic
ofi, n, and k
0 k: parameter
Based on random utility theory, the assumption that the random component
brings the probability P_,,that traveler n would choose alternative i as follows.
e v*'
P,,

traveler's

In order to estimate

distributed

1

ZeV, _

S.,eiV:v.),
,K...a

]EA.

3. Surveys of Inter-City
(1) Outline

is Gumbel

(i_A,)

(

2

)

I_A,,

behavior

parameters,

questionnaire

surveys

are carried

out. The behavior

of travelers

between Akita and Tokyo (about 600km) both at the airport and the railway station are surveyed.
Since long-haul bus services and private cars can not compete with air and rail, then ignored.
(2) Surveys
The questionnaire
survey of air passenger's
behavior is carried out at Akita airport. The survey of
railway passengers
is carried out at Akita railway station only for the bullet train bound for Tokyo.
Results of the survey are shown in table-1.
The survey items are as follows:
1. purpose of the trip
2. originate place of the trip
3. destination place of the trip
4. desirable arrival time
5. access transportation
mode
6. egress transportation
mode
7. passenger

nsattributes

(age, sex, and occupation).

Table-1
Route
hkita
Tokyo
Tokyo
hkita
Akita

Tokyo

Tokyo

Akita

Mode
Air
Air

Results

of Surveys

NumberofSamplss
526
650

_ofRespondents
37'_
41%

Bul.btTrah

615

32*/,

Bu_tTrah

228

12_

4.Modal Choice Model
(1) Selection of Variables
If desirable arrival time is not defined, arrival margin time can not be computed. Passengers who
didn't enter desirable
arrival time are ignored. To suppose
arbitrary desirable
arrival time will
decrease the confidence
of the model. It is assumed that entered desirable arrival time is the time
which brings maximum utility. Since the influence on behavior of early arrival is different from the
influence
of late arrival, arrival margin time should be distinguished
positive
value. Positive value and negative value are dealt with different variables.

value

The variables included the model are positive arrival margin time, negative arrival
line-haul time, egress time, access time, fare, age, bn the way" trip dummy, and
dummy.
(2) The Assumptions
of Routes and Travelers

and negative
margin time,
business trip

Some assumptions
are implicit in this model.
Railway services
are higher frequency
If railway alternative
is chosen, there is no time
difference between the itinerary and the timetable. Travelers can choose the railway service
whenever he wants to use, and the arrival margin time is zero.
•
The differences of each alternative are timetable, fare, and travel time (line-haul,
access, and
egress).
Characteristics
of the alternative included systematic
components
of utility are
described by these factors.
•

A traveler's mode choice model is constructed based on the assumption
stated the above.
seven choice altematives
for the passenger between Tokyo and Akita. They are a railway
over the day or one of the six air flights available in a day.
(3) Passenger

There are
service all

Segmentation

Utility function seems to be different between on the way trip and the way back trip. The
difference of trip purposes,
such as business trip and private trip, must also affect to the shape of
utility function.
Passengers are segmented by the trip characteristics
in the above and parameters of
the model are estimated independently.
Passengers are segmented as follows.
Table-2
Seelrn entatbn
Pattern
non-segm
entatbn
Pattern
1
Pattern
2

(4) Estimation

Segmentation

of Samples

se_rn ent 1

se_irnent 2

on the way trip
bushes_; !:rip

the way back trip
private trip

Results of Parameters

Model parameters
of both trip directions from Akita to Tokyo and from Tokyo to Akita are
estimated separately.
Positive arrival margin time, negative arrival margin time, egress time, and
line-haul time are adopted as significant factors of the modal choice model, while variables of access
time, fare, age,
the t-test.
a) The Parameters

_0n the way"trip

dummy,

and business

trip'dummy

are omitted

from the model

by

of the Trip from Akita to :rokyo

The estimated parameters of the trip from Akita to Tokyo
business trip model can not be built because of shortage of
characteristic
of the function between
'6n the way"trip
and
way trip model, it was found that the later arrival after the

are shown in table-3 and figure-4. Nonsamples.
The results show a contrastive
the way back trip. Regarding the on the
desirable arrival time should reduce the

passenger's
utility more than the unnecessary earlier arrival for unit time period.
Regarding the way back trip, on the contrary, the earlier arrival would reduce utility more than the
later arrival. Line-haul time affects more to the way back trip passengers
than passenger on the way
trip. Relative importance
of parameters for business trip model are almost the same as those of nonsegmentation
model, however, all of them, travel time in particular, are found to be more sensitive.
Egress time
passengers.

especially

influences

the

most

on

the

modal

choice

behavior

for business

trip

b) The Parameters of the Trip from Tokyo to Akita
Samples of _ack" trip and non-business
trip are too few to calculate the models. Egress time
variable is rejected by the results of t-test. The results of non-segmentation
model,
'6n the way"
model, and business trip model are almost similar (table-4, fig-5). The reason is that the differences
between samples of each model are small The ratio of an the way" trip samples to all samples is
high in this route, and the ratio of business trip samples to all samples is similar.
Later arrival factor contributes
to disutility more than earlier arrival factor and line-haul time

factorrelatively.
weight

between

The units of all factors
factors.

are minutes.

The ratio between

each parameter

means

the

c) The evaluation between the route from Akita to Tokyo and the route from Tokyo to Akita
To evaluate difference of traveler _s behavior between these directions,
samples of the models are
not segmented. The results of the models of both directions are shown in table-5, and fig-6. Positive
arrival margin time, negative arrival margin time, and line-haul time are adopted as the factors of the
models. Characteristics
of parameters of both models are almost the same. The parameter
arrival margin time is as from three to four times much as the parameters of line-haul
results show the differences
of each evaluated weight of time related factors.

of negative
time. These

-0.06
non

-0.05
i

-0.04
E

the way trip

• the way back trip
• non- segmentation
[] business trip
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Result of Both Direction (non-segmentation)

e

Table-3

Akita

Result of

rAkita---Tokyo

Tokyo

non-segaent
[ on the way trip
sam pbs:158
[
sam pbs:97
AMT bos itive)
-0,0105
(-7.08)
-0.0068
(-4,02)
AMT negative
-0.0169
(-6.99)
-0,0187
(-5.18)
egress tin e
-0.0345
(-4.41)
-0.0191
(-2,11)
lhe-hau I tme
-0.0093
(-11.65)
-0.0051
(-5.97)
chai--squea
228
139
2
0.335856
0.314277
• AMT : arrivalm argh tire

Table-4
Tokyo

Result of

Akita

I'Tokyo--Akita

non-segment
sam0bg;114
AMT bos itive)
-0.0097
(-7,11)
AMT ne_a tire
-0.0212
(-5.66)
lhe-haul
tin e
-0.0066
(-7,42)
chai-souea
172
2
0.337536
*AMT :arrivalmargiatint

Table-5

non-segm

TripJ

the way back trip
sam pbs:59
-0.0152
(-5.20)
-0.0150
(-4.31)
-0,0099
(-4,96)
-0.0155
(-3.03)
96
0.311105

: t-va he

TripJ

[ on the way trip
]
sampbs:99
-0.0083
(-5.90)
-0.0208
(-L44)
-0.0069
(-6.66)
142
0.316057

busiaess trip
sam obs:95,
-0.0110
(-6.64)
-0.0213
(-5,31)
-0.0068
(-7.03)
151
0.343215
: t-vabe

Result of Both Routes (non-segmentation)

ent

Akita Tokyo
sam pbs:158
AMT _oshke)
-0.0103
(-7.21)
AMT nezative
-0,0167
(-7.18)
liae-haultm
e
-0.0045
(-6.38)
cha b_quea
220
2
0.323725
*AMT : arrivalm ar h tine

bushess
trip
sam pbs:ll9
-0.0109
(-6.13)
-0.0181
(-6.43)
-0.0526
(-5.20)
-0.0142
(713.24)
186
0.35012g

Tokyo A kita
sam pbs:114
-0.0097
(-7.11)
-0.0212
(-5.66)
-0.0066
(-7.42)
172
0.337536
: t-va he

5. Conclusion
(1) Summary of the Results
This paper proposes inter-city traveler _ modal choice model specified evaluation of the timetable.
Arrival margin time signifies time difference between traveler's itinerary and the timetable. It is an
index of passenger _sevaluation of the timetable in the model. The model can estimate the influence
of the timetable to traveler's utility.
As the results of t_n the way" trip model and back" trip model, parameters of disutility by the
time difference between itinerary and the timetable vary according to trip purposes.
Later arrival brings more disutility than earlier arrival in On the way" trip. The characteristic of
back" trip is the contrary. (fig-7)
These results show that the degree of constraint of desirable arrival time of bn the way" trip is
larger than the constraint of back" trip. Line-haul time has great influence on Sack" trip traveler's
behavior, but influence on bn the way" trip traveler is relatively small. On the way" passengers
will regard certainty of arrival time as important and back" passengers will regard total travel time
as important. Business trip travelers are relatively sensitive to time related factors. Arrival time tends
to be constrained in business trip. Therefore it is natural that the factors of later arrival and
uncertainty of arrival time are regarded as important.

(2) Summary of Method and Problem
It is possible to express time difference between traveler's itinerary and timetable by arrival
margin time. Traveler's evaluation of the timetable is reflected in utility function. Disutility of earlier

,_

_,.,

The Way Back

early

late
Desirable

Arrival

Time

arrival and disutility of later arrival can be estimated respectively by regarding positive arrival
margin time and negative arrival margin time as different variables.
In this paper, model samples are segmented according to the purpose of trip. The purpose of a trip
is a factor of the differences of utility functions. Characteristics of parameters are different between
segments.
The method to regard arrival margin time as an immediate index of evaluation of the timetable has
Figure-7

Relation Between Utility and Arrival Time

problems. The distinction of entered desirable arrival time is a problem. Although this paper regards
entered desirable arrival time as the time maximizing utility of the passenger, a respondent may be
constrained arrival time. And it is supposed that entered time might include margin time to avoid
later arrival. The meaning of arrival margin time is varied by the interpretation of entered desirable
arrival time. It is necessary to exclude the bias of a reply in future.
(3) Conclusion
The conclusions of this paper are shown as follows.

•

This paper proposes the method to consider traveler _sevaluation on the timetable and develops
inter-city modal choice model. Factors of the traveler _ modal choice behavior are line-haul
time, egress time, and arrival margin time. Arrival margin time is applied to estimate traveler
evaluation of the timetable.

•

Time related factors such as arrival margin time, line-haul time, and egress time are regarded as
important. The influences on traveler's
utility of each factor are different according
to the
purpose of trip. Later arrival brings large disutility especially in bn the way" trip and business
trip.
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Abstract:
The key civil airports

in Australia

were administered

by a government

department

until

1988. At that stage, the Federal Airports Corporation
was formed to operate a system of
airports along commercial
lines. By 1994, though, policy thinking
shifted in favour of
privatisation,
largely to allow the government
to reduce its debt burden.
So fax, the
government
has received
US$2.6 billion for 17 of the 22 airports.
All but one of the
remaining airports are in the Sydney region where on-going debates about an appropriate
site for a second
The paper

major

describes

airport

have delayed

the sales processes

the sales.

involved

for the 17 airports

and presents

details

about the new owners, the commitments
they have entered
into, and the regulatory
system that has been established
for the post-privatisation
era. It is too early to assess the
performance
of the new owners,
to assist future researchers.
Key words:

airports,

but this paper

privatisation,

performance

documents

the pre-privatisation

situation

Hooper. Cain & White: Privatisation of Australian Airpovts

Introduction
Prior to the 1980's,
in Australia

the Federal

serving

regular

Government

had financial

air passenger

services

responsibilities

and it owned

for aerodromes

and operated

all of the

major airports.
Over a period of time, it had attempted
to pass ownership
management
of the airports serving narrower regional needs to the local authorities
expressing

an objective

to recover

civil aviation sector from users.
system of f'mancial accountability
accelerated
Corporation

and the
(FAC).

major

In part, the commencement

all of the costs

of maintaining

airports

were

corporatised

of the FAC in 1988 reflected

under

However,

four

of these

the

national

the

Federal

policies

Airports

designed

to

for competition.
However,
by 1994
and, subsequently,
the FAC was

disbanded
and 17 of its 22 airports were sold to the private
airports have been set up as airport companies wholly-owned
for sale.

and development

During the mid-1980's,
though, the case for a stronger
became pressing. The local ownership programme
was

reform the public sector and to increase the scope
policy-thinking
shifted
in favour of privatisation

preparation

and
while

sector. The remaining
by the Government

are in the Sydney

region

where

5
in

further

progress on privatisation
cannot be achieved until continuing issues about the siting of a
second major airport have been settled. Starting from a position where it budgeted
to
receive US$1.4 billion for the sale of all of the FAC's airports, including Sydney, the
Government
so far has collected US$2.6 billion _ in gross proceeds.
Taking the FAC's
estimates of earnings before depreciation,
interest and taxes (EBDIT) together with the
sale prices, the average price-earnings
earnings ratios of privatised
airports
similar terms, the Government
expenses 2.

ratio was
in Europe.

would receive

17.1. This is much higher
Should Sydney's
airports

another

US$1.8

billion

than pricebe sold on

after deducting

sale

In this paper, we describe the backgi'ound
to privatisation
and how the process was
conducted in Australia In addition, we present details about the new owners. One of the
aims of the Government
has been successful.

was to maximise

But the privatisation

the proceeds
initiative

from the sales,
also had other

and on this score it

objectives.

set out in the paper and we examine the mechanisms
that were put into place
sale process and we describe the post-sale regulatory framework.
A key concern
charges
result,

because

is that the new airport

owners

they are local monopolies

the post-privatisation

regulatory

have

scope to increase

and their demand
framework

are

during

the

their aeronautical

is insensitive

in Australia

These

involves

to price.

As a

price-capping

t All dollar values in this paper have been expressed first in constant (1998/99) dollar values using the
Australian Consumer Price Index and then have been converted at the rate of one AUD is equal to S0.633
US.
: No allowance has been made in this estimate for assets held by the Government at Bado_e_'sCreek.
Badgerys Creek had been proposed as the site for Sydney's second major airport but. fol_o_{'ingan
unfavourable environmental impact study, the Government is considering other optton_

Hooper,

and monitoring.

The paper

this stage to assess
issues

raised

example,

describes

the success

in the

literature

quality.

The

regulations
prior to 2002,
revisit these matters.

and there

By documenting
the processes
effected and the commitments
new owners,
paper

the intention

illustrates

of airports.

results

Government

is no doubt

of the authors

to shed

issues

light on

include,

to invest

to undertaking

for

in capacity

a review

and policy

of its

makers

will

explaining
how privatisation
was
into by the Government
and the

is to facilitate

of an exercise

and

Such

that researchers

Airports

but it is too early at

in a weak incentive

is committed

that led to privatisation,
that have been entered

the complexity

of Australian

frameworks,

of these mechanisms

regulation

regulation

& White." Privatisation

regulatory

or otherwise
on the

the risk that price-cap

and to improve

these

Cain

future research.

in selling

off a system

Furthermore,
of airports

the

and the

demands it creates for information
about airports and the markets they serve. The paper
commences
with information
about the size and growth performance
of the Australian
airports,

and then describes

to privatisation.

how Government

Remaining

sections

policies

document

towards

airports

the sales processes

moved

gradually

their

outcomes

and

together with an account of the new regulatory
framework.
Although
it is too early to
pass judgements
on the success or otherwise of privatisation
other than in terms of the
amounts received by the Government,
we conclude with observations
about the initial
actions

of the new airport

Airports
Table

offered for sale

1 shows

operated

lessee companies.

its

the relative
full

sizes of the airports

set of 22

in the last year when the FAC owned and

airports 3. Australia's

major

cities

are

located

around

the

periphery
of a large land mass and there has been little potential for the development
of
hub-and-spoke
airline networks
in the domestic
mai'ket. As Australia's
most populous
city, Sydney is the major
the dominant
international
busiest

international

1 that the air transport

Approximately

the triangle

by Melbourne.
However,
Sydney is
vies with Melbourne
as the second

airport.

It is clear from Table
airports.

domestic airport, followed
gateway while Brisbane

formed

two-thirds

by connecting

traffic

of all domestic
the eastern

is concentrated
airline

capital

at a small

trips in Australia

cities

of Sydney,

number

occur

of

within

Melbourne

and

Brisbane. The national capital, Canberra, and the country's premier resort area, the Gold
Coast (Coolangatta
Airport), are the major centres also included in this area. To the west,
Adelaide and Perth
Perth's international
capital

cities, Darwin

important

In a sense,
Cambridge,
airports

each serves more than 3 million passenger movements
each year, but
traffic is more than 7 times the size of Adelaide's.
Of the remaining

regional

gateway,

the privatisation
located

from

is advantageously

close

23 to 22.

process
to Hobart

while

located
Hobart

commenced
Airport

in the far north

is situated

in April

of Australia

in an island

1993 when the small

was sold to a local

investor.

This

State

general

reduced

to serve as an
with

aviation
the number

a small

airport,
of FAC

Hooper,

resident
cities.

population.

The busiest

general

aviation

Cain & White:
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Privatisation

are located

of A ustralian

Airports

in or near the major
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Table

1: Relative

size of the FAC's

Airport

Type of airport

airports

Passengers
(millions) _

Cain

&

White."

Privatisation

of A ustralian

Airports

- 1996/97

Aircraft
(thousands)

i

Tonnes
landed

Revenue
US$1998/99

Share of FAC
Revenue

Sydney

International

20.76

275.6

(millions)
12.32

(millions)
158.60

39.6%

Melbourne

International

13,48

152.3

7.03

81.31

20.3%

Brisbane

International

10.26

157. l

5,32

68.14

17.0%

Perth

International

4.59

95,2

2.42

33.89

8.5%

Adelaide

International

3.69

103.1

1.60

18.00

4.5%

Domestic

1.94

86.0

0.74

6.52

1.6%

Darwin

International

1.01

8 I.l

0.69

5.49

1.4%

Canberra

Domestic

1.76

107.2

0.78

5. l 0

1.3%

0.00

621.0

0.00

4.69

1.2%

0.85

15.0

0.32

3.49

0.9%

Domestic

0.68

59.9

0.32

2.85

0.7%

Domestic

0.80

44.3

0.37

2.84

0.7%

Domestic

0.59

45.5

0.26

2.71

0.7%

Coolangatta

(Gold Coast) 2

Bankstown

(Sydney)

3

General

Hobart 2

Domestic

Townsville
Alice

aviation

2

Springs 4

Launceston
Essendon

(btelbournc)

General

aviation

n.a.

68.9

0.08

2.33

0.6%

Parafield

(Adelaide)

General

aviation

n.a.

292. I

n.a.

1.30

0.3%

General

aviation

0.03

342.1

n.a.

1.17

0.3%

General

aviation

n.a.

378.0

n.a.

0.75

0.2%

General

aviation

n.a.

254.5

n.a.

0.73

0.2%

0.10

6.7

0.05

0.45

0.1%

60.55

3,185.8

32.29

400.35

100.0%

Moorabbin
Jandakot

(Melbourne)
(Perth)

Archerfield

(Brisbane)

Mount isa

Domestic

Total

Notes: (1) Passenger
and aircraft numbers are totals for arriving and departing
movements;
(2) Limited international
services
operate from time to time to Coolangatxa,
Hobart and Townsvillle
airports; (3) Camden and Hoxton Park general aviation airports
included with Bankstown;
(4) Tennant Creek included with Alice Springs.
Source: Federal Airports Corporation,
Annual Report 1996/97.

The marketability
of Australia's
airports was largely influenced
by an impressive
record
of growth and profitable
operation. Table 2 shows that the total passenger
throughput
for
the FAC airports between 1987/88 and 1996/97 grew'at an average annual rate of growth
(AARG)
of 7.8%. Airports
with above-average
growth,
Brisbane
and Perth,
were
becoming

important

gateways

as Australia's

popularity

as a long-haul

increased.
As a group, the airports serving domestic
traffic
though these were still buoyant markets over the long-term.
Aircraft

movements

grew

less strongly

as larger

aircraft

grew

tourist
at the

assumed

greater

destination

slowest

rates,

importance

so

that landed tonnes improved
Sydney, Brisbane and Perth,

almost in line with the number of passengers.
Indeed, for
landed tonnes increased at a faster rate than the number of

passengers.

When

was formed,

aeronautical

charges

the

FAC

as low as possible

in this regard,

one of the

by increasing

its income

its

from other sources.

The

up in the growth rate for revenue. As a result, the FAC's airports
collectively
a surplus before depreciation,
interest and taxes of US$262 million in 1996/97 on
billion 4. However,

does

not

include

Head

Office

activities

airports

Tables

retailing

tokeep

shows
earned

smaller domestic and general aviation
calculated in the FAC's accounts).

through

set was

successes

This

largely

it was

FAC's

an asset base of US$1.99

achieved

goals

2 and 3 also

did not share

and property

show

in the growth

sources,

that some

of the

and profits

(as
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Table 2: Average

annual

Airport

rates of growth

Cain

& White:

of FAC airports

Type of airport

Passengers

Privatisation

of Australian

Airports

- 1988/89

to 1996/97 t

Aircraft

Tonnes
landed

Revenue

Sydney

International

5.7%

3.3%

6.0%

Melbourne

International

7.0%

4.4%

4.6%

9.1%

Brisbane

International

8.5%

4.7*"0

8.9%

14.4%

Perth

International

8.3 %

5.3%

9.7%

14.1%

Adelaide

International

6. 1%

2.9%

5.4%

10.6%

Domestic

6.8%

1.0%

4.7%

8.2%

International

7.5%

-1.0%

6.3%

11.0%

Domestic

4.1%

0.5%

2.6%

n.a.

0.6%

n.a.

Coolangatta

(Gold

Coast) 3

Darwin:
Canberra 2
Bankstown

(Sydney)

4

General

aviation

HobarP

Domestic

6.8%

Townsville zJ

Domestic

4.2%

-5.8%

Alice Springs 28

Domestic

2.3%

Launceston

Domestic

Essendon (Melbourne)

General

Parafield (Adelaide)
Moorabbin
Jandakot

(Melbourne)
(Perth)

Atchcrfield

(Brisbane)

Mount Isa _

4.8%
21.7%

3.6%

9.3%

-3. 1%

1.7%

0.9*/.

-1.7%

5.2°/.

5.1%

2.3%

-3.6%

3.3%

aviation

n.a.

0.4%

-5.9%

4.5%

General

aviation

n.a.

2.5%

n.a.

17.4%

General

aviation

n.a.

-0.9%

n.a.

16.8%

General

aviation

n.a.

4.5%

n.a.

15.0%

General

aviation

n.a.

-0.3%

n.a.

11.8%

Domestic

Total

-10.6%

11.9%

5.9%

-17.9%

0.2%

5.7%

7.8%

3.0%

7.0%

12.5%

Notes: (1) Alice Springs, Canberra, Danvin, Mount Isa and Townsville
airports were transferred
to the FAC during 1989/90, the
year of a lengthy pilots' dispute. The AARG for these airports is for the shorter period of 1990/91 to 1996/97; (2) AARG of for
period 1990/91 to 1996197;
(3) Limited international
services operate from time to time to Coolangat'ta,
Hobart and Townsville
airports; (4) Camden and Hoxton Park general aviation airports included with Bankstown;
(5) Tennant
Creek included with Alice
Springs.
Sources:
Federal Airports Corporation,
Annual Reports 1987/88 to 1996/97.

Table 3: Profitability
Airport

of FAC airports
Total
Revenue
158,598

Sydney

- 1996/97
Operating
expenses
51,088

(US$000

at 1998/99

values)

EBDIT l

Depreciation

EBIT _

107,510

40,054

Assets

67,456

786,945

26,568

54,737

17,032

37,706

307,371

68,137

18,920

49,216

21,875

27,342

343,289

Perth

33,888

11,635

22,253

4,908

17,345

140,865

Adelaide

17,997

7,380

I 0,617

2,899

7,718

94,981

6,519

2,601

3,918

721

3,198

26,573

Danvin

5,495

3,004

2,491

3,189

-699

45,233

Canberra

5,101

2,278

2,823

510

2,313

32,556

4,694

2,620

2,074

1,398

676

80,182

Hobart

3,493

1,788

1,705

623

1,082

8,750

Townsville

2,848

2,014

835

1,360

-525

18,785

Alice Springs

2,841

1,813

1,028

1,430

-402

17,044

Launceston

2,712

1,377

1,335

562

773

10,797

Essendon (Melbourne)

2,330

1,749

581

677

-96

19,135

Parafield

1,297

770

527

355

172

15,369

1,166

885

28 t

263

Jandakot (Perth)

746

1,061

-315

281

-596

8,757

Archerfield

731

801

-70

161

-231

9,428

455

38S

66

379

-313

Melbourne

81,305

Brisbane

Coolangatla

(Gold Coast)

Bankstown

(Sydney)

(Adelaide)

Moorabbin

Mount
Total

Isa

(Melbourne)

(Brisbane)

400.353

'

138,740

261.613

95.677

17

162.937

13,074

7,189
1,986,324

Hoover,

Cain

& White:

Privatisation

of A ustralian

Airports

Notes: (I) Earnings before depreciation, interest, taxes; (2) Earnings before interest, taxes.
Source: Federal Airports Corporation, Annual Report 1996/9L

The path from government

department

to private

ownership

After World War II, a large number of aerodromes
became available in Australia for civil
aviation
operations.
As the volume
of air traffic increased,
most of the Federal
Government's
funds were directed towards
Local communities
had to bear the financial

the busiest airports
burden of developing

until 1941 when maintenance
grants
passenger
transport (RPT) services.

available

An Aerodrome
aerodromes

Local

Ownership

that served

were

Plan (ALOP)

a local rather

for all

aerodromes

was introduced

than a national

serving larger aircraft.
their own aerodromes
with

in 1958 under

need were to be owned,

regular

which

all

developed,

operated
and maintained
by the communities
they served
(Bureau
of Transport
Economics
1985). The Government
offered to transfer its aerodromes
to local authorities
- free of charge, and with an agreement to pay half of future approved maintenance
and
development
for an agreed period. The intent of this policy was that the Government
would support a local aerodrome wherever an RPT service could be sustained.
Over the next two decades,
the financial
burden on the Government
increased
as
responsibilities
were broadened
to include general aviation and aerodromes
on mission
stations.

By

1981, there

were

436 aerodromes

eligible

for assistance,

the Government

itself continuing
to own 81 civil airports, including
12 operated by the Department
of
Defence.
Successive
governments
in Australia
had set themselves
the objective
of
achieving full cost-recovery
from the civil aviation sector, but an inquiry calculated
that
only

55%

of costs

were

being

covered

through

Moreover,
the inquiry found that there were
administering
civil aviation in Australia (Bosch
As

a result,

Government
Federal

the

local

had

divested

Airports

ownership

Corporation

on the industry

significant
problems
et. al. 1984).

programme

itself

charges

was

accelerated

of all but the 23 airports

(FAC).

The most significant

transfer

this period was Cairns Airport which, under the ownership
became Australia's
fastest growing international
gateway.

with the

so that,

vested

against

sweeping

the Australian

management
management,

s The additions
Townsville.

the background

The

economy.

of the airports
and incentive

in 19S9 included
total

of a wide-ranging

by

The corporatisation

greater commercial
systems employed

airports

of 23 airports

shared

was reduced

in 1993

model

when

was intended

the

during

on 1 January
of the FAC
reform

to give the

to emulate
governance,
sector. The FAC was

of Defence

Cambridge

of

Port Authority,

of microeconomic

freedom and
in the private

with the Department

1994,

of ownership

of the Cairns

programme

system

in the newly-formed

The FAC commenced
with 17 airports and an asset base of US$0.8 billion
1988, but another
6 airports were added in April 19895. The formation
occurred

in 1982-83.

Airport

- Canberra.
was sold.

Darwin

and

Hooper,

responsible

for the

operation

Cain & White:
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including

terminal

of A ustralian

facilities

Airports

6 and

other

commercial
services, but did not include air traffic control. It became liable for payroll
taxes in 1998/99 and for income tax in 1991/92, and it had to earn a reasonable
rate of
return

and pay dividends

Transport

to direct the FAC to perform

It was intended
presents
situation
Perth

to the Government

that the FAC would

7. Residual

certain

powers

functions

lay with the Minister

in the public

operate the airports

of

interest 8.

along commercial

lines.

Table 4

selected
performance
measures
for 1991/92 and 1996/97
to document
during the early 1990's. The results for 1997/98 for Melbourne,
Brisbane

were taken

from annual

reports

produced

by their new owners

year of operation as privatised
airports. The remaining
were achieved by the FAC in its final year of operation.
For the group of airports, revenue
five years up to 1996/97, reflecting
of employees
economic

and

crisis

a 43%

increase

in the middle

revenue per employee
strong
improvement

per employee
the combined
in real

and cover

for

1997/98

increased by more than
effect of a 16% reduction

revenue.

of 1997, there

results

was

across all of the airports
in performance
between

Despite

a further

the

the first

in Table

4

54% over the
in the number

onset

of the

improvement

of

in 1997/98. This was
1996/97 and 1997/98

the
and

Asian

11.3%

in

assisted by the
at Melbourne,

Brisbane and Perth airports under their new owners - 37%, 35% and 30%, respectively.
Over the same period, Sydney Airport's revenue per employee
increased by 21%. Much
of this improvement

with increases

in the number

of passengers

and landed

tonnes. However,
Table 4 also shows that
improved in real terms throughout the 1990's.

revenue-earning

performance

generally

Despite

a record

is correlated

of improved

performance

within

a corporatised

structure,

there were

continuing
debates about the merits of fully privatising the airports (Mills 1995, White
1996). The distances between the main Australian airports places a limit on the amount of
competition

that can occur

accompanied

by regulation.

and it was recognised

that privatisation

Price caps were the preferred

approach,

would

have

although

to be

the problem

of creating workable
incentives
for the airport operator to improve quality and capacity
had been observed
(Rovizzi
& Thompson
1992). The FAC had been criticised
for its
failure

to use social

cost-benefit

analysis

to justify

capital

expenditure

incentive for private sector owners to do this would be considerably
1993). Also, Australian
airports were designed to cater for two major
and new entrants

to the airline

access

to terminal

would

ensure competitive

6 Prior
with

to the FAC
the domestic

7 The target

facilities.

taking

rate of retum

Ansert

of its airports,

arose

in 1990 complained

whether

the FAC was

pilots'

in 1989, for which

the Government

and Australian

was 7.5%

s For example,
dispute

after deregulation

weaker
domestic

a private

owner

but the
(Forsyth
carriers

about

their

of the airport

access.

control

airlines,

industry

The question

works,

directed

on assets
to waive

(later

before

merged

long-term

leases

for terminals

taxes.

its landing

it was compensated.

negotiated
into Qantas).

charges

for domestic

airlines

during

the extended

Hooper,

One of the events

that influenced

attitudes

Cain

&
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to privatisation

of Australian

was a review

of aeronautical

pricing
at Sydney
International
Airport.
The FAC continued
the practice
uniform, weight-based
prices for aeronautical
services for all of the airports.
one exception - congestion
charges were permissible
device. As a result of continuing
criticism
of the
especially
by airlines, the Government
1993) 9 to undertake a review.

Table 4: Performance
values)'

measures
Revenue

Airport

1991/92

Sydney

280,920

Melbourne

directed

for selected

per employee

Revenue

as management
being imposed,

Surveillance

years (expressed

Authority

in 1998/99

per passenger

of setting
There was

Revenue

(PSA

US$
per landed tonne

1997/98

1991/92

1996/97

1997198

1991/92

1996/97

1997/98

417,214

502,571

7.26

7.64

8.23

12.24

12.88

14.17

222,237

366,009

502,907

6.01

6.03

6.55

11.04

11.57

12.97

Brisbane

326,714

475,269

641,899

6.37

6.64

7.10

12.55

12.80

14.63

Perth

161,406

284,038

368,460

6.80

7.38

7.26

12.94

14.00

13.58

Adelaide

161,277

240,290

246,580

4.56

4.88

n.a.

10.09

11.27

n.a.

193,378

199,238

232,378

3.65

3.36

3.99

9.07

8.81

10.20

Coolangatta
Coast)

(Gold

1996/97

at Sydney Airport
way charges
were

the Prices

Airports

Darwin

106,101

198,096

187,259

5.74

5.43

5.50

8.35

8.01

8.27

Canberra

124,743

208,700

219,861

2.87

2.89

3.28

6.20

6.55

7.74

105,109

180,092

211,095

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

Hobart

98,911

132,384

121,856

5.87

4.10

3.96

15.25

10.96

Townsville

89,272

147,674

132,674

3.90

4.17

4.72

7.07

8.87

9.80

Bankstown

(Sydney)

11.14

Alice Springs

88,410

156,888

145,735

3.24

3.54

3.53

6.38

7.62

8.30

Launceston

96,675

110,852

114,297

6.03

4.62

4.20

13.18

10.37

9.35

Essendon

70,296

104,031

116,885

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

25.30

29.73

29.90

39,892

114,683

109,200

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

Moorabbin
(Melbourne)

69,098

I 11,549

97,839

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.
n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

Jandakot (Perth)

30,189

71,102

57,939

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

Archerfield(Brisbane) 66,744

85,986

102,515

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

Mount Isa

75,I12

127,790

150,259

4.41

4.77

4.73

6. I0

9.00

8.33

Total2

20 I,141

345,300

6.39

6.73

n.a.

I1.82

12.62

n.a.

Par'afield

('Melbourne)
(Adelaide)

310,270

Notes: (1)Melbourne, Brisbane and Perth airports
were operatedby theirnew owners throughout the 1997/98 financial
year. The
Phase 2 sales were effected at varying stages during 1997/98, but the data in the table were reported
by the FAC in its Annual
Report

on a full-year

basis;

(2) Total

results for 1997/98

do not include

Sources:
Federal Airports
Corporation,
Annual Reports
Annual Report 1997/98,
Westralia
Airport Corporation,
Annual Report 1997/98.

The PSA believed

that efficiency

1991/92,
Annual

would

Melbourne,

Brisbane

1996/97 and 1997/98,
Report
1997/98, and

be promoted

and Perth airports.

Australia
Brisbane

if each airport

that this form of cross-subsidisation
should be removed. In addition,
aeronautical
services
should
not be funded from non-aeronautical
congestion

charges

PSA further
methodology.

"; The

PSA

was

should

recommended

absorbed

into

be applied

to fully manage

that the FAC

the

Australian

and the PSA

Competition

and

10

Consumer

demand

Pacific
Airport

set its own fees and
the PSA argued
revenue
and

at Sydney

work jointly

Commission

Airports Corporation,
Corporation.Limited,

Airport.

that
that
The

on a price-capping

Hooper,

The completion
government

of this inquiry

business

enterprises

coincided

Cain

&
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Privatisation

with a shift in policy

with the proceeds

of A ustralian

towards

being used to reduce

Airports

privatisation
government

of
debt.

After wide-ranging
public
debate,
the ruling Australian
Labor
Party resolved
objections to privatisation.
In April 1994, the Government
announced
that it intended
sell its airports and a scoping
on how best to proceed.

The privatisation
Preparing

study was commenced

to guide

the Government's

its
to

thinking

process

for the sales

The Government
estimates

had made an allowance

for the

sale

of the

FAC

of US$1.4

but

billion

its advisers,

(1998/99

ANZ

values)

McCaughan

in its budget
and

Salomon

Brothers, proposed
a higher net value in 1994 of US$1.8 billion (1998/99
values).
proceeding
with the sale, it was clear that an important objective was the maximisation
the proceeds from the sale, but the Govemment
announced
that it had set a number

In
of
of

sales and ongoing objectives to be met by the winning bidder. Apart from net proceeds on
a risk-adjusted
basis
to the Commonwealth,
financial
strength
and management
capabilities
development

to operate
plans and

environmental
credentials
in the selection criteria.

and develop
airports,
extent
of local
commitment
to the effective
development
and equitable

treatment

of FAC employees

participation,
of airport

airport
services,

were to be included

The Government
also set a limit of 49% foreign ownership
and a requirement
that the
majority of directors
of an airport lessee be Australian
citizens or Australian
residents.
Restrictions
a maximum
Privatisation

were placed on cross-ownership
of major
share of 5% of the airport operators.
of a single

airport,

let alone a system

airports

and airlines

of airports, is a complex

were limited to

exercise.

Four

years were to pass between the announcement
of a policy decision to privatise Australia's
airports and the conclusion
of two phases of the sale process. Even then the most valuable
airport,
Sydney,
was put to one side pending resolution
of uncertainties
about the
development
milestones

of a second
leading

major

airport

in the Sydney

region.

Table

5 summarises

the key

to the sale of the first set of airports.

Preliminary
work took 16 months to complete,
but key issues had to be addressed.
A
scoping study evaluated
sale options and led to decisions
to sell the FAC as a set of
individual

airports

a public tender
to retain
services
problems

rather

process

than as a system.
rather

This was to be achieved

than through

a set of public

the FAC as a public corporation
providing
on a commercial
consultancy
basis, but
of Sydney

from the privatisation

Airport
process

resulted
(White

airport management
later developments

in the Government's
1996).

11

through

trade

sales in

floats. The initial intention

decision

was

and technical
linked to the

to exclude

the FAC

Hooper,
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of Australian

aeronautical

to the airports.
The FAC facilitated
reorganisation.
This included a revision

charges.

The previous

practice

of setting

network-wide

aeronautical

was abandoned
in favour of location and service specific
charges.
system was effected
for Sydney,
Melbourne,
Brisbane,
Perth and

airports

on 1 January

charges

introducing
international

1997. Landing

represented

an

the charges,
the
standards.
Further

October

1998

freighter

aircraft

In addition,

with

the

fees had been held constant

increase

effect

and appropriate

vested

legislation

10.8%

in total

since April

The new
Adelaide

1991 and the

aeronautical

charges.

In

FAC claimed
that its landing
fees remained
low
changes in tariffs for Sydney Airport were introduced
that costs

fell while charges

the assets

of

had
that

the sales process by
of the structure of the

charges
pricing
new

Airports

of the FAC did not facilitate the sale as proposed
since each airport
as a cost centre with the Head Office providing
a range of services

needed
to be devolved
undertaking
the necessary
FAC's

Cain

of landing

smaller,

rose for intemational

domestic

passenger

in the FAC had to be transferred
was drawn

up in the Airports

jet

aircraft
back

aircraft

by
in
and

by up to 30%.

to the Government

(Transitional)

Act.

This also

enabled the Government
to grant long-term
leases in airport
land to "airport
lessee
companies".
At the same time, it was necessary for the Government
to pay offthe FAC's
debts of US$441 million. An additional piece of legislation,
the Airports Act established
the regulatory
framework
that would apply to airports after the sales were completed,
including provisions
dealing with foreign ownership. In particular, the Act nominated
the
Australian

Competition

and Consumer

Commission

(ACCC)

as the body

responsible

for

administering
price-cap regulation,
price surveillance
and quality of service monitoring.
The ACCC also was empowered
to publish information
that the airport operators
were
obliged to provide. The Minister for Transport
also retained
discretionary
powers to
introduce traffic management
measures.
The passage

of the Bills

removal

the

of

was

Australian

delayed
Labor

as a result
Party

from

of an election
power

which

and

its

resulted

replacement

in the
by

a

Liberal/National
Party Coalition.
Although
the new Government
had opposed
certain
aspects of the airport Bills while in opposition,
it moved
ahead with privatisation.
Although
it had an estimated
worth equal to half of the total value of the other 21
airports, the decision was made to defer the sale of Sydney
general aviation airports in the Sydney region, Bankstown,
The remaining
Melbourne,

Brisbane,

that negotiations
the runway _°.
Phase

17 airport

leases

Perth

could

International
Airport and the
Camden and Hoxton Park.

were to be sold in two tranches.

and Adelaide.

continue

Subsequently,

with the State

The first was to include

Adelaide's

Government

about

sale was delayed
a proposal

so

to extend

1 sales

The Government

initially

but

this

later

passed

managed

to a new

the sales process
body,

the

Office

ko In July 1997, the Government
injected USSI6 million
Another
USS2 million was provided
at a later date.

12

through
of Asset

into the FAC

the Department
Sales

to fund

and

the runway

of Finance,

IT Outsourcing
extension.

Hooper,

(OASITO).
Department
from
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Input on transport
policy and regulatory
matters
of Transport and Regional Development.
Expressions

interested

gathering,

parties

evaluation,

of A ustralian

A irports

was provided
by the
of interest were invited

in September

of 1996 as a demanding

schedule

of information

proposal

assessment

A total

of

and

commenced.

170

parties

expressed initial interest, but only 60 of these participated
in the first stage, and only 30
submissions
were received by the due date of 10 'h October 1996. Twelve of these were
selected for further consideration
and their backers were invited to tender.
To assist

the bidders

undertake

their "due

diligence"

task force had prepared relevant documentation
and presenting
relevant
data t_. Since this
Government
then

only provided

went

to considerable

its Information
length

financial

information

measures

and relevant

was criticised

were

consortia

conducted

to airport sites,
was established

plans and drawings.

and the ANAO

for both the

value of the assets
information,
the

to the shortlisted
sales

given access
A data room

documents,

by the bidders

sale process had been increased
National Audit Office 1998).

that the

the Government's

the potential
confidential

Memoranda

to ensure

playing
field. Shortlisted
consortia
were
managers,
and to other key stakeholders.

investigations,

indicating
involved

Government

and

to the FAC's
and contained

The adequacy

later judged

and

on a level

of these

that the costs

the bidders

of the

(Australian

Other ground rules governing
the sales were that the consortia were not permitted
to use
the media in a way that would influence valuations,
and no negotiations
were entered into
about the tender documents
themselves.
The bidders had until the end of January to
formalise
their bids. At that stage, 9 consortia
submitted
17 bids for the 3 airports.
However, there were certain aspects of these bids that did not conform
with the tender
specifications
and all parties were invited to re-submit.
The Government
selected the 3
winning
Table

bids from the 13 revised
5: Milestones

Date

1 of airport

its decisions

in May 1997.

sales

Event

April
May

- Phase

bids and announced

1994

Government
publishes a White Paper on Employment
principle, to sell the FAC's airports

1994

Scoping study initiated
regulatory requirements

June 1994
March
April

BZW engaged to provide business
strategies and the actions required
Scoping study completed

1995
1995

August

feasibility

of selling

in which

the FAC network

it announces

an intention,

and to report

on post-sale

advice to the soaping study task force to advise
to achieve the Government's
timetable.

on sale options

in

and

Decision to sell all 22 FAC airports in two phases in individual trade sales. First tranche to be Sydney
(including Sydney West), Melbourne,
Brisbane and Perth. Adelaide Airport was added later.

1995

September

1995

December

1995

Match

to investigate

and Growth

BZW appointed
as Business Adviser
and bidder contract negotiations.

to assist with marketing,

due diligence,

tendering

Bills introduced
into Parliament.
The Airports Bill established the regulator)
frame,york
privatisation and the Airports (Transitional)
Bill 1995 facilitated
the sale of the leases.
Appointment
of legal advisers (AGS and Clayton Ut.z.)

1996

and bid evaluation
for post-

New Government
elected, but commitment to complete the first phase of sales (Melbourne,
Perth) by 30 June 1997. Sydney _as excluded from the Phase 1 sales pending the resolution

Brisbane
of noise

and

issues over Sydney and the completion of an environmental
impact study for the proposed
second
Sydney Airport at Badgerys Creek (Sydney West Airport). Adelaide also was removed
from Phase 1
sales in order to resolve issues in relation to a proposal to extend the international
terminal..
Airpor_ Sales Task Force within Department
of Finance formed to manage and complete
the sales. The

_ The

preparation

of

the

Information

Memoranda

occurred

13

over

a period

at'twelve

months

Hooper,

&

Office of Asset Sales takes over the task of managing
Transport and Communications'
role was to develop
evaluate bids from a transport policy perspective.

1996

I g October

1996

Privatisation

Call for expressions
of interest in Phase I airports. The requirements
and basis for shortlisting of consortia were issued.

1996

10 October

White:

of Australian

Department of Transport was reorganised as the Department of Transport and Regional
Amended Bills passed in Parliament and effective from 9 October 1996.

September
1996
12 September
1996
October

Cain

for participating

Airports

Development.
in the bid process

and completing the sales. The Department
legislation and regulations, prepare leases,

of
and

Invitation for expressions
of interest closed. 170 parties registered an interest and 60 of these participated
in the bidding process. 30 lodged expressions of interest by the due date.
12 consortia were short-listed and were issued with a Request for Proposal.

30 October 1996
November 1996

Tender documents

were

issued after the signing

of confidentiality

agreements.

Government's
paper on Pricing Policy for airports released (developed
by the Department
and Regional Development
in consultation with the Australian Competition
and Consumer
and other stakeholders).

30 January 1997

9 consortia
The Office

February 1997

of Transpon
Commission

submitted a total of 18 offers (5 for Melbourne, 6 for Brisbane and 7 for Perth)
of Asset Sales and its Business Adviser evaluated the offers and concluded that a further

round of bids was necessary to improve the offers in terms of their conditionality
and conformity
tender requirements.
Six of the consortia were invited to participate in this third stage..
12, revised bids were submitted by the 6 consortia (3 for Melbourne,
5 for Brisbane,
5 for Perth)
Decisions made about successful bids.

10 April1997
3May 1997
7May
1997
1 July 1997

Sale Agreements

were signed for the airports

with

for a total of US$2.1 billion.

New airport operators take over control at Melbourne,
airport sales process completed.

Brisbane

and Perth Airports

and Phase

I of the

Given the initial expectation
of a total net sales figure of US$1.4 billion in the budget
estimates, the first tranche of sales netted US$2.0 billion alone _2.On average, the amounts
paid implied an earnings
multiple t3 of 16.8 compared
to multiples
of 5 to 10 times
earnings
in sales of international
airports in Europe (Australian
National
Audit Office
1998). Details about the winning bids are provided in Table 5.
_'

Melboume/Tultamarine:
Australia
bid of US$0.8 billion (price-earnings

_'

Brisbane: Brisbane Airport
earnings ratio = 18.0)

_'

Perth: Airstratia
ratio = 18.4)

Airport

Corporation

Development

Table 6: First round

of airport

Airport leasing

Limited

Group

(ADG)

Australia

Pacific Airports

Brisbane

Brisbane

Airport

Pet_h

Airstralia

Development

Corporation

Corporation

Ltd

Group

1

Sources:
ANAO (1998), FAC Ann,al Report 1996/97, Australia
Airport Corporation
Limited Annual Report 1997/98. Westralia
Releases issued by the Minister of Transport.

i,. The

gross

payment
_ Defined
revealed

proceeds

to State
here
in the

were

US$2,121

governments

in lieu

as the

sale

FAC's

Annual

price

million,
of

divided
Report

Corporation

(BACL)

(APAC)

for US$0.9

for US$0.4

billion

with its

billion

(price-

(price-earnings

sales

company

Melbourne

Total Phase

Pacific Airports
ratio -- 15.1)

by
for

against

stamp

duty)

earnings

Amount

Price

X

SUS
millions
1998/99

Earnings
Ratio

Factor

before

14

Finance

15.1

4.0%

15%

18.0

4.5%

16%

47%

37%

409.6

18.4

5.5%

16%

0%

84%

2,120.8

16.8

direct

sale

costs

0%

of investor

827.5

which

1996/97.

Local

883.7

Pacific Airports Corporation
Airport Corporation
Ann,_al

were

Share by category
Operator/
Manager

Ann,al
Report
Report 1997/98,

of

USS98

85%

1997/98, Brisbane
and various Press

million

(including

incurred.
depreciation,

interest

and

taxes

(EBDIT)

as

a

Hooper, Cain & White: Privatisation

The Australian
certain

aspects

National

Audit

Office

of the sales process

subsequently

- notably

released

the failure

a report

of A ustralian

Airports

that was critical

of the Commonwealth

of

to indicate

how it would weight assessment
criteria and its contracting
procedures
for advisers
during the sales process (ANAO 1998). One of the most contentious
issues with the sale
process was the way in which infrastructure
bonds were taken into account in assessing
the after-tax value of the bids to the Government t'. The Government's
financial adviser
developed
different
practical

a specific model to evaluate the impact of infrastructure
bonds, employing
a
methodology
embodied
in the Department
of Treasury's
own model. The
result

for Melbourne

of this was that the second-highest

bid was awarded

the sale of the lease

Airport.

_ The financial structures established by the various consortia all had tax implications. The ANAO
reported that the Government should have earned US$1.0 billion in company tax from the airports over a
period of 20 years. However, very high gearing levels and asset revaluations would ensure that the new
airport owners would avoid paying any of this tax, even though the owners expected to earn a return of 1314% before tax.
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of Australian

Airports

Phase 2 sales
The

Government

announced

airports with the
Brochure released
August

revealed

on

12 June

1997

that it would

exception
of those in the Sydney region.
by the Ministers for Finance and Transport
that 8 core airports

sell the remaining

FAC

A preliminary
Information
& Regional Services on 12

would be sold by long-term

leasehold.

The airports

in

this group were Adelaide,
Alice Springs,
Canberra,
Coolangatta,
Darwin,
Hobart,
Launceston
and Townsville.
The remaining
7 regional airports were to be sold on a
freehold basis subject to agreement with State and Territory Governments.
On 10 October

1997, interested

parties

of interest. More than 80 separate
date on 27 October.
Following

were invited to begin

preparing

their expressions

bids were lodged by 30 consortia before the closing
a review by the Office of Asset Sales and the

Government's
Business Adviser, BZW, 26 groups were advised on 6 November that they
had been placed
on a shortlist
and that they should
prepare
detailed
bids. The
Government
indicated that all 15 of the airports were to be sold on a leasehold
although it reserved the fight to offer some of the smaller airports on a freehold
provided

the relevant

State Governments

introduced

appropriate

regulations

basis,
basis

ts.

All of the bidders were provided
with relevant information
on a CD-ROM
package,
eliminating
the need for the data room used in the Phase 1 sales. Although the "Phase 2"
airports

were,

in the

main,

much

smaller

than

those

sold

previously,

the

task

was

nonetheless
another demanding
one. There was greater scope for local participation
in the
bidding and it was expected that there would be more inexperienced
groups involved. The
larger number of airports ranging from capital city international
gateways (Adelaide and
Darwin _) to airports that served only general aviation added to the dimensions
of the
task.

Winning bids for 11 of the airports were announced
in March 1998 while continuing
negotiations
were occurring for the three airports in the Northern Territory, Darwin, Alice
Springs and Tennant
Creek. Only Essendon
Airport in Melbourne
failed to attract an
acceptable
offer. This airport was withdrawn
from sale and subsequently
has been set up
as a stand-alone
airport company, Essendon Airport Limited, with all of the share vested
in the Australian
Government.
In the case of Darwin and Townsville
airports, the
runways
and taxiways remained
under the ownership
of the Department
of Defence.
However,
defence functions carried out at Canberra's
Fairbairn Base are to be relocated
over time. Accordingly,
the lease agreement
with the new owner
the taxiways and the major part of the Fairbairn Base.

When the negotiations
for the 3 airports
Government
had received
an additional
Even

though

these

sales occurred

*: The

outcome,

though,

was that none

*° Hobart.

the capital

of the State

the runways,

in the Northern Territory
were completed,
the
US$468.4
million from 9 different
consortia.

after the onset

of the airports

of Tasmania.

includes

was sold

has international

16

of the Asian

on a freehold
sen'ices

economic

crisis

basis.

on an irregular

basis.

in July

Hooper,

Cain

& White." Privatisation

of A ustralian

1997, the prices were still relatively high in terms of an average price-ea.rnings
of 18.6. Details about the winning consortia are summarised
in Table 7.
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Table

7: Second

round

of airport

Airport

& Patafield

Darwin,

Alice

&

White:

Privatisation

company

& Tennant

Creek

Airports

Amount

Price

X

$US millions
1998/99

Earnings
Ratio

Factor

MSUM

Springs

of A ustralian

sales

Airport leasing

Adelaide

Cain

Airport

232.1

20.8

70.6

20.1

3.0*/,z

67. I

17.1

4.5%

42.6

Development Group

Coolangatta

Queensland Airports

Canberra

Capital Airports

15.1

1.0%

Hobart

Hobart International Airports Corporation

23.0

13.5

3.0*/,

Launceston

Australia Pacific Airports (Launceston)
Pry Ltd

11.1

8.3

2.5%

Australian Airports Pty Lid

10.2

11.3

1.0% 3

5.3

18.7

0.0%

Townsville

& Mount

Isa

Ltd

4.0% I

Group

Moorabbin

Moorabbin

Jandakot

Jandalcot Airport Holdings

4.3

-13,6

Atcherfield
Total Phase 2

Archerficld Airport Corporation Pry Ltd

2.0

-28.4

0.0%

18.6

16.0%

Airport Corporation Pty Ltd

468.4
Notes: (1) X-factor
Townsville.
Source:
Joint
Development.

applies only to Adelaide;

media

releases

Cross-ownership
emerged.

by the

Minister

of airports

Infratil

(2) X-factor

applies

for Finance

& Administration

was permitted

Australia

Pty

only to Darwin and Alice

in the Phase

Limited

became

Springs;

and the Minister

(3) X-factor

applies only to

for Transport

and Regional

2 sales and several

the

majority

0.0%

combinations

shareholder

in Perth

International
Airport in July 1997, and it took a 51% share of the Airport Development
Group in its winning
bid for Darwin, Alice Springs and Tennant
Creek (Northern
Territory)
airports. Airport Group International
also owned shares in these
- 16.5% of Perth International
Airport and 49% of the Northern
Territory
30% of Hobart Airport.

Australia

Pacific

of Launceston

Airports
Airport

Corporation,
as Pacific

consortium
for Adelaide
Airport
Manchester
Airport Plc was involved
to provide management
services tT.

The

regulatory

On-going

The Governments

and regulatory

on-going

objectives

_7 This

common
Investments

Airport,

Pty

purchased

Limited.

also was successful
in
in this consortium
through

The

90%

winning

acquiring
Coolangatta.
a contractual
agreement

provisions
for privatisation

sufficient
diversity
of ownership
and competitive
benchmarking"

Ensure that air service
commercial
terms

Serco

(Launceston)

framework

objectives

_" Establish
innovation

the owner of Melbourne
Airports

same airports
airports, and

members
Australia

of

the

operators

consortia

Limited,

the

for

enjoy

of the

competitive

Adelaide

Macquarie

were to:

and
Bank,
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Coolangarta
and

Unisuper

airports

access

"in

the

to airports

airports
Limited

were

interests

on reasonable

financial

institutions,

of

Hooper,

_" Maintain a commitment
airport services
_'

Sustain investments
pricing policies

by airport

required

Promotion
of economic
environmental
management
In addition,
monopoly
prices.

the Government
power

in relation

The regulatory

Officers

of Transport

ensure compliance
A condition

acknowledged

services

region

Development

was that the new owners

sound

degree

of

and monitor

of the sales was set out in the

expense

and development

with

had some

has appointed

at the

appropriate

to control

responsibilities
for economic
and Consumer
Commission

Controllers,

with environmental

through

that airports

Airports

of quality

consistent

and the need

to apply after completion

and Regional

of A ustralian

to the provision

of the

concerns

to aeronautical

Building

of the sales

companies

development
of the region
and the interests of users.

framework

and Airport

leasing

& White: Privatisation

for development

Airports Act 1996 with administration
mostly on the Australian
Competition
Department

Cain

regulation
(ACCC)

falling
Is. The

Airport

Environment

airport

operators,

of the

to

requirements.

could

not sell their

shares

during

the

first two years without the consent of the Government
authority to prevent mergers and acquisitions
deemed

and the ACCC has the necessary
not to be in the public's
interests.

Though some cross-ownership
arrangements
occurred
sales, the major airports are independently-owned.

during

The early experience
with the Phase 1 airports
has brought new ideas to airport management

the second

phase

of airport

has been that each of the new operators
based on their international
experiences.

Their annual reports, for example, reflect a strong marketing
orientation,
particularly
relation
to non-aeronautical
and property
services.
Emphasis
also
is given
organisational

structures,

cost control

and management

teams

with

strong

local community.
The Australian
approach to privatisation
requires disclosure
and operating information
to assist the ACCC in its on-going
monitoring.
reports

for Melbourne,

Brisbane

information

to the public

The ACCC

and the airport

competitive
Westralia

access.
Airport

about

Both

Limited

and Perth

airports

certainly

have

links

in
to

to the

of financial
The annual

disclosed

detailed

their plans and performances.

operators

already

Australia
(Perth)

have been active

Pacific

sought

Airports

in clarifying

Corporation

determinations

from

the terms

(Melbourne)

the ACCC

of
and

on terms

and

conditions applying to a range of airport services and the procedures
for dealing with
negotiations
and disputes. The ACCC did not, in the first instance, accept these proposals
- largely

on the grounds

access

undertakings,

directly

to arbitrate

the airport

_3Details
privatised

about

the

party

seeking

if a satisfactory

operator.

enforceability

of enforceability.

The

ACCC

of the undertakings,
the ACCC's

airports

interpretation

are available

on its web

In the absence
access

agreement

to the airport
cannot

was not satisfied
pricing

of services

of its responsibilities

can

be reached
with the
outside

determination

appeal

provisions
the price

of

to the ACCC

in the first instance

and its determinations

site e[ http://www.accc.go_.au.

19

of a favourable

relating

with
to the

cap, the adequacy
in relation

to

Hooper,

of information
supplied
procedures.
In addition,

to access
the ACCC
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seekers, and the negotiation
and dispute resolution
has issued a draft determination
in relation to rental

car services, judging them to be a "declared" airport service under the Airports Act 1996.
The ACCC's
activity in these matters indicates clearly that competitive
access will
continue to be monitored
carefully.
The

Sale Agreements

tied

aeronautical
infrastructure
the new airport owners

the

bidders

development
are obliged

to specific

amounts

of capital

expenditure

on

for the initial ten years of the lease. Collectively,
to spend almost US$450
million
on continued

development
and major maintenance
works over the next ten years. Lessees failing to live
up to these commitments
incur a liability to repay the difference to the Government.
The
leases also contain an undertaking
on the part of the lessee to develop
own expense consistent with a major international
airport throughout
lease. The leases for the general aviation airports require
airport, but place few other obligations
on the new owners.
Furthermore,

the new airport

operators

were required

communities

will be fully appraised

of development

continued

to submit

maj or development
proposals
for the approval of the Minister
Development
following
a minimum
90 day public comment

the airport site at its
the full term of the
operation

airport

master

plans and

for Transport and Regional
process. This ensures that

proposals

and that they will have a

reasonable
opportunity
to comment
on their impacts. The new airport operators
are active in establishing
formal lines of communication
with the local community
pursuing joint development
and tourism marketing initiatives.
Price

and quality

of service

as an

already
and in

regulation

A distinction
has been made to aeronautical
services where the airport operator has a high
degree of monopoly power and those services provided on airports that face competition
from off-airport
sites. The details of the price oversight arrangements
are described
in
more detail by the ACCC (1997). The price caps apply to declared airport services for a
period of five years, by which time the ACCC is to provide advice to the Government
about the need for continuing oversight of prices.
Tables 6 and 7 specified
the price cap commitments
entered into by the new airport
operators within a CPI-X formula approach. That is, an airport operator is not-permitted
to increase declared aeronautical
charges by more than the Consumer
Price Index less a
pre-determined

factor.

operator to pursue

The

efficiency

intent

of this mechanism

improvements

and to pass the benefits

The particular

way the price cap is applied

using

shares

rise

revenue
above

the price

from the previous
cap for specific

is to apply

is on a weighted

period

as weights.

items provided

there

average

pressure

on the airport

on to airport

users.

of a basket

That is, prices

of tariffs,

are permitted

are compensating

elsewhere
within the tariff basket. This allows the airport operator the flexibility
modif3' pricing structures.
The operators also are permitted
to over- or trader-recover
each

period,

provided

that

the

pricing

commitment

2O

is met over

the

to

reductions

five-year

to
in

period.

Hooper,

Under particular
charges to recoup

Cain

circumstances,
the airport
investments
in infrastructure.
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are permitted

Airports

to increase

their

Regulation
of charges other than those services declared to be within the price capping
arrangements
also is effected by the ACCC in its price-monitoring
role. The Treasurer
issued a direction to the ACCC specifically
to monitor "aeronautical-related"
charges at
particular privatised
airports. It is worth noting that the Government's
Business
Adviser
made

it clear to bidding

charges

or introducing

imposed

consortia

that there

new charges

was scope

to increase

outside the price cap. Levies,

on taxis and other commercial

passenger

vehicles

revenue

by varying

for example,

at Brisbane

have been

and Perth

airports.

The most contentious
issue to date, though, has been in relation to aircraft refuelling.
These are not included
in the price cap so that the airport operators
are free to vary
charges

without

contracts
introduce

formally

notifying

the ACCC.

The FAC had made provisions

within its

with oil companies
for the introduction
of a fuel throughput
levy. Proposals to
such charges have been raised for Brisbane and Perth airports and the ACCC

has made it clear that this is a designated
aeronautical-related
service that it is obliged to
monitor formally in terms of prices, costs and profits. The ACCC expressed
the view that
the price reductions
achieved over five years under the price cap should not be expected
to be offset by increases in other charges not related to changes in costs in provision.
In

addition

to the

commitments

made

under

the

sale

agreements

for

continuing

investments
by the airport operators, the Airport Act 1996 provides for monitoring
of
quality of services
at the core airports. This monitoring
is linked to pricing
oversight
arrangements
and is administered
analyse changes in service levels
performance

indicators

aerobridges,

waiting

such

again by the ACCC. The approach
taken
over time. The ACCC has indicated that

as

aircraft

times and crowding

delay,
associated

availability
with passenger

equipment
availability
and the standard of facilities. Results
will be published by the ACCC at least every two years.

Concluding

of

aircraft

Perth

by strong

outbound

travel

the high growth

airports

and

processing

facilities,
exercises

comments

in Asia was moderated
particular,

gates

of the monitoring

The new airport owners for Melbourne,
Brisbane and Perth airports purchased
to the onset of the Asian economic crisis. Although the impact of the economic
of the Australian

will be to
it will use

depended

Airport

Corporation

declined

by 10,000

rates

growth

in the Australian

market,

that had been

to a far greater

Limited,

for

sales

example,

were equally

experienced

degree

on Asian

reported

in its first year. Nevertheless,

second phase of airport
become apparent.

economy

all of the new airport

that

high even though
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and by an expansion

owners

were affected.

previously
tourism
its

the price-earnings

just prior
downturn

at Brisbane
markets.

passenger
ratios

In
and

Brisbane
movements

involved

the downturn

in the

in Asia had
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There are various reasons why the winning bids for Australia's
airports
earnings ratios relative to the sales of airports in Europe. One explanation

had high pricefor this is that

there

airports.

have, to now,

been

limited

opportunities

to purchase

especially the case in the Asia Pacific region
aviation market until the middle of 1997.

where

international

there was very strong

This is

growth

in the

Another factor is that most of the airports enjoy a significant
degree of local monopoly
power. All of the major airports
are located at some distance
from each other. For
example, the distance
between Sydney and Melbourne
is 707 kilometres
2,120 kilometres
from its closest state capital city, Adelaide. Although
scope for the airports
the major Australian

19, and Perth is
there is some

to vie for a share of the international
traffic, generally it is true that
airports do not compete with each other. Also, the nature of the

airline networks does not lend itself to the type of competition
North America and Europe for hub transfer business.

Another factor that influenced
the sale prices
improved.
The Federal Airports
Corporation

seen

at some

airports

in

was the prospect
that earnings
could be
claimed that studies proved it had low

aeronautical
charges by international
standards and that it was an most efficient operator.
The bidders appear to have believed that they would be able to increase earnings, if not
improve efficiency at the same time. In their first year of operation, the phase 1 airports
have demonstrated
their zeal in marketing
their yields from non-aeronautical
sources.

retail

and property

services

and in improving

The difficulties in privatising
airports is demonstrated
in two ways. That it took between
3 to 4 years to sell the airports
after first making
a policy
decision
in favour of
privatisation

illustrates

the complexity

of the task.

Even

after

five

years

have

passed,

though, Australia's
major airport remains
on the Govemment's
books despite a very
strong financial incentive to sell. Major airports are more than commercial
undertakings
and, in Sydney's
case, on-going
regional planning and environmental
issues are difficult
enough to resolve while the airport is owned by the Government.
Nevertheless,
its assets

and

the Government
it has used

has succeeded

the funds

to retire

in realising
public

higher

debt.

than expected

It is too early

prices for

yet to decide

whether the Government
also has been successful
in achieving
its post-privatisation
objectives,
but the regulatory
framework
has been established.
This framework
ensures
that there relevant information
will be available
to the regulators,
public. Researchers
assessing
the merits of airport privatisation
useful lessons from the Australian case in years to come.

x_ Measured
Distances.

as a Great

Circle

distance

(Department

of Transport

_M

and Communications

airport users and the
will be able to draw
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Abstract
Regulating Access to Airport
Peter
In the mid

1990s

Australia

privatised

Facilities

Forsyth
most

of its major

city

airports.

When

it did, it imposed
a system of price-caps
to regulate
aeronautical
charges. At
about the same time it instituted
general
changes
in competition
policy
which included
explicit
regulation
of access to essential
facilities.
Where a
firm owns natural monopoly
facilities,
or facilities
which are uneconomic
to
duplicate,

such

as electricity

required
to make
price. This access
is either
detailed
judged

transmission

grids

or gas pipelines,

it can be

these facilities
available
to its competitors
at a regulated
regime is also being applied to airports;
something
which

unique to Australia
or very rare. It may well result in extremely
regulation
of airports.
Where
airport
facilities
or services
are
necessary

for civil aviation

and uneconomic

to duplicate,

they can be

made subject
to access
regulation.
Such facilities
include
runways
and
taxiways,
aircraft
parking
areas,
international
passenger
processing
facilities,
land for freight operations
and landside vehicle
facilities.
The objective
of this access regime
is to promote
competition
in the
provision
of airport services.
The ways in which it applies
to airports
is
described
in this paper. This regulatory
regime poses a number
of difficult
issues; these include the relationship
cap regulation,
the choice of ai_ort
and
access
measurement
with

an overall

between
access
price structures,

regulation
new entry

to terminals,
choice
of access
pricing
of costs. These are explored
in the paper,
assessment

of access

regulation

and priceby airlines

principles
and
which concludes

in the airport

context.

Introduction
Airports typically possessconsiderable market power, and it is not unusual
for them to be subjected to price regulation. When countries such as the UK
and Australia privatised their airports, they instituted detailed systems of
regulation of the prices that airports charge their customers,
primarily
airlines.
incentives

Regulation
has its costs,
one of which
facing firms to keep costs at a minimum;

able to keep

all the savings

they make,

is a reduction
in the
since firms may not be

they are less likely

to make

them. A

system of privately
owned airports, subjected
to a form of regulation
which
is designed
to be relatively
positive
in terms of incentives,
is regarded
in
several countries
as likely as any to produce
efficient
performance.
Few
countries

take the regulatory

Australia

has

taken

approach

a further

further.

step in regulating

its airports.

It is applying

regulation
of access to essential
facilities
regulation
to airports.
Not many
countries
have explicit
essential
facilities regulation,
and those which do, do
not extend it to airports.
This regulation
is normally
applied
to significant
natural

monopolies,

such

as

telecommunications

local

loops,

electricity

grids, rail track and gas pipelines.
Its objective
is to make competition
in the
final good or service,
such as telephone
calls or retail electricity,
feasible by
enabling
terms.

many

firms

to obtain

Australia
has created
a general
is applying
it to airports.
This

access

to the bottleneck

SYstem of essential
means that a range

facility

on equal

facilities
regulation,
and
of facilities
and services,

which make up an airport,
such as runways,
taxiways,
aprons,
passenger
processing
facilities
in terminals,
freight
facilities
and vehicle
landside
facilities
are individually
being subjected
to access regulation.
Thus it is
possible
for a firm which wishes to compete
with the airport in providing
passenger
services
or to handle freight can seek access to the airport's
land
and facilities,
and if need be, get the competition
regulator
to regulate prices
and conditions
of access. In some cases, this could have large implications
for the way

airports

are run;

airports.
It may result
Furthermore,
depending
entry

into the domestic

it may result

in substantial

unbundling

of the

in exceptionally
detailed
regulation
of airports.
on how it develops,
it could have implications
for
airline

industry.

The background
to these changes
this,
the application
of access

is discussed
in the next section,
and after
regulation
to airports
is outlined.
In the

following section, a range of issueswhich arise from this are analysed. In
the final section, a brief assessment is made of the new regulatory
framework.

Background: Airport

Privatisation

and Access

Regulation

The implementation
of access
regulation
in the context
of airports
in
Australia
is the result of two policy shifts. Firstly there was the privatisation
of most of the main airports.
Secondly,
there was the creation
of a whole
new system of access pricing
industries,
designed
to control

regulation,
monopoly

applicable
across
power in bottleneck

a wide range
facilities.

Most of the large city airports
in Australia were privatised
1998. Airports
such as those at Melbourne,
Perth and Brisbane

of

in 1997 and
were sold by

the federal
government
to consortia,
which
included
major
airports
overseas,
such as BAA
which owns the London
airports,
and Schiphol.
There were exceptions,
such as Sydney, the nation's
largest airport, which
has been retained
in government
ownership
pending
decisions
about future
expansion
of capacity
at a second airport, and because
of environmental
problems.
Another
by local government

exception
is that of Cairns
authorities.

airport,

which

Airports
in Australia
are separated
by large distances,
scope for them to compete
except for a limited amount

remains

owned

and there is little
of business.
Thus

they have considerable
market
power.
In recognition
of this, they are
subjected
to price regulation
(strictly speaking,
this is described
as price
surveillance,
which is slightly less binding
than regulation)(Forsyth,1997).
The
general
competition
regulator,
the Australian
Competition
and
Consumer
Commission
(ACCC), is charged with the price regulatory
task.
The preferred
method
of regulation
in Australia
is that of CPI-X regulation,
or price-caps,
which
Price-caps
have been
though
associated

non

is also the preferred
method
imposed
on a defined bundle

aeronautical
with

this

services

method

have

are
been

not

price

recognised

in the United
of aeronautical
regulated.
by the

Kingdom.
services,

The
ACCC,

problems
and

to

some extent
addressed.
For example, profit maximising
firms facing pricecaps have an incentive
to save on costs by lowering quality; to this end, the
ACCC monitors
quality of service (ACCC, 1998a).

The system of price regulation is now well established, but some problems
have emerged. In particular, there has been a problem of fuel levies.
Airports in Australia do not have a history of charging levies on fuel
throughput, such as many European airports do. Thus such levies were not
included in the original bundle of services to be price-capped. Soon after
they were privatised, the new owners of Brisbane and Perth airports
imposed fuel levies. Such levies are very difficult for airlines to avoid, and
they constitute an effective means of circumventing the price-cap. While,
for the present, such levies are accepted as outside the price-cap, the ACCC
has argued for legislation to include them (ACCC, 1998c).
Price regulation of the final outputs of private airports is not unusual, and it
would normally be expected that it would be sufficient to limit the use of
market power. However, in Australia, airports are also subject to access
regulation which applies to any bottleneck facilities they own. Airport
privatisation took place in the context of privatisation and restructuring of
the utility and transport industries and an extensive review of competition
policy.
It was recognised that many of these industries were not likely to be
competitive as a whole, but that there was scope for competition in parts of
them. An industry such as rail is constituted of natural monopoly sectors,
such as the track system, and potentially competitive sectors, such as train
operation. If the track owner also operates its own trains, it can discourage
potential competitors in operating trains by refusing them access to its
tracks, or by charging prohibitively high prices for access. Even if it is
willing to allow them to use its tracks, it will at least charge them a price
which preserves its monopoly profit. Since the objective of the reforms is to
promote competition, this will be a less than satisfactory outcome.
The objective of access regulation is to ensure that competitors have access
to the natural monopoly or bottleneck sectors on a basis which enables them
to compete effectively. Sometimes this access regulation is applied to a
vertically integrated firm which possesses both bottleneck and non
bottleneck sectors (such as integrated rail systems) and at other times it is
applied to specialist owners of the bottleneck facilities (such as rail track
corporations). Access regulation involves both mandating that competitors
have accessto the facility, and setting prices at which this access is to take
place.

Australia is now implementing a general system of access regulation (for a
description, see King and Maddock, 1996), but there are specific provisions
for particular

industries,

such

as airports.

The

legal

structure

of the access

arrangements
is complex
(see ACCC, 1998b). It seeks to ensure
to give the access seeker and the facility owner scope to negotiate
prices of access. However,
it contains
provisions
for arbitration
prices
by
environment,
directly
decisions
ACCC

the ACCC,
the policies

should
negotiations
of the ACCC will

fail.
Clearly,
in such
an
be critical;
sometimes
it will

regulate
access
prices,
but even where
it does not, its likely
will condition
the prices at which the parties negotiate
access. The
has indicated,

in other

industries,

that

it prefers

price, to have the effect of promoting
competition
consistent
with
cost
recovery
by the facility
telecommunications
incremental
cost
cost but consistent
This

access, but
terms and
of access

access

a cost based

access

as much as possible,
owner.
Thus,
in the

industry,
it has opted
for total
service
long run
(TSLRIC),
which it considers
will be close to marginal
with cost recovery.

regulation

environment

extends

to airports.

It makes

a range

of

airport
services
potentially
subject
to price regulation.
The only airport
services
left out are those which are not essential
to operate
air transport
services,
or which
can be provided
competitively.
Runway
services,
passenger
gates, land for refueling
services,
road access for car hire firms
and land for freight handling
services
are all subject to access provisions,
though retail facilities,
sites for cargo terminals
and flight catering facilities
are not. A wide range of individual
services,
which together
make up what
an airport is, could be subject tO regulation
or to the threat of it. All in all,
this constitutes
purposes.

a

Applying

Regulation

The

access

Access

regulation

to be subjected

considerable

unbundling

framework

to regulation,

determines
and

then

for

what

services

or facilities

sets

out

procedures

as it applies to airports
sources
of legislation,

and one specific
to privatised
airports;
application.
Furthermore,
within
both
procedures
to be applied

airports

regulatory

to Airports

access to be determined.
The system
complex
one. There are two separate

complicated
arrangements

of

for terms

are
of

is a distinctly
a general one

these
sources
overlap
in their
of these
pathways
there
are

to be followed
in
to a specific airport.

formulating

the

access

The general approach to accessregulation is encapsulated in Part IIIA of the
Trade Practices Act, which was included when competition policy was
extensively revised in 1995. It sets out several pathways to access
regulation. A competition policy advisor, the National Competition Council
(NCC) has the task of defining the accessarrangements. If it considers that
an effective access framework is in place, for example, because of
regulation by a state government, it can approve that framework. This has
not been relevant to airports so far. Alternatively, a facility owner, such as
an airport can lodge an undertaking with the NCC, setting out terms and
conditions under which it would grant access. If the NCC accepts this
undertaking, it becomes enforceable, and no further regulation is imposed.
Finally, if no undertaking has been accepted,an access seeker can apply to
have the facility "declared" for access. The NCC evaluates the application
in terms of various criteria, including whether the facility is uneconomic to
duplicate, and may declare the facility. If it does, the owner is obliged to
negotiate terms of accesswith the seeker, and if negotiations fail, the ACCC
is called upon to arbitrate. Effectively this means that the ACCC regulates
accessprices and conditions.
This pathway was used by one access seeker in 1997. A freight handling
company sought access to facilities at Melbourne and Sydney airports. The
NCC concluded that the criteria were satisfied, and declared the facilities
(NCC,1997).
The other pathway arises from the Airports Act, and applies specifically to
the privatised airports. As is to be expected, it is a provision which is more
specific to airports. Section 192 of this act gives the airports one year from
time of privatisation to develop an access undertaking. Should such an
undertaking be accepted by the ACCC, it becomes enforceable, and the
facilities of the airport cannot be declared. If the undertaking is not
accepted, the ACCC may declare certain services for access; if so it then
regulates prices and conditions. The Act sets out two main criteria for the
ACCC to be used: whether the services are "necessary for the purposes of
operating and/or maintaining civil aviation services at the airport" and are
"provided by means of significant facilities at the airport, being facilities
that cannot be economically duplicated". The latter condition is similar to,
though not identical to, one of whether the facility is a natural monopoly or
not.

The major privatised airports, such as Melboume and Perth produced
undertakings for the ACCC to approve. It did not, mainly on grounds of the
undertakings being too vague especially on issues such as price of access,
arbitration arrangements, and becauseof the scope for the facility owner to
delay providing access. On expire of the year since privatisation, a range of
services were automatically declared. The list of services the ACC regards
as declared is given in Table 1.
Some services were not declared because they are not necessary to operate
aviation services- thus retail facilities were not judged essential. Other
facilities were judged as essential but were not declared because it is
possible to duplicate them economically- sites for cargo terminals and
heavy maintenance are in this category. Finally, some services were
determined as essential and uneconomic to duplicate- not surprisingly,
runways fall into this category, as do international passenger processing
areasand land for refueling.
These decisions set out the access regulation framework for airports in
considerable detail, though there is still scope for refinement. For example,
in late 1998, a car hire firm requested the ACCC to declare landside roads
associated with passenger pick up to be declared. In 1999 the ACCC
determined that the requested facilities, with somemodification, be declared
(ACCC,1999).
Declaration does not necessarily mean that facilities will be directly
regulated by the ACCC. No accessseekersmay come along, and the ACCC
will have not dispute to arbitrate. Alternatively, the airport and the access
seeker may negotiate terms themselves, and the ACCC may not be called in.
This is to be expected in several cases, especially when the parties have a
clear idea of how the ACCC would go about regulating the facility.
However, whether the ACCC has a direct role or not, it will have a critical
impact on accessprices, since the parties will negotiate prices close to those
which they anticipate the ACCC will impose. Hence the ACCC's
approach
to access regulation
declared
airports.

Issues

in Access

Price

will

be a critical

Regulation

factor

affecting

the operation

of the

Imposing

access

cap regulation
range of these

regulation

on airports

creates a number
are considered:

(a) The expected

benefits

(b) The interaction

which

of issues

are already

subject

to price-

to be resolved.

In this

section

and costs of access

between

access

a

regulation,

and price-cap

regulation,

(c) The bundling
of prices,
(d) Access to terminal
gates,
(e) Access pricing principles,
(f) Measuring
costs, and
(g) Quality problems.
These

are considered

Expected

Benefits

in turn.
and Costs

The objective
of access regulation
is to promote
competition
in downstream
services.
An airport may own a bottleneck
facility, such as land required
for
a freight
service,
and competition
in the service
depends
on competitors
being able to obtain access to the land at a price which is consistent
with
them competing.
Left to itself, the airport
would
not offer access
to its
competitors
at prices close to the cost of the land. If access
place, the market
power
that the airport
possesses
in the
constrained.
Thus prices
will be kept down,
and it will

regulation
is in
service
will be
be feasible
for

competitors
which
are productively
efficient
to operate.
Access
price
regulation
has the potential
to increase allocative
and productive
efficiency.
The extent to which this is the case depends
on the nature of the bottleneck
and

service

being

very important
critical for new
significance

considered.

products;
competitor

to products

Some

services

systems.
facilities

be

essential

inputs

for

for example,
access
to terminals
and gates is
airlines. Other facilities
may be of considerable
which

are not

significant

things, but which might as well be supplied
off facilities
for car hire firms.
Access regulation
terms of reduced

may

in the overall

efficiently;

scheme

for example,

of
drop

has its costs, as well. All forms of regulation
have costs in
incentives
for efficiencythere are no first best regulatory

Regulated
prices
or underinvestment.

can give

wrong

signals,

and

induce

overuse

of

I0

Another

possible

cost,

specific

to access

regulation,

is that

it leads

to

unbundling
of integrated
firms, leading to a possible
loss of economies
of
vertical
integration.
There may be costs to a firm from making
facilities
available
to competitors
which the regulator
is unaware
of. There could be
good

reasons

control

why

a single

of upstream

firm

should

and downstream

sell

a range

production.

of services

Having

several

and have
users

of a

single facility can result in higher costs, for example
as competitors
get in
each other's way. The costs of vertical
disaggregation,
forced by access
regulation,
could be significant,
but they will not be obvious.
Price-Caps
Access

and Access
regulation

in

Regulation
Australian

airports

involves

superimposing

one

regulatory
framework
on another which is already in place. The airports are
subject
to overall price-caps
on aeronautical
services.
The private
airports
are regulated
by
fees, international

CPI-X regulation,
and services
terminal
use (domestic
terminals

long term basis
by the airlines),
services are included
in the basket
revenue weighted
one.

aircraft
covered

such as aircraft
landing
are normally
leased on a

parking
charges
and security
by the cap. The price index is a

This regulation
is in place to limit the use of market power by the airports. It
does not cover non aeronautical
services,
such as retail, even though there
may be some market
power present with these. While this regulation
is not
explicitly
caps that

cost plus regulation,
there was the intention
in setting the pricerevenue
would
be close to overall
costs. Within
the price-cap,

there is the scope for the airport to charge
service,
though
if it does, it will be forced
services.

very high
to charge

The

of if price-cap

obvious

question

which

arises

is that

prices for a specific
low prices for other

regulation

is in

place, is detailed
access price regulation
really necessary?
The airport may
be able to exercise
market
power in selling a specific service, but its overall
use of market
power
is tightly constrained.
The answer
to this question
depends
on how the firm behaves,
and on how the two forms of regulation
interact.

Consider
first a profit
result in airports which
an incentive

to minimise

maximising
are keenly
costs,

firm; privatisation
interested
in profits.

and where

they

can be expected
to
Such firms will have

are not capable

of achieving

I1

minimum
costs by production
in-house,
they will be willing to contract out
to those firms which can. One possibility
is that they will make bottleneck
facilities
available
to those which can use them most efficiently,
and they
may

allow

such

firms

to sell

the final

output

to the users;

for example

an

airport may make land available
for freight operators,
rather than undertake
all freight
handling
itself. In setting
the price for access,
it would be
constrained
by its own price-capped
services.
Suppose
included

that an airport is selling
within the capped basket.

a service
Suppose

to users at $20. This service is
further that the cost of using the

bottleneck
facility is $8 and that the cost of the add on services,
which could
be provided
by competitors,
is $12. If the airport charged more than $8 for
the use of the bottleneck,
competitors
would only be able to compete
if they
had costs less than $12. If, for example,
competitors
were able to supply the
downstream
service for $11, the airport could charge them slightly less than
$9 for the use of its facility,
and it would increase
its profits.
Productive
efficiency
would be enhanced
through more efficient
competitors
replacing
the airport's
in-house
production,
and prices would be no higher. As long as
the overall price-cap
limits the price of the service to $20, there would be no
additional

advantage

from access

regulation.

Whether
price-caps
really constrain
access prices in this way depends
on
how the price-cap
basket is constructed.
Suppose
that revenue
weights are
used in the price index of the airport's
output (as is the case). Suppose there
is a service which the airport could either supply directly,
or allow other
firms, accessing
its facilities,
tO sell directly
to users. It could set a high
price for its own service,
and also set a high access price for its facilities;
however
it could set this price such that the other firms could undercut
its
own prices.

If it did this it would

lose all its market

to these

other

firms,

and

the weight
in the price-cap
basket
would fall to zero.
It would
not be
constrained
by the price-cap
to reduce prices of other services
it supplies,
but it would be able to exercise its market power at the access price level. In
short,

it would

be able to circumvent

Short

of moving

to a fixed

weight

the price-cap.
index,

which

creates

its own

problems,

this problem
can be corrected
in two ways. One would be to include access
prices within
the price-cap.
While this could be done, it would make the
construction

of the price-cap

a good

deal

more

complex.

capped
services
would need to include
all the facilities
might seek access to in order to produce
final services.

The

which
Many

basket

of

other firms
or most of
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these

facilities

have

not been

use have been established.
prices for services
which

opened

up for access,

and

The altemative
is to have
airports from circumventing
would

ensure

that

for their

The regulator
would need to set a whole range of
might never be used. Alternatively,
the regulator

could include facilities
in the capped basket once their
traded;
this would be cumbersome
and would involve
the price-cap
basket.

it

no prices

access price
the price-cap

both

the

service

services
began to be
ad hoc revisions
of

regulation.
in they way

This would
prevent
discussed
above, and

itself,

the

and

facility

used

in

producing
it, would be priced close to cost. Granted the Australian
approach
to access regulation,
whereby
the regulator
only has to set a price if the
access seeker
and facility
owner fail to agree on a price, this should be
informationally
efficient
in that it does not involve
the regulator
large range of prices for trades that may never take place.

setting

Some airports
may not be profit maximisers.
(Even the private
airports
subject
to price
regulation,
which
can lessen
the incentives
for
minimisation).

If access

prices

price regulation,
such airports
services
even when they can

are not in the cap,

and

may discourage
other
produce
at lower cost

there

is no

a

are
cost

access

suppliers
fi'om selling
than the airport itself.

They will set high access prices to lock out alternative
suppliers,
and may
not contract
out services when they could reduce costs by doing so. Access
price regulation
will ensure that efficient competitors
can gain access to the
facilities
they need to offer their services.
Some airports,
such as Sydney,
are not privately
maximisers.
These

owned,
and they cannot
be
airports are subject to the general

the Trade Practices
Act,
Part IIIA. Even
take a strongly
negative
view of allowing
access
more
This

undertakings,

which

designed
to keep
could
be because

airport's

straightforward.

behaviour
Where

that

with

granting

respect

it possesses

airports

to non-capped
market

in aeronautical

services.

The

airport

submitted,

power,

even

it will

prices,

will

use

will

be more

use it. The market

should be relatively
to cover all cases
could

to be

out of them.
of vertical

at high

services

seem to
the draft

seemed

to make profits
that economies

access,

power
an airport
possesses
in these services
most cases, since the price-cap
is intended
power

to be profit
on access in

privately
owned airports
access to their facilities-

competitors
out than
the airports
believe

integration
are great, and
detract from their profits.
An

the private

assumed
provisions

its market

small in
of market
power

at
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both

the final

service

and access

stages.

Where

the airport

offers

access

at

profit
maximising
prices
it will be feasible
for efficient
suppliers
to
compete,
and where these have lower costs than the airport itself, it will be
in its interest to let them supply the market,
but to cream off profits at the
access stage. Thus, if the airport is a profit maximiser,
productive
efficiency
will be guaranteed
even if there is no access price regulation.
There will be
some cost in terms of allocative
efficiency
since there will be no way in
which

the competitors

can put downward

pressure

on prices.

Here,

the case

for access price regulation
depends on its ability to assist competition
and
lead to lower prices. Were the airport is not a profit maximiser,
it may not
allow efficient
competitors
access, and thus productive
efficiency
could
suffer. In such situations
the case for access price regulation
is stronger.
Price Bundling
It is common
in Australia
for airports
services
to users. Individual
services,

to offer a package
deal of bundled
such as runway
use, taxiway
use,

apron use and some passenger
facilities
is so, it is very difficult
for other firms

are not priced separately.
When this
to compete
in selling these services.

Suppose
a firm wished
to compete
in offering
baggage
handling
at a
terminal.
It could gain access to the facilities
it requires,
and it would be
able to offer a product
at a price. However,
if the airport is offering
only a
package
deal of all the services an airline needs from a terminal,
would
be unable
to compete.
A user would
need to buy some

the firm
services

directly
from the airport, and baggage services would be included
in the all
up price. Using the new competitor
would add to its costs. Bundled
pricing
makes it difficult
for competitors;
access price regulation
would
not prove
effective.
The price structure
which is being implemented
dates back
during which the private airports were operated
by government
and by public
enterprise.
In these days
maximise
profits. In general,
unbundling
profits,

since

prices

for each

service

and improves
overall efficiency
of services
for the users who
private
ownership,
there
However,
the incentives
strong.

While

unbundling,

the

they did not have an imperative
to
prices helps to achieve
maximum

can be tailored

to demand

conditions

(though an airport may still offer a bundle
prefer
to buy on this basis).
Thus, under

may be a move
towards
unbundling
for unbundling
under
price-caps
are

price-caps
airport

many years,
departments

are
will

not

consistent
gain

much

with
by

price
doing

services.
not very

rebalancing
so.

Every

and
time

it
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increases
designed
between

one price, it must lower another,
to keep within the
price structures
will maximise
profits, but the difference
a well designed

and an average

structure

is not likely

A further difficulty
is that access price regulation
gives
an incentive
to bundle
rather than unbundle
prices.
If
effects of access regulation
by bundling
its prices it may
regulation
may hold up a move towards
more efficient
airports.
Access
The

to Terminal

Australian

cap. Well
in profits

to be great.

the private
airport
it can escape
the
do so. Thus access
price structures
at

Gates

domestic

airline

industry

was

deregulated

in 1990.

At the

time there were two major airlines. In 1999, there are the same two airlines,
and no independent
competitors
for them. In the early 1990s there were two
attempts
at entry. Both failed, for a variety of reasons
(See Nyathi,
Hooper
and Hensher,
1993 and Trade Practices
Commission,
1992).
Prominent
amongst
the reasons
was the inability to get access to terminal
facilities
on
favourable
terms.

Domestic
terminals
are leased to the two major airlines,
for very long periods.
These airlines have little incentive

Ansett and Qantas
to provide
terminal

facilities

their profits

to their

competitors,

who will seek

They will only willingly
supply
as they might
when
allowing
complementary
the govemment

facilities
access

rather than competitive
imposed
a requirement

to compete

when they can profit
to partner
airlines
routes. At the time
that these airlines

away.

by doing sowhich
serve

of deregulation,
make terminal

facilities
available
to new entrants.
However,
this requirement
was very
vague and unenforceable.
New entrant airlines
did not always succeed
in
obtaining
access to terminals.
In some cases they had to operate from sheds
outside the terminal,
and when they did obtain gates in terminals
these were
inconvenient
ones. Problems
in obtaining
access to terminal
facilities
have
been

a disincentive

to those

with only

two competitors,

which,

contemplating

entry

is less competitive

to the

domestic

than it might

market,
be.

New access arrangements
could contribute
significantly
towards
resolving
this problem.
Access seekers can seek for gates or terminal
facilities
to be
declared,

and if they were,

they could

If negotiations
fail, the ACCC would
which seeks to promote
competition,

negotiate

with

the incumbent

airlines.

arbitrate.
It is likely that the ACCC,
would set access prices which are as
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close

to (its

estimate

of) cost

obtaining
terminal
facilities
incumbents,
and a significant

as is possible.

If so, new

airlines

would

on as close as feasible
to equal terms
barrier to entry would be eliminated.

be

to the

It is unclear
at this stage whether
this scenario
will come about. Airport
services
have been declared
for access, but precisely
which services
are
declared
is still being resolved,
and domestic
passenger
handling
facilities
have been set aside for further consideration
on a case by case basis. To be
declared,
Terminal

services
facilities

operation
whether

must met two criteria,
discussed
in the section
clearly meet the first criterion,
of being essential

of aviation

services.

they are "uneconomic

There

are different

interpretation,
not a natural
at most
terminals.
Another

ways

However

there

are

questions

surrounding

to duplicate'.

in which

this criterion

can be interpreted.

On one

they can be said to be not uneconomic
to duplicate.
monopoly,
and in fact there are at least two domestic

They are
terminals

airports
in Australiaboth Ansett
and Qantas
have their own
In the past, it has been economically
feasible to "duplicate"
them.
interpretation
of the criterion
stresses
whether
it would
be

economically
feasible
for them
airline
building
a new facility.

to be duplicated
in the sense of another
If existing
facilities
have
some excess

capacity,
it may be uneconomic
for additional
capacity
ACCC has indicated
that it accepts the latter interpretation.
possibility
already
similar,

above.
for the

that

domestic

terminals

declared
international
though not identical,

could

Passenger
to domestic

be

to be added. The
Thus there is the

declared.

processing
facilities.

The

ACCC

has

facilities,
and these are
The ACCC has reserved

its decision
and states that it will consider
applications
for declaration
on a
case by case basis
(ACCC,1998b).
(Domestic
airport
terminals
are not
affected

by

price

caps,

since

they

are

operated

by

the

amines,

not

the

airports).
The application
of access regulation
to terminals
and passenger
facilities
is potentially
the most significant
application
of access
in the airport
much larger

context.
industry,

This is because terminals
the domestic
passenger

processing
regulation

are an essential
input
industry.
This industry

into a
is of

far greater
economic
significance
than, say, freight handling
or off airport
car hire. If access regulation
is applied to terminals,
it could remove one of
the most serious obstacles
to entry to domestic
aviation.
In turn, granted that
there

are only two major

large

difference

airlines,

to the performance

a few additional
of the industry.

competitors

could

make

a
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Access

Pricing

Principles

In setting access prices, the regulator
Three options are usually suggested.

will need to rely on pricing
The regulator could

(a) set prices

at marginal

(b) set prices
the single

at the minimum
consistent
product
case), or

(c)

set prices

which

components

cost,

do not impose

pricing

principles.

rule

(ECPR),

with cost recovery

(average

a loss on the incumbent
or the Baumol

Willig

(the

cost in
efficient

rule).

The first of these may seem appealing
on efficiency
grounds,
but it will
normally
be inconsistent
with long run cost recovery.
The purpose
of access
regulation
is to impose
limits
on pricing
of facilities
which
cannot
be
economically
duplicated;
effectively,
involve a natural
monopoly
element.
Marginal
cost pricing
where there are economies
of scale or scope yield
losses for the facility owner, and thus it poses problems
for privately
owned
facilities.

The lowest possible
price consistent
with cost recovery
in the single product
case is average cost. Such a price, if regulated,
will maximise
the chance of
competition
downstream
inefficient
one.

from
new firms
market.
It will,
entry,

for example

accessing
however,

the facility
and
give rise to the

if the downstream

market

selling
in
possibility

the
of

is an oligopolistic

This approach
becomes
more complex when the firm sells multiple
outputs,
as airports do. Average
cost is undefined,
since total cost is spread amongst
several
outputs.
However,
if efficiency
maximisation
is the criterion,
a
Ramsey price structure
will ensure cost recovery
at minimum
cost in terms
of efficiency.
Ramsey
prices involve a mark-up
above marginal
cost which
is in inverse proportion
to the elasticity
of demand
for each product.
This
approach
is well known in the context of final products,
however
it can also
be

applied

charged

to

for each

access
facility

pricing
such

(Laffont
that, when

and

Tirole,1996).

additional

costs

Mark-ups

are

of production

are

added,
the resultant
price
for the final product
is the Ramsey
price.
(Alternatively,
the access price for the facility equals marginal
cost plus the
implicit Ramsey mark-up).
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While straightforward
in theory, implementing
this would
be difficult
in
practice.
Effectively
it requires
information
about
derived
demand
elasticities
for the facilitiessuch information
would
rarely
be available.
There are many patterns
of prices which
would be consistent
with cost
recovery,

but

efficiency
significantly

it would

be

impossible

to

distinguish

between

then

on

grounds.
Prices
should
be above
marginal
cost,
perhaps
so if scale economies
are large and there are many joint and

common
costs. How high they should be would be difficult
for the regulator
to determine.
Granted this, the regulator
has considerable
discretion
over the
access price it chooses,
and when the airport is price capped,
it is unlikely
to
be forced into deficit, since lower prices for one service can be made up for
by higher prices
elsewhere.
The precise
choice of access
price probably
does not make a lot of difference
so far as efficiency
and viability
are
concerned.
The third approach
1994). The facility

would
be to opt for the ECPR (Baumol
and Sidak,
owner would not lose from this price as an access price,

and it will be either equal to, or close to, the price that the owner
would
negotiate
itself.
Its advantage
is that it eliminates
the possibility
of
inefficient
entry- only efficient
entrants
can compete
with the owner given
the

high

obverting
preserves
minimal

access

price.

It can

also

the need
for explicit
the market
power that
scope
for competition

be

approximated

product

market

is contestable

or effectively
regulated,
the ECPR
average
cost (in the single product
regulation
effectively

effectively
constrains

constrains
each price

free

negotiation,

regulation.
Its disadvantage
is that it
the facility
owner possesses,
and it gives
to bring prices
down.
It also risks the

inefficient
duplication
of the facility by entrants
access to a facility with spare capacity.
If the final

by

access
case)

(very

who

unlikely

cannot

in the airport

prices will equal
or Ramsey
prices.

revenues
to no more

obtain

cheap

case)

or approximate
If the form of

to be equal
to costs,
and
than the Ramsey
price, it will

result in the firm negotiating
prices which are equal to the Ramsey
access
prices. In this situation,
it would be sufficient
to allow a profit maximising
airport
to negotiate
its own access
prices,
constrain
access prices. However,
as has been

since
noted

actually
imposed
on Australian
and there is scope for airports

as perfect
as this supposes,
the price-cap
through
their

access

pricing

strategies.

airports
is not
to circumvent

final
product
prices
earlier,
the regulation
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Overall, access pricing
principles
give the regulator
guidance,
but they do
not give precise measures
of the access prices which are the best feasible.
At best, the regulator
will have information
about marginal
costs (though
see below),
and the total costs
to be recovered
(plus, perhaps
some
information
about the cost structure).
It must convert
these into a structure
of access
individual
efficient.
setting of

prices. It has
facilities,
and
With efficient
prices to the

production

of services

considerable
discretion
over the level of prices for
it will be difficult
to determine
which price is most
final product regulation
it may be able to leave the
airport, at least for facilities
which are used in the

whose

prices

are regulated.

If it sets prices

different

from the (unknown)
optimum
prices, the efficiency
losses are likely to be
small since demand
elasticities
are likely to be low, and there is not too
much danger of imposing
deficits on the airport, since it can rebalance
its
charges.
Measuring
Access

Costs

pricing

costs. This
information

presupposes

is unlikely
about parts

that
to be
of the

the regulator
so in
airport

has good

information

the airport
situation.
Firstly,
cost
system
is likely
to be difficult
to

obtain. Secondly,
marginal
costs, or opportunity
costs, of capital
facilities are likely to vary considerably
over short periods of time.
The

regulator

is likely

to have

about

information

costs

of the

airport, but for access regulation,
it needs information
about marginal
of the various
facilities
or services
that it is attempting
to regulate.

costs
It will

need to know the marginal
cost of using
some specific terminal
facilities.
Even the
of setting
prices
for final services,
may
about the intermediate
inputs which go

about

the

overall

intensive

a particular
piece of land, or of
airport itself, which has the task
not have good cost information
into these services.
There is no

market price which
it can rely on. There is some risk that the regulator
could, for example,
seriously
underestimate
the marginal
cost of a service
and set an access price which imposes
a loss on the airport and forces it to
subsidise
its competitors.
The problem is compounded
by the variability
of costs. For many facilities
in airports,
costs, and especially
marginal
costs, vary considerably
over
short periods
or hour they

of time. Facilities
can be in excess

can be quite

low. At other

times

have fixed capacities,
and for part of the day
supply, and the marginal
cost of using them
they can be in excess

demand,

and perhaps
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subject

to severe

congestion,

and the opportunity

cost

of using

them

can be

high. Efficient
pricing should take these cost variations
into account,
setting
low prices in the off-peak,
and high prices in the peak. There can be other
sources of variation
in cost which should be taken into account,
such as the
location of facilities.
This

variation

regulation

in

cost

tends

to

poses

be

a major

inflexible.

problem

for

It is unlikely

different regulated
prices at different times
could set access prices which are constant

to

a regulator,

because

be

to

feasible

have

of the day or hour. The regulator
over time; prices which are, on

average, right. However
this is not good enough,
since prices which are on
average right will be too high sometimes
and too low at other times. A
single price
will result
in the facility
being
overused
when
it is most
congested.
At a time when it would most like to use
airport will be forced to make it available
at a low price
In principle

it might

be possible

to get around

this

its own facility,
to its competitors.
problem

by

the

setting

a

price cap rather
than specifying
each price. Thus
the airport
could set
different
prices
for a facility at different
times of the day subject
to the
average
of these prices
not exceeding
the cap. For some larger facilities,
such as terminals
or gates, this may be feasible,
though
it would require
considerable
require

monitoring

that the facility

The reality
considerably
the extent
Quality

on the part of the regulator,
be used widely

throughout

and it would

the time period.

of costs which are both difficult
to estimate,
over time, means that price regulation
must
that it is inaccurate,

probably

and which
be inaccurate.

vary
To

it can be inefficient.

Problems

It is becoming

increasingly

recognised

that

when

firms

are

subjected

to

regulation
of the price-cap
form they have an incentive
to downgrade
the
quality of the product
they are selling. Quality
reductions
can usually
lead
to cost reductions,
and as long as these do not lead to big falls in demand,
the firm

can gain

remains

unchanged.

now monitoring
The same
regulated.

sorts

additional

profit,

For this reason,

quality

of service

of incentives

However,

since

in

this

the price

price

regulators

in the industries

are present
context,

allowed

when
there

such

as the ACCC

are

they regulate.

access
is an

by the regulator

prices
additional

for facilities

are

incentive

to
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reduce

quality.

This

occurs

because

the firm that is purchasing

the access

is

also the firm with which the regulated
firm is competing.
By reducing
the
quality
of the service
it provides,
it can lessen the effectiveness
of its
competitor.

This

could

happen

to

the

extent

that

access

regulation

is

ineffective
as a means of promoting
competition.
The regulator
can seek to
monitor
quality,
though
in doing so it will need very detailed
information
about the ways the firm operates its facilities.
Most of ways in which a firm
may

hobble

its

competitor

are

less

than

transparent,

and

unsuitable

for

measurement
according
to standard
indices of performance.
The regulator
may be drawn into the detail of the relationships
between
the firms and be
unable to rely on established
rules.

Assessment

and Conclusions

This review
has examined
a number
of issues which arise from applying
access regulation
to airports. Overall, the objective of access regulation
is to
promote
competition
in a range of airport services,
with the potential
to
increase
allocative
and productive
efficiency.
A number
of problems
have
been highlighted,
and one can question how effective this regulation
will be,
and whether
it will increase
efficiency.
The answers
to a number
of
questions
can be suggested.
Is Access

Regulation

Necessary?

If there is an efficient
and effective
system of regulation
prices, or these products
are sold in competitive
markets,
of services
superfluous.

of final product
access regulation

and facilities
used in producing
the final products
As it is, this is not the case, for several reasons:

(a) The effectiveness
of price
be ways of circumventing
(b) Not all airports

will behave

(c) Not all final services
be domestic
passenger
Are the Potential

Gains

regulation
it,
as profit

are price
terminal

of airports
maximisers,

regulatedservices.

is limited,

would

and there

be

may

and

an important

exception

would

Significant?

Many airport services
are, in themselves,
not very significant,
though it is
desirable
that they be produced
and priced efficiently.
If simple regulation
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can improve
things,
at little cost, it will be desirable.
Some
services,
especially
domestic
passenger
processing
services,
are potentially
very
important,
because
of the impact
they can have on competition
in the
domestic
airline industry.
It has yet to be seen whether
being implemented
will address this problem
area. Final
albeit

imperfect,

along

with

behaviour,
may be sufficient
for most airport services.
Will the Access
Some

factors

Current
be able

Regime
will

to achieve

prove

work

private

ownership
a feasibly

the access regime
product
regulation,

and
high

profit

level

oriented

of efficiency

Effective?

to diminish

the effectiveness

of the access

regime.

price bundling
will limit its effectiveness,
since competitors
will not
to match the airport's
mix of services
and will not be able to sell

individual

services.

could have
structures.
effectiveness

a cost in creating a disincentive
for airports to reform their price
Another
factor
which
will
reduce
access
regulation's
is the reduction
of quality.
Facility
owners
can reduce
the

quality
of price
weakening
them;
Will Regulation
The

access

mix of negotiation
direct and costly
negotiators
need

regime

thus
this.

Efficiently?

regulation

Given

the ACCC's
choice
on arbitration.

There

of the access

system

is quite

cumbersome,

however

its

followed
by possible
arbitration
may result in reducing
intervention
by the regulator.
For this to be so, ideally
to know what the ACCC will do, and at what level it is

to set prices.

Can the ACCC

the implementation

regulated
facilities
supplied
to their
competitors,
it would be very difficult for the regulator
to control
be Implemented

Australian

likely

Furthermore,

the difficulties

of prices

set Efficient

is a considerable

of choosing

may be unpredictable,

efficient

access

prices,

and parties

may

gamble

levels.

Given

Prices?

risk

of prices

being

set at inefficient

that there
are scale
economies
and cost recovery
common
costs, cost variability
and information
about

problems,
joint
and
the costs of individual

services is difficult
to obtain, one cannot presume
that regulated
prices will
be efficient.
It is quite possible
that efficiency
is not very sensitive
to the
actual
benefits

precise

price

of access

set,

price

but

if this

regulation

is so,

would

it would

be small

also

anyway.

be

true

that

the
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Where

to from Here?

As access

prices

are implemented,

the answers

to some

of the

questions

raised here will become
evident.
It may well be that access price regulation
of services
or facilities
that are indirectly
regulated
through
final product
regulation
will prove superfluous
(especially
if the design of this regulation
is improved).
Access regulation
can then concentrate
on making
regulation
of a few services,
such as domestic
passenger
processing
services,
which
can really matter,
more effective
and efficient.
It can also be directed
to
some less important
which can be handled

services,
for which efficiency
gains are possible,
with minimal direct intervention
by the regulator.

but
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TABLE 1
DECLARATION

Service

OF AIRPORT

Necessary for Aviation
Services?

SERVICES

Uneconomic

to

duplicate?

Likely to be
declared?

Yes

Yes

Yes

International Passenger Processing
Areas (gates etc)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Domestic Passenger
areas (gates etc)

Yes

Case by Case

Case by Case

Yes

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

Yes

Case by Case

Case by Case

Land for Refueling services

Yes

Yes

Yes

Land for Freight services

Yes

Yes

Yes

Ground Handling and Freight
Handling Equipment Storage

Yes

Case by Case

Case by Case

Sites for Cargo Terminals

Yes

No

No

Sites for Emergency Maintenance

Yes

No

No

Sites for Heaw/Maintenance

Yes

Yes

Yes

Landside

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

No

Airside Facilities
Taxiways etc)

Administrative

(runways,

Processing

Office Space

Commercial/Retail

Facilities

Flight Catering Facilities
Refueling

facilities

Vehicle Facilities

Waste Disposal

Source:

Facilities

ACCC, 1998b, p. ix

Case by Case

24

References

Australian
Economic

Competition
and Consumer
Commission
(ACCC),
Regulation
of Airports:
An Overview,
Melbourne,
ACCC,

.....
(1998b),
Section
192
Services,
Melbourne,
ACCC,

of the Airports
October

Act-

.....
(1998c),
Fuel
Throughput
Commission's
Monitoring
Functions
1983, Melbourne,
ACCC, December

Levies:
Under

.....
(1999)
Draft
Rentals),
Melbourne,

Statement

Determination:
ACCC

Baumol,
W and G Sidak (1994),
Cambridge,
Mass, MIT Press

Toward

Declaration

of

Reasons

National

and
J
Theory

Competition

Tirole
(1996)
and Practice",

Council

(NCC)

Nyathi,M,

P Hooper

and D Hensher

1990 to 20 December
1991:
119-149 and 13(3), 185-206

Trade Practices
Commission
(1992)
Report, Canberra,
TPC, February

Australian

The Reform

"Creating
Competition
through
Journal
of Regulatory
Economics,

and Melbourne

(1993)

What went

Car

Telephony,

with

the Infrastructure:
Allen and Unwin

(1997)Applications

of Certain Airport Services
at Sydney
Decision,
Melbourne,
NCC, May

the
Act

(Delta

in Local

Forsyth, P (1997) "Price Regulation
of Airports:
Principles
Applications",
Transportation
Research-E,
33:4, 297-309

Laffont,
J-J
Interconnect-ion:
10, 227-256

of Airport

Report
Pursuant
to
the Prices
Surveillance

Competition

King, S and R Maddock
(1996) Unlocking
of Public Utilities in Australia,
St Leonards,

(1998a)
July

"Compass

wrong?",

The Failure

for
Airports:

Airlines

Transport

of Compass

Declaration
Reasons

for

1 December

Reviews,

Airlines,"

13 (2),

Main

The Impacts

of the Asian
Short-run

Economic

Responses

Crises on Asian

and Long-run

Airlines:

Effects

By

Anthony Chin
Department
of Economics
National

Senior

University

of Singapore

Paul Hooper
Visiting Fellow, Department
of Economics
National University of Singapore

Tae Hoon Oum*
UPS Foundation Professor
Faculty

of Commerce

and Business

Administration

Universi_
of British Columbia,
Vancouver, Canada

*Tae Hoon Oum would like to acknowledge the research grant support of the Center for Korean Research,
University of British Columbia.

Hoopel;

Chin & Cain." Impacts

The Impacts

of the Asian

of the Asian economic
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Responses

on Asian
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Airlines:

and Long-run

Effects

Introduction

Throughout
the 1980's and 1990's, rising per capita incomes in Asia Pacific
an expansion in intra-regional
trade and the emergence of a sizeable "middle

resulted in
income"

class with the resources to travel. As a result, the demand for air travel sustained annual
growth rates in excess of 10% and there were expectations
that Asia Pacific would be the
engine of growth for the world's travel industry well into the 21" Century.
The Air
Transport Action Group (1997), for example, predicted that the demand for air travel in
Asia Pacific would grow by 7.4% per annum between 1995 and 2010, twice the rate it
forecast for the rest of the world. This optimism was shared by IATA with its prediction
that over half of all passenger movements by air by the year 2014 would be associated
with travel to, from or within Asia.

In 1992-93,

8 of the world's

15 most profitable

airlines

were from the Asia Pacific

and

their low input prices, especially for labour and "materials",
gave them a competitive
advantage.
The prospects for the aviation sector appeared to be excellent and confident
airlines and airports embarked on expansion plans. "Growth" was the driving force
setting the agenda for policy makers and governments
allowed the private sector broader
scope to participate

in aviation

through

privatisation

and the formation

of new airlines.

Nevertheless,
there were some emerging problems for the airlines.
Yields were falling in
highly competitive
markets where capacity grew more quickly than demand and profits
were being squeezed by rising costs. Currency appreciations
eroded competitive
advantage, especially
for Japan, but a host of new challenges
emerged early in 1997. The
predicted "bubble" in the demand for travel to Hong Kong prior to the handover
did not
eventuate. Concerns about the arrival of the Peoples Liberation
Army in Hong Kong and
possible changes to freedoms and liberties once under Chinese rule were beginning
to
have an impact. The bird flu scare, in particular, deterred tourists and the Hong Kong
travel market began to decline from June 1997. Smog from the forest fires in Indonesia
affected
demand

tourism demand throughout South East Asia, but the main
was that the Japanese market had lost its momentum.

Then came the events

of the second

factor

half of 1997 that led to the currency

affecting

crises

and the

need for IMF assistance in Thailand, Indonesia and South Korea. Collectively,
the Asian
economies had accumulated
over US$240 billion in short-term
debts. When the
Government

of Thailand

could no longer afford

to support

its currency

against

the attacks

of speculators
it floated the Baht on 2 July 1997. The ensuing crash reverberated
through
the Philippines,
Indonesia and Malaysia.
Confidence
was undermined
as the extent of
non-performing
loans became clear. Within a very short period
out of the region, and Asia's wealth fell sharply.

of time, capital

flowed

Hooper,
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crisis

The IMF provided US$1 billion in assistance to Thailand on 19 July and followed this up
with another US$17.2 billion on I 1 August, but the contagion
continued to spread and
there were sharp falls on stock exchanges late in October.
The IMF offered US$40
billion in a bail-out package to Indonesia on 31 October and then negotiated
a record
amount of assistance
(US$58 billion) with South Korea on 3 December.
Some major
corporations
were in serious financial difficulty, governments
were adopting austere
economic measures, unemployment
was rising and job security was threatened.
Even a
fiscal stimulus of US$128 billion introduced by the Government
of Japan to its own
economy failed to satisfy financial markets and downward
pressure on the Yen
continued.

With the resulting drop in consumer confidence
and fall in intemational
purchasing
power, Asia's travel markets slumped.
In Japan, young office workers who previously
made up an important segment of the travel market now were the target of plans of
corporations
to reduce their labour costs. The crisis of confidence
in South Korea was
sudden and deep and airline traffic fell by as much as 80% on some routes in the month
following the IMF bail-out package.
As a result some important players in the travel
sales and distribution
system have gone out of business and it will take time and
resources to rebuild these systems.
The airlines were highly exposed with commitments
to purchase
hard currency.
The value of their debt escalated rapidly, interest

aircraft and spares in
rates and fuel costs

(expressed in domestic currencies)
increased, and traffic fell sharply.
Profit projections
for the region's carriers were written down immediately
and some made losses of several
hundreds of millions of dollars (US) during 1997/98.
The newer carriers that relied on
domestic

and intra-Asian

business

have been the worst

affected.

Some airlines

have gone

out of business or have suspended
their operations.
Other responses have included selling
aircraft, partly to reduce capacity and partly to finance deliveries
of new aircraft.
Saleand-leaseback
deals have been common and aircraft orders are being deferred where
possible.
Airlines are reallocating
capacity to stronger routes connecting
Asia with
Europe and North America.
The currency devaluations
will be wirmers and losers
Also, as some airlines
increase their revenue.

ultimately should help to stimulate travel demand and there
as destinations
compete for their share of a smaller market.

pull out of routes the remaining
carriers have opportunities
to
Depending
on the ability of the airlines to maintain their yields,

Asia's carriers will keep their attention firmly on reducing their costs and on re-financing
their fleets. However,
the restructuring
process has been and ,,vill continue to be painful
even under the most optimistic
scenarios.
There is speculation
that some airlines will
merge in order to create one or more mega carriers
North American
carriers may become part-owners

in Asia and that major
of Asian carriers.

European

and

This paper examines the impacts of the economic crises on the airlines and the responses
being pursued by management
and governments.
Given the trend towards liberalization,
an important question is whether the current circumstances
are likely to lead to a return to
more protectionist

attitudes.

The temptation

to shield

carriers

from competition

are being
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balanced against the need to open up markets, to forge alliances and to attract investment.
Though we illustrate the impact of the economic crisis with examples of recent
developments,
competitiveness

our focus is on long-term impacts of the Asian economic
of Asian carriers and on the regulatory environment.

Asia's

and the competitive

airlines

environment

crises on cost

in the early 1990's

For the present purposes,
Asia's airlines can be categorised broadly into two groups. The
first set began to make its presence felt in international
markets in the 1970's as widebodied aircraft were reducing the costs of long-haul travel. Traffic between Japan and
North America had grown because of the USA's military presence during and after the
conflict in Korea. At the same time, growth on the Kangaroo Route from Australasia
to
Europe was creating opportunities
for aggressive airlines based in South East Asia
(Rimmer, 1996). Singapore
Airlines and Thai Airways, for example, are located
advantageously
at interchange
points and are convenient and attractive stopover airports.
Furthermore,
Asia's emerging airlines of the 1970's possessed a significant competitive
advantage through their low input prices (Findlay, 1985) and they were able to capture a
growing share of the market.

As the Asian economies

began to prosper

during the 1980's,

these carriers expanded

and

the network of intra-Asian
airline services entered into a period of rapid development
(Rimmer, 1996). In aggregate,
traffic in Asia was averaging growth of more than 10%
each year while some routes were sustaining growth rates of over 20% for several years
in succession
(Air Transport Action Group, 1997). For various reasons, the established
Asian airlines were having difficulty coping with this growth and governments
began to
relax their regulations
to permit new, private-sector
airlines to emerge (Nuutinen, 1991;
Bailey, 1993; Bowen & Leinbach,
1995). This accelerated the liberalisation
of airline
competition

through

as the new entrants

multiple
pursued

designation
international

and the development
ambitions

(Bowen,

of new intra-Asian
1997; Hooper,

routes

1997).

In developed airline markets, the most successful entry strategy for new airlines has been
based to a large extent on cost leadership.
The source of the cost advantage can come
from high productivity
levels, say, through
Southwest Airlines in the USA) or through

high aircraft and manpower
utilisation (eg.
low input prices (eg. by paying less to

employees
and for "materials and services" and by operating older aircraft). The first
group of Asian airlines did enjoy a significant advantage in terms of input prices. For
example, in 1976 Pakistan, Malaysia, Korea, Indonesia and Thailand all had input costs
that were less than half those for the US carriers (Brunker et. al., 1989). Though the
Asian carriers had relatively
low productivity
levels, their unit costs remained
competitive.

The situation was different for the emerging Asian carriers of the 1990's because they
operated new aircraft and offered high levels of service. In addition, they often had to
pay premium rates to attract staff. They did not have the scale of their established
opponents,

but a more

important

problem

was that many of the opportunities

4

for them
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were on thin, developmental

of the Asian economic

routes.

In short, Asia's

crisis

new international

airlines

were

unable to reap economies
of traffic density and they lacked a strong cost advantage
while
operating in highly competitive
and price-sensitive
markets (Oum & Taylor, 1995). In
some cases, governments
believed that, by allowing new airlines to enter international
service,
1997).

they would

The common

factor

be able to cross-subsidise

unprofitable

creating

for the new airlines

the opportunities

domestic

services

(Hooper,

was the rapid rate of

growth in the region's
air traffic. Forecasting groups looked at the high economic
rates in Asia and believed these were sustainable
for several reasons.
In particular,
has a large workforce that has been improving its skill levels while industries
can

growth
Asia

continue

had

to adapt proven

provided necessary
Foreign investment

technologies

(McDonnell

Douglas,

1995).

Governments

infrastructure
and had pursued economic policies promoting
exports.
was available, especially from North East Asia, and this was

facilitating
technology
transfers. Rising per capita incomes, the emergence
of a large
middle class and the continuous microeconomic,
institutional,
social and political reform
(Bowen & Leinbach,
1995; Chin, 1997) were considered likely to stimulate continued
growth of air travel demand in the long run.
The rapid expansion

in traffic

provided

ample opportunities

for Asia's

airlines

to enter

new routes and add capacity, but the imperative to increase efficiency levels was
becoming
stronger.
Windle (1991) estimated that Asian carriers had a 21% cost
advantage
over airlines from the USA in 1983. However, some of this was attributable
factors beyond the control of management
and was not a source of competitive
advantage.
For example, the longer stage lengths of the Asian airlines reduced
costs by 10%, but the lower input price for labour was the key reason
lower in Asia.

Maintaining

a competitive

position

based on geographic

differences

to

relative

why costs were

in input r,nces

is

difficult because international
airlines practice global sourcing.
Also, rising GDP per
capita levels in Asia have been associated with higher labour prices. For example, wages
in South Korea in 1992 were 12.8 times higher than they were in 1975 when expressed ir
US dollar terms while the corresponding
ratio in Japan was 5.3 (Forsyth,
1996). A_ the
same time, trade surpluses led to currency appreciations,
especially for Japan, further
undermining
cost competitiveness
1. Japan Airlines would have had an 8% higherur_it cost
than American
Airlines in 1993 had the Yen maintained parity with the US dollar _ .s
1986 level (Oum

and Yu, 1997).

In fact, the actual level of cost disadvantage

was: ._._;o.

Singapore
Airlines, Korean Air, Cathay Pacific and Thai Airways were cost competinve
compared to American
by factors of 16%, 23%, 4% and 9%, respectively,
pr-!._,arily as a
result of lower input prices. These Asian carriers' unit cost advantages
wot:
:_ave been
higher had they achieved same level of efficiency as the U.S. mega carrier'.
In summary,
growth

the challenges

ambitions

while

facing Asia's

improving

airlines

productivity

in the mid-1990's
levels

and controlling

were

',

inpt.

_ance their
,aces

' Cost competitiveness is defined as lower costs resulting from input prices and productive efficiency after
removing the effects of stage length and output mix.
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through global sourcing.
Access to markets and membership
of alliances also were key
issues and governments
liberalised competition
in domestic markets and gave new
airlines access to some international
routes (Hooper, 1997), although the approach was
cautious and pragmatic
from outside the region

(Bowen & Leinbach, 1995). In addition, there were pressures
to increase the level of competition.
In particular, the US

Government
was turning its attention to Asia after its successful negotiation
of"open
skies" air services agreements
in Europe and Latin America (Jennings,
1996; Ballantyne,
1997; Chin, 1997). Subsequently,
Singapore, Brunei, Malaysia, Taiwan and South Korea
all signed open skies air services agreements.
As the Asian economies need to rely more on the IMF and the U.S. in order to get their
economies back on track, it is likely that the U.S open skies effort will gain momentum.
In addition, Asian nations have considered various regional initiatives to promote more
competitive
markets for air services, but generally the approach to regulatory reform has
been cautious.
This has been especially the case for the exchange of filch freedom rights
with the result that the Asian airline industry remains relatively fragmented.

The impact

of the economic

Informal business networks,
borrowers were mechanisms

crisis on traffic levels

close relationships
between financial institutions
and their
that facilitated rapid growth in Asia, but the financial sector

became exposed to risky investments.
A lack of control over lending practices and
inadequate disclosure
and reporting requirements
have been pin-pointed
as fundamental
weaknesses
to emerge,

of the Asian economies.
When the weaknesses
of the financial sector began
currencies began to enter a free-fall. Table 1 shows that the Thai Baht fell to

almost half of its value against
improved during 1998.
Were the price of an overseas

the US dollar

holiday

in the second half of 1997, although

to be set in US dollars,

the Thai consumer

it has

now

would have to pay 44% more in terms of Bahts. The Indonesian
Rupiah became so
unstable that trade in it was suspended and the Indonesian
consumer has to offer almost
4.5 times as many Rupiah now to purchase goods and services sold in US dollars
compared
.suffered.

to one year ago. Clearly,

the affordability

6

of overseas

travel outside

of Asia has
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Table 1: Changes

of the Asian economic

in exchange

rates for selected

(local currency
Economy
China

crisis

Asian economies

per U.S. dollar)

Currency
Yuan

June 97
8.3

Dec. 97
8.3

June 98
8.3

Dec.98
8.3

%devalue
0%

Hong Kong
Indonesia
Japan
Malaysia

Dollar
Rupiah
Yen
Ringgit

7.8
2,600
114
2.5

7.8
5,450
139
3.9

7.8
9,800
146
3.9

7.8
11,000
116
3.8

0%
76%
2%
34%

Philippines
Singapore
South Korea
Taiwan
Thailand

Peso
Dollar
Won
Dollar
Baht

26.4
1.43
881
27.8
25

39.5
1.65
1,695
32.2
47

38.4
1.69
1,383
34.5
40

38.8
1.66
1,206
32.2
36

32%
14%
27%
14%
31%

To make matters

worse,

Asia's

wealth

devalued

overnight

through

sharp falls in property

prices and share values.
Table 2 illustrates the extent of this effect. A consumer in
Malaysia, South Korea or Thailand who had invested in shares in June 1997 would be
able to sell them for less than half of their previous value in June 1998. Coupled with
this, the list of business failures includes merchant banks through to steel producers.
All
businesses are seeking to reduce their labour costs and consumer confidence
has slumped
with the loss of job security.
Table 2: Changes
in share price indexes
December 1997 and June 1998

for selected

Asian

economies

- June

Share Price Index

Loss in value relative

Jun 97

Dec 97

Jun 98

to period 6 months
before (%)
Dec 97
Jun 98

2,743
4,550

2.,971
3,963

3,220
3,864

-8%
13%

- 17%
15%

Hong Kong
Indonesia

15,,056
732

10,723
402

8,543
446

29%
45%

43%
39%

Japan
Malaysia

20,176
1,079

15,259
594

15,830
456

24%
45%

22%
58%

Philippines
South Korea

2,816
758

1869
376

1,760
298

34%
50%

38%
61%

Taiwan
Thailand

8,997
569

8187
373

7,549
267

9%
34%

16%
53%

Economy

China - Shanghai
China - Shenzhen

Domestic
Malaysia,

1997,

demand and imports fell by more than 20% in real terms in 1998 in Indonesia,
South Korea and Thailand (Camdessus,
1999). The lower exchange rates

improved international
competitiveness
and the Philippines,
South Korea and Thailand all
succeeded in selling more exports.
Indonesia fared the worst overall with its GDP
declining by 15% in real terms in 1998 (IMF estimate).
In the same year, the economies
of Malaysia, South Korea and Thailand contracted by 7-8%.
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Consumers
in those economies
that remained relatively strong, or those in countries
fixed exchange rates, were able to afford more travel. For example, the number of

with

visitors to Singapore
from Australia, China and India was up by 10.6%, 7.2% and 2.6%,
respectively,
in the first quarter of 1998. However, the general pattern was one of decline.
The number of arrivals in Singapore from Japan was 31% lower in the first quarter of
1998 compared
to the same period one year before and the total number of visitors to
Singapore
declined by 20%.
In June of 1998, Airports
passenger

movements

Council

International

for all of Asia's

reported

main airports

that the overall

number

fell by 5.1% compared

of

to the same

month in the previous year. Nevertheless,
there are signs that the market might be about
to enter the recovery phase. Thai Airlines and Singapore Airlines both increased
passengers
carried marginally
in the first three quarters of 1998. The Association
of Asia
Pacific Airlines reported that its members had a 2.3% growth in passengers
for the month
of September
in 1998 and that the average load factor increased from 68% to 72%.
Notably,

revenue

passenger

kilometres

increased

by 4.3%, reflecting

the greater

importance
to the airlines of long-haul, international
flights. Thailand, for example, has
succeeded in attracting more tourists from outside the region, especially Europe. It
appears, though, that yields are suffering and that the market growth is driven largely by
low prices.
Prior to the financial crises, IATA predicted that air traffic in the Asian
grow by 7.7% a year to 2001, but it has revised this to 4.4% per annum

region would
and 5-6% on

international
routes. Boeing, in its most recent issue of Current Market Outlook, argues
that economic growth in Asia will resume and, over the next ten years, will average
between 2% and 3%. As consumer confidence returns, and as economic growth
strengthens,
the prospect is that Asia will again be one of the main driving forces of air
traffic growth globally.
Over the period between 1998 and 2007, Boeing predicts the
growth in revenue passenger
kilometres will average 5% across all markets. However,
annual growth rates in Asia will be 8.4% for China, 6.9% for Southwest Asia and
Northeast Asia and 6.1% for Southeast
will re-emerge in Asia's travel markets

Asia. Airbus is similarly
after a 2-3 year period.

optimistic

that growth

Uncertainty
about the future of Asian travel markets reflects underlying
questions about
the prospects
for an economic recovery.
Some economists point out that the fundamental
strengths of Asia are its plentiful supply of labour with increasingly
high skill levels, the
capability
to leverage growth with proven technology, government
policies that supported
export activity and that provided necessary infrastructure.
A less optimistic view is that
there are major political and institutional
barriers in Asia inhibiting further development
and that it will take time to resolve these problems (Walton, 1997).

Hooper,

Airline

Chin & Cain: Impacts

responses

The scope

of the Asian economic

to the economic

for action

crisis

crisis

by airline managers

The economic crisis immediately
placed Asia's airlines under severe financial stress.
Airlines that relied on domestic and intra-regional traffic were the most exposed, but
several carriers were making losses even before July 1997. Garuda Indonesia and Korean
Air, for example, had accumulated
large operating losses. Korean's
net loss for 1996/97
was US$280.7 million while Asiana Airlines recorded a loss of US$281.4
million.
The
costs of servicing loans and leases mostly were in hard currencies so that the devaluations
escalated debt levels. Korean Air had more than 90% of its debt in foreign currencies
and
it debt rose to US$5.5 billion, more than six times its equity. Korean Air revealed in
February
1998 that it had a "paper" loss of US$900 million as a result of the devaluation
of the Won, although subsequent strengthening
of the Won improved
the situation.
Philippine
Airlines had embarked upon a fleet renewal and expansion
programme
prior to
the onset ofthe economic crisis and found itself committed to financing costs of US$29
million

each month.

By the middle of 1998, the airline's

management

had decided

to

down-size,
triggering a costly dispute with its pilots that led to 5,000 employees
being
sacked or laid-off.
In September,
1998, Philippine Airlines went into "protected
bankruptcy"
after making a loss of US$157 million in the previous six months.
In its
attempts to restructure
its finances, PAL attracted the interests of Northwest
Airlines,
Lufthansa
and EVA. The most serious proposal was for Cathay Pacific to take a 40%
stake in PAL, but this floundered on the issue of control. In January 1999, PAL claimed
it would

be able to attract sufficient

capital

to continue

operating

Sempati Air, a new entrant in Indonesia, went into liquidation in June of 1998. One
month later, Merpati Nusantara suspended its services. In total, 9 airlines went out of
business across Asia (including South Asia) in the first twelve months of the economic
crisis (Bonassies
1998). Several more carriers continue to operate with large debt
burdens, but the IMF's guidelines make it difficult for governments
to rescue their
airlines within the strict budgetary conditions of the bail-out packages.
Few airline managers
in Asia have had to deal with falling traffic levels let alone
financial problems of this magnitude.
The airlines clearly needed to restructure
their
finances and rid themselves
of excess capacity, but they also needed to develop broader
strategies
strategies

to take them through
that we now turn.

Capacity

decisions

One of the first actions

the remainder

in any industry

of this deep recession.

suffering

a downturn

It is to these

in demand

is to reduce

capacity.
This response is difficult in the airline business because canceling
flights can
damage long-term marketing
prospects while not resulting in significant
savings.
Much
depends on whether capacity can be allocated elsewhere on the airline's network or
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whether aircraft can be leased or sold to other airlines. In any case, labour costs are
difficult to adjust in the short-run and airlines have to be ready to resume services once
the market improves.
If the service involves a congested airport, airlines also are
concerned about losing access to valuable slots.
Most airline

costs cannot

be avoided

once the schedule

is set and, since this tends to

occur twice a year, the scope for managerial
action is limited
months.
Under "normal" circumstances,
the typical response

for a period of up to six
to a temporary
fall in traffic

is to increase marketing
expenditure
and to use promotional
prices more aggressively.
For example, Qantas and British Airways have offered deep discounts of up to two-thirds
off their fares to London, Frankfurt or Rome. Qantas provided an additional bonus of a
free domestic round-trip to any one of 10 Australian
cities. Singapore
passengers
the first night's accommodation
on a stopover in Singapore
additional nights have been priced as low as US$30.

Airlines gave its
for US$1 and

In the current situation, though, demand has fallen by as much as 80% in some markets
and the prospects of a quick recovery are poor. The airlines have no alternative but to
reduce their services on the worst-affected
routes and to pull out of some routes
completely,
relying on code-share partnerships
to maintain a presence.
Where possible,
the capacity is being diverted to other routes, but those airlines that are most exposed to
intra-Asian
routes recognised
that they needed to reduce the size of their fleets.
The most immediate
decision has been to cancel orders for new aircraft or to defer
deliveries.
In March 1998, the airlines in Asia Pacific had orders for 179 narrow-bodied
aircraft valued at US$7.5 billion and 254 wide-bodied
aircraft valued at US$33 billion.
Korean Air and Asiana alone had orders for 76 new aircraft.
Taking account of the orders
placed by leasing companies
that are attributable
to Asia, it was estimated that the Asian
carriers were accountable
for one-quarter
of all orders for wide-bodied
aircraft in 1998
(Williamson
1998). Close to half of all orders for B747-400
and B777 aircraft have been
made by Asia's carriers.
Boeing indicated that the Asian economic crisis will have an
impact on deliveries of 150 aircraft, including 60 wide-bodied
aircraft.
Those

airlines

in the most difficult

situations

have put aircraft

up for sale either to reduce

capacity or to make way for deliveries of new aircraft.
In many cases, the sale of older
aircraft has helped to provide the necessary finance to pay for new aircraft, while in
others the sale-and-leaseback
option has been necessary
aircraft were sold or leased by Asia's airlines to outside
capacity increased
World, December

by 1.3% overall as 140 new aircraft
1998 issue, page 14). The prediction

to reduce debt levels. In total, 91
Asia during 1998, but seat
were delivered (Air Transport
is that net capacity will increase

by another 1% in 1999. Even with the depressed market conditions it seems likely that
capacity growth will fall behind demand.
Since load factors are already high on many
routes, this will give airlines the opportunity
to improve their yield.
The Asian economic

crisis and

cost competitiveness

l0

of Asian carriers

Hooper,

Chin & Cain: Impacts

of the Asian

economic

crisis

What impact does the current economic crisis have on the Asian airlines' cost
competitiveness?
In order to answer this question properly, it is necessary to discuss the
factors determining
cost competitiveness.
Airline cost competitiveness
depends on input
price levels and productive
efficiency - lower input prices and/or improved efficiency
enhance cost competitiveness.
Oum and Yu (1998) found that except for the Japanese
carriers, other Asian airlines have unit cost advantage relative to their North American or
European competitors
mainly because of their lower input prices.
In particular, before the Asian economic
unit cost advantage relative to American

crisis, Singapore Airlines and Korean Air had
Airlines by about 16% and 23%, respectively,

although both of these Asian carriers have slightly lower productive
efficiency than
American Airlines.
Most of the Asian carriers' unit cost advantage come from the lower
labour

and other purchased

materials

and services

input prices in terms

of international

currency.
Thai Airways had only about a 9% unit cost advantage relative
Airlines although they enjoy extremely low input prices. This is because

to American
Thai Airways'

productive
efficiency is very low. Cathay Pacific has lost unit cost advantage relative to
American Airlines because it no longer enjoys any input price advantage relative to those
in the U.S.
As shown in Table 1, since June 1997 Asian currencies were subject to varying degree of
devaluation.
For example, between June, 1997 and December,
1998 the currencies of
Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines,
Thailand and Korea are devalued by 76%, 34%, 32%,
31% and 27%, respectively.
The immediate effect of these currency devaluations
is to
increase unit cost advantages
of the Asian carriers.
Although aircraft financing cost and
fuel prices are not likely to change in U.S. dollar terms, labour and purchased materials
and services prices in terms of U.S. dollar are likely to decrease due to the currency
devaluation.
As stated earlier, because of the currency devaluation
and the depressed
travel demands in Asia, the Asian carriers have lowered their air fares substantially
in
terms of U.S. currency.
In the medium to long term it is clear that currencies of these
Asian countries are likely to be revalued to their previous levels while inflationary
pressure which will follow their economic recovery will increase labour and other input
prices in those countries.
This implies that, unless the carriers improve productivity,
cost
competitiveness
in the medium to long term for these carriers are not likely to improve
beyond the levels they enjoyed prior to the economic crisis.
However,

the current

economic

crisis has been and will continue

to force Asian

airlines

to

restructure
their networks and operations
for improved efficiency while forcing their
governments
to open up markets for competition.
These changes are likely to bring two
positive outcomes to the Asia's air transport industry.
First, the procompetitive
changes
are likely to induce Asian carriers to improve productive
efficiency to the level the major
carriers in North America enjoy. Second, in the process of restructuring
the industry, one
or two mega carriers may emerge in Asia. For example, Singapore Airlines may be able
to participate
in the ownership
of one or more major Asian carriers (Thai Airlines and/or
China Airlines).
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JAL, ANA or Cathay Pacific may use this opportunity to expand their markets
into one
of multiple hub networks by acquiring equity stakes in other Asian carriers. Because of
these positive changes anticipated
in the industry (and not because of their currency
devaluation),
in the medium to long term the Asian economic crisis is likely to help
Asia's air transport industry.
In the very short run, the sudden collapse of tourism air
travel demand in the region has harmed severely the bottom line of all Asian airlines. In
the short run, the devalued Asian currencies will prolong the period in which Asian
carriers enjoy unit cost competitiveness
relative to the North American or European
carriers. Although it will take several years for getting their economies
back to the precrisis level, air travel demands are expected to increase very rapidly as the economic
recovery begins in earnest (see Boeing, 1998).
As Asian carriers cope with the sudden reduction
(yield per passenger mile) decreased substantially

of air travel demand, the average prices
even in domestic currencies.
For

example, Singapore
Airlines'
average yield per passenger miles (in Singapore
dollars)
during the six months period ending September 30, 1998 decreased by 9.1% as compared
to the same period a year ago. Cathay's average yield per passenger mile decreased by
5.9% during the six months ending June 30, 1998 as compared to the same period in the
previous year. The passenger
load factors of Asian carriers were also reduced
substantially

after the Asian

economic

crises.

Obviously,

the lower load factor has

significant negative effects on the productivity
of Asian carriers. For example, Singapore
Airlines' labour productivity
was reduced by 3.5% in the six months ending September
30, 1998 as compared to the same period a year ago.
Alliances

Alliance formation
can be a tactical response or it can be part of a longer-term
strategy.
Since the onset of the Asian economic crisis, there has been widespread
alliance activity.
For example, when Qantas Airways ceased operation to Seoul, it turned to its code-share
partner, Asiana Airlines, to carry its passengers.
As Qantas enters the AustraliaArgentina
market, it intends to use its own aircraft while benefiting
by making use of the
code-share agreement
with Aerolineas Argentinas.
This provides Qantas with an
opportunity
to use its capacity while also benefiting Aerolineas Argentinas
as the latter
can use the aircraft released
Argentina-Europe
services.
While

the economic

from the Australian

market

to meet a growing

crises in Asia have placed the carriers

demand

based in the region

for the

under

financial stress, the process of globalisation
of the airline industry has taken a major step
forward. The Star Alliance built around United Airlines and Lufthansa has gained
momentum
with the addition of Air Canada,
Varig, Thai Airways, Air New Zealand, All
Nippon, and Ansett Airlines with a likelihood that Singapore Airlines will become a
member during 1999.
The formation of oneworld between American Airlines, British Ai_vays, Cathay Pacific,
Canadian Airlines, Iberia and Qantas in September of 1998 was presented as a brand
name for a global network.
Among other measures, the partners have code share
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agreements
with each other and share frequent flier plans. Cathay's dominance
at the
new Chek Lap Kok Airport in Hong Kong gives that "alliance"
a strong position in Asia.
Asiana code shares with Qantas to Cairns and with American to Los Angeles, New York,
San Francisco and Seattle.
A third major global group has coalesced around KLM, Northwest
Airlines and
Continental
Airlines and includes Malaysian Airlines.
Key members of these global
groups have been active in signing up partners in Asia.
Lines, which in turn is allied with Air France, Austrian,

Korean
Sabena

Air is linked
and Swissair.

to Delta Air

Some of these alliances will help the Asian carriers in the short-term,
in some cases, with
injections of capital, through sharing the use of resources, by consolidating
traffic and
improving utilisation of aircraft and by strengthening
market positions.
However,
they
clearly have long-term significance.
For example, Thai Airways is a member of the Star
Alliance, but Singapore Airlines' realignment with Star led to an announcement
by
Lufthansa that it would shift its South East Asian focus from Bangkok to Singapore.
The
subsequent
decision by the Government
of Thailand to privatise Thai Airways has
attracted major world airlines as potential bidders. The current wave of alliance formation
in Asia will help the region's airlines rationalise services, to consolidate
traffic and to
improve their finances, but they also will play a role in deciding the competitive
strength
of the major global alliances at key Asian hubs.
Service

decisions

The key service decisions that managers have taken are to change frequencies,
to suspend
services and to withdraw from mutes. Other dimensions of service are difficult to target
at particular routes in the short and medium term. For example, Indonesia's
airlines made
an application to increase domestic fares from 11 to 16 cents (US) per seat kilometre.
When the Minister for Transport and Communications
refused to grant permission,
Sempati Air immediately
cancelled services on 10 domestic and 4 regional routes
(including to Taiwan).
The Minister intervened to stop Merpati Nusantara,
one of the
Government's
airlines, taking similar actions on 80 of its routes.
Instead, the Minister
agreed it could phase out routes with load factors under 30%.
its international
flights by 30% and domestic flights by 26%.
Qantas

Airways,

Ansett

International

and Air New Zealand

Garuda

Indonesia

were among

then cut

a number

of

airlines to suspend services to South Korea early in 1998 when the number of Korean
residents travelling abroad fell sharply. Asiana Airlines ceased 15 flights on 6
international
routes and Korean Air dropped 48 flights on 21 international
routes.
Airlines
Airlines

also have been seeking opportunities
to re-deploy their capacity.
and Cathay Pacific Airways both implemented
plans to increase

Singapore
the frequency

flights to Australia.
All Nippon Airways was quick to take advantage
of its improved
access to the USA market under the new air services a_eement
concluded
between the
USA and Japan early in 1998.

After South Korea entered

13

an open skies

ageement

with

of

Hooper,

Chin & Cain." hnpacts

the USA, Korean
Los Angeles.

Regulatory

of the Asian economic

Air was able to increase

responses

to the economic

crisis

its frequency

to San Francisco,

Chicago

and

crisis

The airlines clearly are realigning their capacity while setting themselves
up to take best
advantage of global airline groups and to pursue sustainable
productivity
improvements.
Nevertheless,
the impacts of the economic crisis are so great there will be a temptation for
at least some governments
to provide their airlines with direct financial support and to
protect them from competition.
It seems likely that some of the financiers backing the
airlines in their sale-and-leaseback
deals believe that, ultimately,
the governments
of Asia
will ensure their airlines remain solvent (Williamson,
1998). In addition, equipment
suppliers and their governments
will be supportive of distressed
airlines as appears
evident with the success Korean Air has had in securing a low interest loan ofUS$254
million (Mann, 1998). The Govemment
guarantees
in order for Garuda Indonesia
Governments

also could step in to protect

of Indonesia
to complete
their airlines

already has given sovereign
purchases
of aircraft.
from competition,

setting back the

pace of liberalisation
in Asia. However, there are good reasons to believe these options
will not be favoured in general and that the pressure to liberalise will grow even stronger.
One force working in this direction is that the governments
of Asia have larger problems
to solve and their ability to support airlines making large, on-going losses is limited. For
Indonesia, Thailand and South Korea, the International
Monetary Fund has imposed
conditions on its support programmes
that further constrain actions of these types. The
IMF's prescription
is to open up markets, to allow foreign investment
and to privatise
government
business undertakings.
Furthermore,
airlines are eager to gain access to
stronger markets in Europe and North
want to take part in global alliances.

America,

they need injections

of funds,

and they

Table 3 documents recent regulatory responses.
Though the airlines continue to suffer
financial stress, the picture that is emerging is that the governments
of Asia are
accelerating
regulatory reform in the direction of liberalisation.
For example,
South
Korea signed an open skies agreement with the USA in June, 1998.
The Japan's new
liberalized agreement with the USA is restricted to incumbent airlines and is constrained
because of slot restrictions.
South Korea was looking to expand access for its airlines in
the USA-Korea
market, but it also valued the greater access to beyond flights to Latin
America.
The USA-Korea
agreement also will place pressure on Japan to proceed further
down the liberalisation
path.
At the same time, the Government
of Thailand decided to allow private airlines
domestic routes without limitations and to liberalise its international
markets

to fly on

progressively.
In addition, there have been renewed attempts to privatise Thai Airways,
prompting several large international
airlines to express interest in taking an equity
position.
In June 1998, the Government
of Thailand amended the 1954 Aviation Act to
allow for up to 49% ownership of Thai carriers by foreig-n investors.
The Government
of
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South Korea also lifted the restriction
on foreign ownership of its airlines to 50%. Many
other countries in Asia have been active renegotiating
air services agreements
in order to
give their airlines flexibility to adjust their networks.
Governments
in Taiwan and the Philippines have become concemed
about safety
standards in the wake of the economic crises. In June 1997, a Boeing 737 operated by
China Southern Airlines crashed at Shenzhen killing 35 passengers.
Sempati Air had a
crash in the next month with 30 fatalities.
In August, a Korean Air B747 crashed into a
mountain-side
in Guam with 228 people losing their lives and, in the next month, a
Garuda Indonesia A300 crashed at Medan during poor visibility associated with forest
fires. In that case, 234 people died, but this was followed in December by another 104
fatalities with another airline crash in Sumatra.
This time it was Silk Air. February was a
difficult

period

with crashes

involving

Cebu Pacific

(104 dead)

and China Airlines

(205

dead).
Two more airline crashes in Taiwan prompted the government of that country to
encourage its airlines to merge to improve their economic and safety position.
The
situation reached the stage in the Philippines where the Government
suspended
Grand
Air's operating licence after repeated violations of the regulations
and indicated it was
increasing its surveillance
of all carriers, including Philippine Airlines.
The exact causes
of some of these crashes still are not known and it would be unreasonable
to attribute
them all to economic factors, but the publicity given to safety
challenges for the airlines and regulators alike.
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Table 3: Regulatory
Economy
China

of the Asian economic

responses
Decision

in Asia Pacific

Considering

crisis

1997-98

raising the limit on foreign

ownership

of airlines

to 40% from 35% equity and 25% voting rights in an attempt
to attract more capital
China & Malaysia

Memorandum
of Understanding
to allow Malaysian Airlines
and any other Malaysian carriers to operate 64 flights each
week to six cities in China and Chinese
flights a week to 3 Malaysian cities

China & the

Memorandum

Philippines

China & Rep. Korea

& Taiwan

Japan & USA

to allow airlines

to fly to Manila

to

Agreement
for increase from 42 flights each week on 11
routes to 111 flights on 27 routes to take effect in first half of
1998
Agreement
negotiation,
Airways.

on increased airline services after 10 years of
increasing capacity and access to Osaka for EVA

with USA to give

Continues to deregulate its domestic airline industry in the
first half of 1998. Restrictions on pricing removed and new
entrants given slots at Haneda Airport

New Zealand

&

Singapore
Pakistan

Enter a liberal open skies agreement with no foreign
ownership
restrictions and free capacity on fifth freedom
Announces
restructuring

Rep. Korea

a new limited open skies policy and a
of Pakistan International
Airlines

5th freedom flights beyond Seoul provided they originate in or
terminate in the USA. Gives Korea's airlines access to Latin
America via the USA;
Korea increases

Rep. Korea

& USA

Taiwan

Civil Aeronautics
& USA

the foreign ownership

Open skies agreement
gauge

merge

to achieve

allows airlines

Administration
greater stability

Open skies agreement

of airlines

to 50%.

from the USA to change

puts pressure

on airlines

and improvement

gives greater

Transport

and Communications
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Minister

announces

to

in safety

access to USA and

beyond for China Airlines and EVA and alliances
with American and Continental
Thailand

from
in addition
now

and one other airport

Agrees to limited open skies agreement
ANA greater access to USA

Japan

Taiwan

can fly 64

Philippines
to fly to Guanghzhou and Shenzhen
Beijing, Shanghai and Xiarnen. China's airlines
permitted

Japan

of Understanding

airlines

emerging

new

Hooper,

Chin & Cain." Impacts

of the Asian economic

crisis

policy to deregulate domestic market and to allow multiple
designation
on international
routes, commencing
with regional
services (eg Indonesia). Restrictions
on charter flights by Thai
and foreign airlines to be lit_ed.
Thailand

Govemment
increases
to 30°/'o and announces
Thai Airways

foreign ownership
limit in Thai by 10%
intention to reduce its own stake in

from 79.5% to 49% or lower

(pressures

from

nvrF)

Conclusions
The Asian

economic

crisis has generated

a considerable

amount

of pessimism

about the

prospects for the region's airlines. The carriers were highly exposed to currency risks and
to a slowdown in traffic growth. While the economic crisis is reducing
the amount of
intra-regional
traffic, the currency devaluations
will stimulate more trips to Asia from
North America and Europe.
By virtue of the reduced costs of employing
labour and other
local inputs, the cost competitiveness
of Asia's airlines has improved.
The immediate
problem facing the carriers is to refinance their debt, to realign their services and to match
capacity to the weaker demand conditions.
As this adjustment
process continues,
the
world's mega-alliances
are consolidating
their position so that Asia's airlines are faced
with difficult choices from a weakened position.
It seems likely that the end result will be fundamental
changes in the way Asia Pacific
aviation markets operate in terms of alliances, hubs, ownership,
and regulation.
Given
the depth of the economic crisis in some Asian economies,
a desire to protect national
airlines would be understandable.
However, the longer-term
challenge
for the Asian
carriers is to turn the economic crisis into an opportunity
to develop strategies
that give
them a sustainable
competitive
advantage.
This will come about through productivity
improvements
that would be pursued most aggressively
under competitive
conditions.
At
the same time, competitive
airlines need access to markets.
Attempts
to protect airlines
could have negative consequences
including pressure from the IMF and international
financial community
The evidence is mounting that the airlines themselves want the flexibility to adjust
capacity, to enter new routes, to enter into alliances and to attract investment
from the
world's major carriers.
Some governments
have shown a willingness
to liberalise
competition,
to privatise
flight back to protection,
policies

of Asian

and to relax foreign
the Asian economic

governments

ownership
restrictions.
Far from being a
crisis appears to have shifted air transport

far more in the direction

of liberalisation.
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Abstract
The Asian

economic

crisis

started

in July

1997

and has

since

affected

most

businesses
in the region, including
airline companies.
The aim of this report is to
identify the major influences
of the crisis on the financial and operating
performances
of key airlines in the Asia-Pacific
regions. We will cover 11 carriers in Asia-Pacific
region, together with British Airways as a benchm_k
carrier for the period of 5 years
from 1994 to 1998. Five financial measures
and five operating
measures
are used to
uncover the source of pain. We find that high exchange
losses, inflated operating and
financing
costs and an overall drop in traffic are the main causes for the financial
stresses experienced
by several Asian carriers.

("

I want to thank
collection.

Ho Hean

Chan,

Quek

Sze Quan

and Chris

Tan

Seng

Kita

for their

assistance

in data

I.

INTRODUCTION

The Asian economic
crisis sparked in Thailand in July 1997 and had since spread
throughout
the region. Prior to that, Asia had been enjoying
high economic growths.
The crisis came as an unpleasant
surprise and many were caught off-guard.
Serious
currency devaluation
in countries like Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippine
and Thailand has
greatly pushed up currency-related
costs, forcing many companies
to undertake
costsaving measures.
Asian airlines are no exception.
Debt costs, lease costs as well as
operating
operating

costs have increased,
causing
serious
leverage,
profits
for airlines are more

financial
sensitive

problems.
Due to high
to economic
and market

conditions.
In general, due to pro-cyclical
nature of the airline businesses,
the airline
industry will most likely experience
a greater pain during
economic
recessions
as
compared to other industries.
On the other hand, during the boom times, airlines tend to
reap relatively greater rewards.
Thc nature of this study is explorative.
Its main purpose is to analyse the impact of
Asia's
economic
crisis
on major
airlines
in the Asia-Pacific
region.
Various
performance
indicators
will be used to highlight the nature and magnitude
of impact on
different airlines. Their performances,
inferred from relevant
financial data and traffic
statistics,

will be analyzed

over a period

of five years from the year 1994 to 1998.1

The rest of the paper is organized
as follows. Section II uses
comparative
measures
to highlight
overall impact of the crisis

ten commonly
used
to various carriers.

Section III uses statistical
methods to analyze the impact of crisis and the relationships
among the measures.
Section IV attempts to pinpoint each airline's problems relating to
the recession. The last section presents a summary with a few recommendations.

II. PERFORMANCE
The
section,

financial

MEASURES
crisis

may

AND

influence

we will use 10 commonly

different

COMPARISONS
carriers

used performance

in different

and exposure

areas.

measures

In this

to find the

source of the pain.
It aims to provide a broad and general
descriptive
view of the
economic
turmoil's
effect on 11 key airlines
in Asia-Pacific,
together
with British
Airways (BA) that serves as a benchmark
carrier. The choice of BA is in part due to its
reputation
and strength as a market player and in part due to data availability.
Table 1
summaries the inclusion of these carries.
Time-series

data used in the research

were collected

from

1994 to 1998. Data before

1994 is excluded,
as the purpose of this study is to investigate
the short-term
impact of
the economic
crisis. The 1998 data, as of the period this research is conducted,
is the
most up-to-date
data available.
The bulk of the operation
statistics
is taken from the
Digest of Statistics
series published
by the International
Civil Aviation
Organization
(ICAO). Data in the annual reports of airline companies,
whenever possible, are used to
cross-examine
the data or fulfil the missing records. For the same purpose, relevant
reports

and databases

published

by various

investment

organisations,

such as Moody's

As Garuda Indonesia and Philippine Airlines, t_vo key carriers in ASEAN, are not listed companies,
relevant data are limited. Bearing this limitation m mind. they will be covered, whenever enough
information is available, only in the later part of this report

and Goldman
uniform
basis

Sachs,
are also
for comparison.

used.

Table

exchange
consistent
Table 2.

rates
with

Hong Kong

December

Taiwan

December 31

Indonesia

Japan
Korea

(KAL)

Airlines (MAS)
(QAN)

profitability

Malaysia

March 31

Australia

June 30

Philippine

N/A

Singapore

March 31

Int'l (THAI)

figures

exchange
the

need
rates

rates

Thailand

to be converted
as at the

employed

0.729500
1.483400
0.129200
0.009728
0.001268
0.373500
0.594800
0.637100
0.038090
0.040030

dollars,

we will

sheet

foreign

use

dates.

the US

Since

currency,

the

not

all

interbank

comparison.
These
exchange
rates,
in each economy,
are summarized
in

USD Interbank

Rates

1995

1996

1994

Jun
Mar
Dec
Jun
Dec
Mar
Jun
Mar
Dec
Sep

US

balance

in translating

2: Historical

30 September

into

respective

will act as surrogates
to facilitate
the year-end
month
of the carrier

0.703000
1.614100
0.129300
0.011330
0.001289
0.394400
0.667900
0.705000
0.036650
0.039900

1997

0.787000
1.525400
0.129300
0.009308
0.001183
0.394400
0.684400
0.709500
0.036360
0.039340

1998

0.746700
1.638600
0.129100
0.008076
0.000619
0.403400
0.677900
0.691900
0.030660
0.027700

0.615500
1.676500
0.129100
0.007519
0.000837
0.273200
0.514500
0.619600
0.030990
0.025410

MEASURES

TAX.

a percentage

the

airline

The
of

of a business

that

31

Airlines (SIA)

will be able to assess
have
increased
while
indicate

March 31
December

Singapore

BEFORE
as

N/A

Airlines (PAL)

Month

PROFIT

31

Philippine

Australian Dollar
British Pound
Hong Kong Dollar
Japanese Yen
Korean Won
Malaysian Ringgit
NewZealand
Dollar
Singapore Dollar
Taiwan Dollar
THAI Baht

1.

Indonesia

Korean Aidines

Currency

expressed

(Garuda)

June 30
March 31

Japan Airlines (JAL)

Airways

Year-end

New Zealand

(CAL)

a

in This Study

China Airlines

Table

FINANCIAL

to achieve

Cathay Pacific (CX)

monetary
disclose

Selected

in order

UK

That Airways

airlines

standardised

Air New Zealand (ANZ)
British Airways (BA)

Qantas

interbank

1: Carriers

are

Economy

Malaysian

When

data

Carrier

Garuda

dollar

All

profit

total

organisation.

before

revenue.

managed

(PBT)

more

margin

is commonly

By comparing

how well the company
the revenue
and profit
was

tax
It

is profit
used

the margin

is doing. For instance,
decreased
in dollar
efficiently.

Conversely,

to

over

before
measure

the

if the

the

years,

the margin
terms.
This
margin

tax
we

might
would
was

on a downward trend, it would
causes should be looked into.

indicate

that costs are rising

Table 3: PBT Margin (%)
1994
1995
1996
7.66
9.91
8.46
4.24
4.56
7.54
0.62
2.71
3.68
10.95
11.66
11.94
-3.45
-1.43
-0.59
0.68
4.29
-6.21
0.40
1.49
4.39
3.63
4.47
5.28
13.97
14.61
15.70
6.15
6.31
6.26

Airline
ANZ
BA
CAL*
CX*
JAL*
KAL*
MAS
QAN
SIA
THAI*

faster than revenue,

1997
5.87
7.66
6.17
7.74
-1.22
-9.26
5.40
5.16
14.90
-35.27

and the

1998
4.20
6.71
3.46
6.40
-1.56
2.02
-3.20
5.88
15.17
-20.76

(*) Forecast figure for 1998.
From Table 3, it is evident that SIA has seen constantly outperforming
the rest. JAL
has been making before-tax
losses since 1994. THAI seems to have taken a hard blow
from the crisis - it took a deep plunge in its 1997 fiscal year even though it had stable
PBT margins prior to 1997. KAL, too, has suffered losses since 1996 but is expected to
recover in 1998. MAS has been improving over the years but may fall into the red at the
end of its 1998 fiscal year. The other airlines are experiencing
a falling margin from
1996 onwards,
except for the improving
CAL before it dipped
in 1998. The main
factors for the weakening
PBT are the depressing
airfares and the substantial
reduction
in air travel demand,

a typical

symptom

of economic

recessions.

2. EBITDA
MARGIN. EBITDA
refers to earnings
before
interest
charges, tax,
depreciation
and amortization
expenses. The margin is obtained by dividing
EBITDA
with total revenue, which are summarized
in Table 4. This measure
eliminates
two
major non-cash
expenses
depreciation
and amortization

depreciation
is subjective

and amortization.
Firstly,
due to different accounting

the treatment
of
policies adopted

by the airlines. For example, JAL recently switched its depreciation
life assumptions
from a declining
balance basis to a straight-line
basis. Secondly,
interest
expenses
include charges to be paid in US dollars and are vulnerable to exchange
rate risk, which
varies from country to country. Therefore, the absence of these expenses
will result in a
better comparison
of each airline's operating performance.
From Table 4, it is evident that BA does not seem to do well in this area compared
to the rest. THAI's margin has been in declining
since 1994. Both CX and ANZ are
generally moving downwards
while the margins of other airlines
with biggest movers being THAI and MAS. On average, SIA has
with the catching-up
efforts by KAL and MAS. QAN, like SIA,
stable margins from 1994 to 1998. JAL is consistently
below
between 5% and 9%.

have been fluctuating
been leading the pack
has been experiencing
the rest with margins

On average, the EBITDA margin has been turned downward
since 1996, a sign of
depressing
profitability
for Asia-Pacific
carriers during the current economic
recession.

Table 4: EBITDA

Margin

(%)

Airline
ANZ
BA
CAL*
CX*
JAL*
KAL*
MAS
QAN
SIA
THAI*
Average
(*) Forecast figure

3.

RETURN ON EQUITY (ROE).

1994
1995
15.0
15.7
13.9
15.0
18.2
13.9
22.6
20.2
5.8
5.8
20.8
21.7
17.2
22.8
12.9
12.1
25.9
27.0
28.6
25.3
18.1
18.0
for 1998.

1996
13.5
15.3
10.7
21.0
8.9
19.0
27.7
12.2
27.4
25.1
18.1

The return on equity

1997
11.3
12.6
11.0
17.0
7.9
24.6
25.6
12.5
24.9
18.7
16.6

(ROE)

1998
9.7
12.2
13.8
17.1
6.3
20.1
20.4
13.7
26.7
14.7
15.5

measures

the rate of

return on shareholders'
investment,
which is the net profit for the year divided by the
total shareholders'
equity (Table 5). It measures how well the resources are managed to
generate profits; it is a critical measure of a company's
overall success. The ROE trends
to mirror

the trends

of the PBT

margin.

Table 5: ROE
Airline
1994
1995
ANZ
16.5
21.0
BA
15.8
20.0
CAL*
0.3
4.0
CX*
15.5
17.5
JAL
-12.4
-5.2
KAL*
5.9
14.1
MAS
0.2
3.9
QAN
9.2
7.9
SIA
9.7
10.2
THAI*
9.1
10.0
(*) Forecast figure for 1998.

(%)
1996
16.8
19.0
5.0
12.9
-3.4
-22.6
6.0
10.1
10.5
11.2

1997
9.8
18.5
5.9
7.8
-5.9
-54.0
7.2
9.5
9.8
-13.4

1998
7.9
15.0
5.0
6.3
-34.0
9.0
-6.1
10.3
9.1
NA

It is evident that all airlines except MAS experienced
the pressure in 1997, while
the impact on MAS was finally felt in 1998. Among the individual carriers, BA tops the
others in this area with the highest average ROE from 1994 to 1998. JAL, on the other
hand, has consistently
been in the negative zone and has fallen sharply in 1998 to 34.0%. SIA and QAN are comparable
with each other averaging
around the same
percentage
then.

point.

CX and ANZ peaked

The most prominent
trend in Table
slightly in 1995 but dropped drastically
1997. However, it is expected to recover

in 1995 but has been gradually

weakening

since

5 belongs to KAL. Its performance
improved
in 1996 followed by a much deeper plunge in
in 1998. THAI's performance
in this area took

a sudden turn in 1997. By 1998, it is reported that it has a negative equity. In fact, the
reported impact in Table 5 on KAL, MAS and THAI provides clear evidence of serious
impact of the financial
crisis on these carriers as their home economies
through large contractions
since 1997. As Japan was also in recession during
had obviously felt the deep pain too.

has gone
1998, JAL

4. NET DEBT/EQUITY
RATIO.
Net debt is the sum of loans, finance
leases, hire
purchases
arrangements
plus convertible
capital
bonds net of short-term
loans,
overdrafts and net cash. Equity refers to the value of total shareholder
funds. Net debt is
expressed
as a percentage
of total equity to arrive at the above measures in Table 6 that
provide information
on each company's
leverage.
Table 6: Net D/E Ratio (%)
Airline
1994
1995
1996
ANZ °
72.4
81.5
49.8
BA
69.4
63.9
59.8
CAL*
60.0
68.5
91.3
CX
47.1
47.1
23.0
JAL*
376.5
420.3
450.1
KAL °
529.0
452.3
467.2
MAS*
181.4
198.3
184.9
QAN*
291.6
289.9
225.2
SIA
0.0
0.0
0.0
THAI
241.6
270.6
292.8
(*) Forecast figure for 1998.

1997
65.6
57.0
105.0
34.0
490.1
905.4
156.3
170.0
0.0
7994.0

1998
62.9
58.1
192.1
61.0
696.9
941.9
231.2
160.7
0.0
-875.4

(") This figure was a result of the ratio of net debt to negative equity.
SIA has a very favorable
debt structure that is fully supported
by its cash reserve.
On the other hand, as the domestic
currency
is weakening,
it is expected
that the
financial leverage
will substantially
undermine
Asian airlines'
ability to service their
US dollar debts. THAI, in particular,
experienced
a drastic increase
1997 and 1998. In 1997, THAI's value of equity dropped significantly

in its leverage in
as a result of the

decrease in asset value together with the increase in liabilities. This is mainly attributed
to currency devaluation.
At the same time, its net debt increased and all these factors
caused its ratio's jump to 7994.0%.
In 1998, THAI's liabilities are expected to exceed
its assets and this will give rise to a peculiar situation where its equity value falls below
zero. Consequently,
its Net D/E Ratio becomes negative, a clear sign of financial stress.
Japanese and Korean carriers have very high ratios due to high debt financing
while BA, CX and ANZ, on the other hand, have much healthier ratios.
5.

FOREIGN

translation
liabilities

EXCHANGE GAIN OR LOSS. Foreign

of foreign
denominated

local currency
against
loss) as a percentage

exchange

other currencies.
We expressed
of the total operating
revenue

exposures.

the main exceptions
MAS, other airlines

gain or loss arises from the

currency
loans, and the translation
of monetary
assets and
in foreign currency. It is directly related to the strength of the

understand
the related
financial
monetary figures into percentages,
For the years 1994 to 1995,
foreign

exchange

activities;

the foreign exchange
gain (or
for each airline in order to

burden posed on them. By converting
the absolute
we will have a more meaningful
comparison.
it is evident that most of the carriers have minimal

The percentage

gain or loss was around

zero percent,

of CX (negative) and KAL (positive). In fact, except CX, KAL
have rather stable performances
in the area of foreign exchange.

with
and

It is interesting
to notice that ANZ and QAN virtually have no foreign exchange
gains or losses for the years concerned,
which should indicate both airlines have been
very successful
in managing
their exposures to foreign exchange risk, even in the face
of the present economic
turbulence.
CX, even though improving in this aspect, has been
a consistent
under-performer
and its poor performance
has only bettered
KAL and

MAS, especially
exchange
losses
big
and

in the midst of the currency
as a result
of the recession.

foreign
exchange
THAI
is evident.

loss

Table
Airline

in 1998.

The

7: Foreign
1994

ANZ °
BA
CAL
CX
JAL
KAL*
MAS
QAN
SIA
THAi

damage

Exchange
1995

0.23
-0.18
0.25
-3.53
-0.46

1.37
0.39
0.00
0.00
0.01
(*) Forecast figure for 1998.

OPERATING

1.

load

seasonal

variations,

factor

and

According

The
that

direct

raked
THAI

in huge
would

crisis

to K.AL,

of the currency

Gain Margin
1996

(%)
1997

1998

0.10
-0.71
-0.44
-1.61
-0.29

0.07
0.64
-0.15
-1.51
0.31

0.00
0.73
0.00
-1.47
0.21

0.00
-0.21
0.00
-0.03
-0.03

2.22
0.61
0.00
0.00
-0.15

-3.06
-0.23
0.00
0.00
-0.86

-10.92
0.15
0.00
-0.19
-1.33

1.04
-10.19
0.00
1.05
NA

foreign
suffer a
MAS

economic

conditions

Table 8:
1994
68.1
66.5
77.9
69.0
64.9
69.7
63.9
63.3
69.5
69.2
68.2
for 1998.

overall

by many

Overall
1995
65.3
68.2
78.0
69.5
65.9
71.7
63.9
65.9
69.8
68.7
68.7

8, the overall

indicate

of

the

load

recession

from

the

Table

any

adverse

factor

into

takes

including

account

two

factor

on

the

that

of each

1998
67.5
69.2
83.5
68.3
67.5
66.7
60.6
63.2
69.1
67.0
68.3

carrier

Mean
66.8
69.0
80.1
69.8
66.2
70.6
62.2
64.3
69.7
68.4

is rather

similar

superior

performance

carriers'

overall

load

seems
result

to have

from

the

no

fares,

programs.

a much

there

could

competition,

of marketing

Load Factor (%)
1996 '
1997
65.4
67.7
70.7
70.3
80.2
81.1
72.6
69.5
65.6
67.0
72.8
72.3
62.3
60.3
64.3
64.6
69.4
70.5
68.1
69.0
69.1
69.2

8. In fact,

effects

elements

and the effectiveness

for CAL,
which
has registered
the years 1994 to 1998.
effects

load

It is the ratio of revenue
tonne-kilometers
(R.TK) to
and a key indicator
of capacity
utilization.
An

affected

to Table

observable

could

cargo.
(ATK)

is usually

Airline
ANZ
BA
CAL*
CX*
JAL*
KAL*
MAS
QAN
SIA
THAI*
Average
(*) Forecast figure

another
except
others through

The

FACTOR.

- passenger
tonne-kilometers

airline's

clearly

Both carriers
expected
that

MEASURES

OVERALLLOAD

components
available

crisis.
It was

to one
over

factors

seem

observable

recession.

In fact,

the
not
trend
the

individual
suggesting

overall load factors of the carriers seem to fluctuate
around
an average,
that the airlines' performances
in this area appears to be "normal".

But the fact the average load factor was declined by almost one percentage
point
from 1997 to 1998 gives some evident of an adverse impact of the crisis. In particular,
MAS experienced
a dip of 2 percentage points in 1997; KAL and THAI had a drop of
5.5 percentage points and 2 percentage points in 1998, respectively.
It is hard to ignore
the negative impact of the crisis.
2.

BREAK-EVEN LOAD FACTOR.

The break-even

load

factor

is the theoretical

load

factor when operating
revenue
equals operating
expenses,
implying
that all the
operating expenses are covered by revenue and no profits or losses are made. In order
to reap profits
factors higher

and operate successfully in the long run, airlines have to operate at load
than their respective
break-even
levels. A low break-even
load factor

would be preferred,

as it would be relatively

Airline
ANZ*
BA
CAL*
CX*
JAL*
KAL*
MAS*
QAN*
SIA
THAI*
Average
(*) Forecast figure

easier

to achieve

high profit

Table 9: Break-even Load Factor (%)
1994
1995
1996
1997
72.8
67.8
69.7
74.3
61.4
61.5
62.9
63.6
76.1
77.0
77.8
78.4
58.5
59.8
63.1
66.1
72.5
74.1
71.7
74.1
67.1
68.6
76.8
69.6
69.1
65.7
61.8
61.6
67.0
68.9
67.5
68.7
65.5
62.5
62.6
65.9
62.5
61.9
62.2
63.0
67.3
66.8
67.6
68.5
for 1998.

1998
78.8
64.4
81.2
64.8
75.1
69.4
67.9
68.4
65.2
64.3
70.0

margins.

Mean
72.7
62.8
78.1
62.5
73.5
70.3
65.2
68.1
64.3
62.8

Looking at Table 9, we can see that CAL has the highest break-even
load factor, at
78.1%, while CX registers the lowest, at 62.8%, followed by BA and THAI at 62.8%.
Even though different
cost structures
could be the primary
reason for this obvious
difference, but the fact that the average break-even
load factor has been increasing
since
1995 should indicate
that not enough effort has been put in place to control the
operating expenses, even during current economic
crisis. With the overall load factor
being declining and the break-even load factor being increasing,
it does not portrait the
promising picture for the industry. It is hoped that we will see a declining
trend across
the board in 1999 since many Asian carriers, CX and KAL in particular,
have made
serious effort to rationalize
their operations.
Asian
carriers
would
have
missed
a
competitiveness
during the current crisis.

Without
golden

the reversal
opportunity

of this upward
to enhance

trend,
their

3. YIELD. Yield is one of the most commonly used measures
in the airline industry. It
is the ratio of the total operating revenue and the revenue
tonne-kilometres
(RTK),
taking into account of both passenger and cargo operations
(Table 10). It measures
the
amount of revenue earned from passengers
and freight per kilometre
flown. Yield is
usually expressed in cents per RTK, but in our case, it will be expressed
in US dollars
per RTK for easier comparison.

Airline
ANZ
BA
CAL*
CX*
JAL
KAL*
MAS
QAN*
SIA
THAI*
Average
(*) Forecast figure
Yields

of European

Table 10: Overall Yield US_(_
1994
1995
1996
1997
0.69
0.76
0.71
0.65
0.78
0.85
0.81
0.87
0.46
0.44
0.45
0.36
0.60
0.60
0.56
0.52
1.02
1.13
0.92
0.80
0.48
0.50
0.44
0.26
0.61
0.64
0.60
0.61
0.67
0.66
0.75
0.67
0.48
0.52
0.49
0.46
0.63
0.65
0.65
0.45
0.64
0.68
0.64
0.57
for 1998

airlines,

represented

1998
0.51
0.86
0.35
0.50
0.73
0.35
0.43
0.54
0.42
0.44
0.51

Mean
0.66
0.83
0.41
0.56
0.92
0.41
0.58
0.66
0.47
0.56

here by BA, are the highest

in the world

without considering
the Japanese carriers. Not surprisingly, BA is seen performing
well
above the average,
only overshadowed
by JAL, which has been deteriorating
since
1995. Japanese airlines have been traditionally
enjoying one of the highest yields in the
world due to its protected
market and the strength of its currency.
It is evident that a
gradual decrease of the yields seems to be the trend in the industry,
especially
from
1996 to 1998 indicating
that the Asia economic crisis has seriously
affected the overall
yields of carriers in the region.
In
due to
result
effects
4.

particular,
THAI and KAL's yields dropped sharply in 1997, which was in part
the increased competition
in a weak demand market for air transport but also as a
of the drastic currency depreciation.
MAS's worst yield came in 1998 when the
of the Asian crisis were finally felt in Malaysia.

STAFF

COST

Staff

MARGIN.

cost margin

is the

staff

expenses

expressed

as a

percentage of the total operating expenses. Staff costs constitute a major portion of total
operating
costs and therefore justify our attention, since the recession
is very likely to
affect
the costs.
According
to Table 11, QAN, BA and CX have the highest margins
among all
airlines in the study, with means of 29.82%, 28.54% and 27.56% respectively,
which is
due to relatively higher labour costs. We can also see that KAL has the lowest average
margin of 10.09% in the period from 1994 to 1998. The closest comparison
is THAI
with a mean of 18.70%. The main reason for KAL's low average margin is attributed to
relatively

lower

labour

input

costs. All other

airlines,

including

THAI,

are quite close

and fall into a narrow range 18.70% to 21.75%. We expected the staff cost margins of
JAL to be higher due to high labour input costs in Japan, but it turned out otherwise.
Except
should

for JAL and SIA, the margins for all other carriers dipped in 1998. This, in part,
be due to the regional crisis that has caused airlines to downsize in order to cut

costs and remain competitive.
Another reason could be the fact that total operating
expenses are expected to rise faster than staff costs in 1998 for all Asian airlines. In
particular, SIA and THAI have been experiencing
rising trends recently while others are
on the decreasing
trend.
Table 11: Staff Cost Margin (%)

Airline
1994
ANZ*
21.25
BA
28.59
CAL
NA
CX*
27.19
JAL*
22.39
KAL*
10.67
MAS*
20.85
QAN*
30.23
SIA
17.73
THAI*
17.24
Average
21.79
(*) Forecast figurefor1998.

1995
20.48
28.94
NA
27.31
22.66
11.39
21.33
30.79
19.29
18.60
22.31

1996
20.66
29.25
NA
27.37
22.12
10.34
21.30
30.29
17.60
18.91
21.98

1997
20.41
28.77
NA
28.92
20.64
9.36
19.92
29.45
18.60
19.98
21.78

1998
18.07
27.17
NA
26.99
20.93
8.69
19.12
28.34
18.90
18.77
20.78

Mean
20.17
28.54
NA
27.56
21.75
10.09
20.50
29.82
18.42
18.70

From Tables 9 and 11, we may say that the staff costs, which, on average, have
been decreasing
since 1995, are not the main reason leading to the upward trend of
break-even
load factor. Airlines
need to pay attention
to other components
of the
operating costs to revert the problem.
5.

FUEL COST MARGIN.

airline companies.
Fuel
expressed
as a percentage

Fuel costs, together

with staff costs, are major

cost margin, calculated
similarly
of total operating expenses.

to the staff

Table 12: Fuel Cost Mar0in (%)
Airline
1994
1995
1996
1997
ANZ*
11.74
11.43
11.64
12.97
BA
10.86
9.48
9.31
10.78
CAL
NA
NA
NA
NA
CX*
14.07
14.37
15.81
16.77
JAL*
11.50
11.11
11.09
12.91
KAL*
15.03
14.89
17.01"
19.26
MAS°
15.52
14.30
15.14
18.13
QAN*
11.32
10.59
11.10
12.25
SIA
18.28
16.44
14.80
17.10
THAI*
11.92
11.45
12.90
14.49
Average
13.36
12.67
13.20
14.96
(*) Forecast figure for 1998.
According

to Bonnassies

(1998),

many

Asian

airlines

had

cost items for
cost margin,

1998
12.22
9.71
NA
17.08
12.92
19.47
18.12
11.85
17.10
15.45
14.88

stocked

is

Mean
12.00
10.03
NA
15.62
11.91
17.13
16.24
11.42
16.74
13.24

a considerable

amount of fuel. This could in part explain the expected drop in fuel cost margins in
1998, as fuel expenses
remain
relatively
stable while operating
costs increase.
Furthermore,
the Asian economic
crisis has depressed
oil prices down to levels below
pre-Gulf War levels. Even though many Asian carriers are expected to purchase more
fuel in 1998 when their reserve fuels are mostly depleted,
the depressed
oil prices
would still most probably
keep the margin low. CX would benefit much from the low
jet fuel prices due to the HK$/US$ peg.
On average, KA.L has the highest fuel cost margin, BA has the lowest. The margin
movements
also tend to move in the same direction for all the above airlines each year.
The rise and fall of international
jet fuel prices play an important role in this aspect,
which dictates the broad trend of change in fuel cost margin across the industry..
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III.

ANALYSIS

AND

RESULTS

We now move on some formal analysis by using the data summarized
previous section. In summary, we have the following measures:
Financial Measures
PBT Margin (PBT)

_

Measures
Overall

Load Factor

(OLF)

EBITDA Margin (EBITDA)
Return on Equity (ROE)

Break-even Load Factor
Yield (YIELD)

Net D/E Ratio

StaffCost

(NDE_Ratio)

in the

Margin

(BE_LF)

(Staff)

Fore_
Fuel Cost M_
Note: The symbol in the bracket is the variable name to be used for the discussions
in this section.

From the discussions
in the last section,
statistically,
to indicate that

there are some evidences,

even though

•
•

The economic crisis will adversely affect all five of the financial measures;
The crisis seems to have a serious "pushing-up"
effect on the Break-even
Factor and a sizable downward pressure on the overall Yield;

•

The crisis has a mild negative impact on the Overall Load
visible impact on staffand
fuel cost margins (at least not yet).

These observations
are useful when we attempt
crisis, which is the focus of this section.
ANALYSIS

Due

to the

to further

pinpoint

Factor,

non-

Load

while

the impact

no

of the

OF VARIANCE

diversity

among

the

airlines,

the

variability

for

each

measure

is

intrinsically
dominated
by the difference
maong the airlines. In order to properly
measure
the variability
over the years, we must "filter out" heterogeneity
effect of
carriers. With this in mind, we can apply the standard two-way
ANOVA,
where we
treat carriers as the blocking effect. This leads to the results summarized
in Table 13.
From Table

13, we can make the following

observations:

•

The financial measures are truly dominated by the airline effect. And relatively
speaking,
the time effect, in part capturing the impact of the crisis, has bigger
impact on EBITDA than on any other financial measures.

•

Both the airline effect and the time effect do not have significant
Net D/E Ratio and the Foreign Exchange Gain/Loss.

•

For the operating

measures,

both the airline

a significant
impact with an only exception
significant
time effect).
Table
Variable

effect and the time effect
of the Overall

13: Two-Way ANOVA Results
P-value for F-Test

ll

impact

Load

on the

will make

Factor

(a non-

Airline Effect
0.000
0.000
0.001
0.151
0.764
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

PBT
EBITDA
ROE
NDE_Ratio
FX
OLF
BE_LF
YIELD
STAFF
FUEL

CORRELATION

Time Effect
0.314
0.143
0.209
0.379
0.768
0.479
0.040
0.000
0.004
0.000

ANALYSIS

As all measures
used are comparable
across the carriers, for each of the measures,
we will pool all the observations
together to create a single variable.
This is equivalent
to crash a small panel data into a single variable without the time dimension.
The main
reason for this pooling of a panel data is to further analyze any relationships
among
these variables. 2 We start with a simple
correlation
analysis
by generating
the
correlation coefficient
matrix (Table 14).
Table 14: Correlation
1

Coefficient
2

1 PBT
2 EBITDA

1
0.254

3ROE
4FX

0.635 0.111
0.300-0.174

50LF
6 BE_LF
7YIELD

3

Matrix of Performance
4

0.254 0.635 0.300
1 0.111 -0.174
0.5571

0.053-0.031-0.060
-0.185 -0.595 -0.383
0.084-0.503

8STAFF
0.233-0.412
9 FUEL
-0.056
0.592
Note: Numbers in bold and
significant
at5%. Some

0.193

5

6

0.053-0.185
-0.031 -0.595

0.084
-0.503

0.55;-0.060-0.383
0.045
0.038

0.193
0.289

0.0451
1
0.038 i 0.446
0.2891-0.436

Measures

7

8

0.233-0.056
-0.412
0.592
0.427-0.345
0.166-0.375

0.446-0.436
1 -0.130
-0.130

9

-0.252
-0.292
1

0.128]
-0.062 t

0.521-0.794j

0.427 -0.375!
0.166l-0.252
0.521 -0.575 1-0.575
-0.345
0.128 -0.292
-0.062 -0.794
italic
arc significant
at I% and numbers in bold arc
variables
ha',;c
missingvalues.(n = 50)

From the above table, we can make the following

observations:

•

Among the remaining
four financial measures,
EBITDA
does not significantly
correlate with another other three. The highest correlation
among any two of
them is between PBT and ROE.

•

PBT does not significantly
is a bit of surprising.

•

It is equally surprising to see that the OLF
any of the four financial measures.
EBITDA
exception

is highly
is OLF).

correlate

correlated

with

any of the five operating

four

is not significantly

of the

five

operating

measures,

which

correlated

with

measures

(the

After a preliminary check-up, we found that the Net D/E Ratio is very unstable in sense that it is very
skewed to the right, we decided to drop this variable in the rest of our discussion in this section. This
does not umply that this variable is not trnponant. It simply says that we are encountered
with a
serious measurement problem.
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Among
YIELD,

the operating
measures,
which is at -0.794.

It seems

to be counter-intuitive

correlation

to see a positive

Margin and ROE, between
Cost Margin and EBITDA.
CAUSALITY

the highest

Staff Cost Margin

belongs

correlation

to FUEL and

between

and YIELD,

and

Staff Cost

between

Fuel

ANALYSIS

In this part, we will investigate possible causal relationship among the variables. In
particular,
when analyzing
the financial measures,
we will treat PBT, EBITDA
and
ROE as dependent
variables
and all operating
Gain/Loss (FX) as the explanatory
(independent)

1.

DETERMINANTS

PBT.

OF

profit before
tax ('PBT).
estimated
equation:

PBT = -20.654

regression

+ 1.219FX

model

+ 0.386OLF-

(2-238) 3
(0.896)
+ 0.401Staff+
0.762Fuel
(0.423)

EBITDA

0.294BE

and

Exchange

measures

on

led to the following

LF + 0.655Yield

(-1.04_

(0.056)

R 2 = 0.104)

FX has a very limited role in explaining
PBT. And
significant,
indicating that the operating measures do
implies that PBT may not be a good performance
analyze the impact of operating measures, as the ones

EBITDA.
To avoid over-fitting,
selection and generated the following
0.973BE_LF-

(-11.078)
(R 2 = 0.865, Adjusted
The
EBITDA

is used

OF

= 101.945-

the Foreign

(0.996)
Adjusted

The model is insignificant.
Only
none of the operating measures is
not explain PBT very well. This
measure if the primary focus is to
used in this study.

2. DETERMINANTS
procedure for variable

plus

We ftrst look into the role of the operating

Multiple

(R.2 = 0.229,

measures
variables.

negative
impacts
of Break-even
are expected.
But it is puzzling

12.963Yield-

we have
model:

used

a stepwise

0.499Staff

(-4.82)
(-6.071)
R 2 = 0.854, DW = 1.6844)
Load Factor
and Staff
to also see a negative

Cost Margin
role of Yield

on
on

EBITDA. This counter-intuitive
result is mainly caused by the conversion
on local currency into US dollar, which is subject to currency fluctuation.

of the yield
In the midst

of the current crisis, majority of Asian currencies
have been depreciated
(Table 2), while changes in EBITDA were in a much lesser extend.

substantially

The number m the bracket is the corresponding t-test statistic for the variable.
DW is the Durbin-Waston statistic, which is to test serial correlation of the residuals. With n -- 50, the
acceptance range for a two-sided D\V test is as follows: 1.54 < DW < 2.62 for two independent
variables; 1.59 < DW < 2.66 for three independent variables; 1.64 < DW < 2.70 for four independent
variables. For more detail, refer to Studenmund (1997, p.346).
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DETERMINANTS
OF ROE.
Using similar procedure
following regression
model that highlights its relationship
and the foreign exchange gain/loss:
3.

ROE = 113.65

+ 2.933FX

- 1.392BE

(4.29)
(R 2 = 0.555, Adjusted
The estimated
relationship
correct. From the discussions

as for EBITDA, we have the
with the operating measures

LF - 0.957Fuel

(-4.421)
(-1.6445 )
R 2 = 0.522, DW = 2.185)

between
ROE and independent
variables
in the last section, we know that on average,

is intuitively
carriers incur

losses in foreign exchange.
The above relationship
tells us that better management
of
the foreign exchange
risk will significantly
improve the return on equity. As for the
break-even
load factor, it will adversely affect ROE during the current crisis, as the
break-even
load factor has been in an upward trend in recent years.
4.

DETERlVlINANTS

the basic
equation:

operating

YIELD

As the last part of the casual

OF YIELD.

measures

affect

= 1.902 - 0.0089OLF

(R-" = 0.653,

the overall

yield.

This

PROBLEMS

leads

we want to how
to the

following

- 0.0487Fuel

(-1.6446)

(-8.455)

Adjusted

R 2 = 0.636,

DW = 2.012)

The above relationship
is plausible even though the Overall
at 5%. It is evident that the Fuel Cost Margin has a major
yield. 7

IV.

analysis,

Load Factor is insignificant
role in affecting the overall

RECONCILED

After looking through various performance measures in Section III and quantitative
analysis in the previous
section, we now turn to specific financial troubles faced by the
airlines as a result of the economic crisis. It is well known that the airline industry is
extremely
sensitive
The extent to which

to the economic
environment
due to the high operating
leverage.
a country's
economy performs largely affects the carrier's overall

performance.
In this section, we look into three main areas that have been largely
influenced
by the financial crisis, namely (a) foreign exchange losses due to transaction
exposure;
(b) inflated operating and financing costs; and (c) decrease in demand for air
travel. We will include
discussions
in this section.

Garuda

Indonesia

and

Philippine

Airlines

(PAL)

in our

5 Thep-value for variable FUEL in this equation is 10.8%, indicating that it is insignificant at 5%. We
included this variable to improve the model fit and to generate an acceptable DW statistic.
The p-value for variable OLF in this equation is 10.5%; so it is insignificant at 5%. We included this
variable to improve the model fit and to generate a better DW statistic.
7 On the other hand, we should be cautious when we interpret this relationship as the overall yield has
been convened to US Dollar, which is subject to exchange rate fluctuations.
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FOREIGN

EXCHANGE

LOSSES

Transactional
exposures
arise out of changes in the value of foreign currencies
underlying
outstanding
contracts.
The prevailing
exchange rates will determine
the
actual amount (in home currency) that has to be paid when the unsettled contracts are
due, resulting
in exchange
instalments
that are usually
Japanese yen debt.
There
exchange
airlines
Section

are several
losses due

gains and losses. Examples
include
aircraft
purchase
denominated
in US dollars, and obligations
to repay a

airlines in our study which have incurred relatively large
to the weakening of their respective
domestic
currencies.

foreign
These

include THAI, PAL, MAS, KAL and Garuda. According
to our findings in
III, 8 THAI is so far the most severely affected airline. Since July 1997, the

value of baht
almost doubled

has declined
by approximately
33%. THAI's
foreign exchange
loss
in the 1997 fiscal year compared to the 1996 fiscal year. This was the

largest increase among all the expense items. In addition, its net debt to equity ratio
reached a staggering
7,994% in 1997 after translating all debts into THAI baht. It is
safe to say that the foreign exchange loss contributed largely to the increase in THAI's
overall expenses,
35.27%. Previous

resulting in a plunge in its 1997 PBT margin
year's PBT margin was a positive 6.26%.

(Table

3) to a negative

PAL has been burdened by huge debts, which totalled around US$2.0 billion owing
to over 9,000 creditors and suppliers. The main contributing
factor is PAL's ambitious
fleet expansion
and modernisation
plan in recent years, resulting
serious
financial
obligations
adversely
affected by the untimely economic crisis which has weakened the
Philippine
peso by around 30% against the US dollar since mid 1997.
In the midst of the crisis, MAS has a relatively higher
margins among other airlines in the study. Before the monetary

foreign exchange
board intervened

loss
in an

attempt to stabilise the economy in September
1997, the Malaysian
ringgit has already
depreciated
approximately
34% against the US dollar. This severe devaluation
of the
ringgit dealt a significant
blow to the financial
standing
of MAS, which has a
comparably
high average net debt to equity ratio (Table 6). Higher leverage would
imply higher transaction
exposure risk. In 1998, the carrier's
foreign exchange
loss
margin was negative
10.19%, compared to a gain margin of 0.15% the previous fiscal
year (Table 7). Effective debt repayments
in ringgit
resulting in the increase in foreign exchange loss.

have increased

by a large margin,

At the end of KAL's
1997 fiscal year, the Korean won fell by about 48% against the
US dollar. Its 1997 PBT margin fell deeper into the negative zone while its foreign
exchange
loss margin increased from negative 3.06% to negative 10.92%. Its financial
reports
revealed
an increase
in total operating
expenses
over the same period.
Therefore,
the increase in foreign exchange loss margin could not have been caused by
a decrease
in operating
costs. Rather, the increase in foreign exchange
losses was a
result of currency devaluation.
Comparatively,
the Indonesian
rupiah fell the most against the US dollar. In 1998,
the rupiah averaged
around 80% weaker than the average rates existing before the
crisis. In this respect, Garuda has been reported to be in critical condition.
Garuda's
foreign
The

debt amounted

findings

exclude

to nearly

Garuda

US$300

million,

and PAL.
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of which

S100 million

was already

due. Accordingto IndonisianMinister for StateEnterprises,major restructuringis
neededfor the airline, otherwise"Garuda planes which fly overseaswill be
confiscated".It is evidentthatthebasisfor the confiscationis attributableto the nonrepaymentof debts.
INFLATED

OPERATING

AND FINANCING

COSTS

Operating costs include aircraft lease payments
and fuel costs, which are two of the
major cost components
for airline companies.
Financing
costs include
debt interest
payments,

on which

we would

focus our attention

since many

airlines

have

heavy

debt

burdens. All the Asia-Pacific
airlines included
in this study, with the exception
of
Cathay Pacific 9, are experiencing
rising operating costs, mainly as a result of weakened
home currencies.
From Table 9, it is clear that the average break-even
load factor has
been increasing
in recent years, signifying
increasing
costs. Debt-ridden
airlines are
faced with high debt costs, in addition to rising operating
costs. Rising operating
and
financing costs have significantly
affected the carriers like THAI, MAS, KAL, PAL
and Garuda.
Based

on Table 3 (PBT Margin)

and Table 4 (EBITDA

Margin),

we observe

that in

1997, KAL's PBT decreased
despite an increase
in EBITDA.
This would signify a
significant
increase in interest as well as amortization
expense.
Depreciation
expense
has decreased due to a revision in KAL's accounting
policy I°. Tax expense is out of the
picture for both indicators
(PBT and EBITDA).
Therefore,
interest
and amortization
expenses
must have increased.
A further
revealed a 40% increase in the item "Interest
regarding
however,

"guarantee
charges" in the financial
we do see a large increase in debts

inquiry
into K.AL's
financial
statements
and guarantee charges".
Nothing was said
report. With relevance
(after all foreign debts

to interest charges
are translated
into

Korean won). Consequently,
interest charges have increased
substantially.
From Table
12, it shows that KAL's fuel cost margin has increased from 17.01% in 1996 to 19.26%
in 1997. The increase is significant because fuel costs have risen at a faster rate relative
to total operating costs. In addition, the airline's
1997 while its seat capacity rose by only 8.4%.
DECREASE

IN DEMAND

fuel costs

increased

by about

17.3% in

FOR AIR TRAVEL

The third factor that has been largely affected by currency
devaluation,
and the
subsequent
economic
recession,
is the drastic decrease
of demand
in air services,
mainly passenger
demand. The weakening
home currencies
have made travelling
for
locals more expensive,
thereby adversely affecting outbound
traffic. We would expect
inbound traffic to increase,
as Asian countries
have become
cheaper
destinations.
However, reports in traffic statistics have indicated a general fall in inbound traffic too.
Reasons cited include the 1997 haze from burning forests in Indonesia,
and political
and social unrest in the region. The already
declining
Japanese
economy
has also
9 Operating costs of CX did increase, but it was due mainly to increased flights and not to currency
devaluation.
J0The useful life of aircraft was increased from 10 years to 13 years, resulting therefore m a decrease in
depreciation expense of W197,000 million for the period. The salvage value of aircraft, property and
equipment are depreciated for a change, causing an increase in depreciation expense of W4,653
rrullion. The net effect is a fall in depreciation expense of W192,347 million.
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affectedintra-Asiatravel,addingto thedeclinein air travelbecauseJapanhasbeenthe
main origin marketin Asia-Pacific.The net effect is over-capacity
during recession,
which

is experienced

in different

The overall yield
economic
downturn
currency and steeper
(Table 8) had
falling traffic.
While

also

severity

by all of the Asian

airlines

in this study.

(Table 10) has been falling since 1995, in part due to a prolonged
in Japan. The falling yield is further compounded
by weaker
price discounts during the current recession.
Overall load factor
dipped

other airlines

in 1998,

reflecting

the problem

are hit with falling demand

due largely

of over-capacity
to currency

CX's decline in demand is notably because of their now relatively
dollar that is pegged to the US dollar. CX's fares became more

amidst

devaluation,

strong Hong Kong
expensive
to Asian

travellers
and this lowered overall demand for CX even with aggressive
discounting.
This, in turn, adversely
affected the carrier's
earnings;
the impact is greater on the
carrier's revenue
Asian carriers.

rather

than

on its costs,

as opposed

to the situation

faced by other

OTHER ISSUES
The Japanese

airlines

have

high inherent

costs

which

resulted

in relative

weaker

cost-competitiveness.
Before the crisis, this situation was compensated
by high yields
as Japanese
carriers
have the highest
average
yields among
the airlines
studied.
However during the crisis, overall yields fell while costs of these airlines, which were
already

high, increased

further.

This added to the erosion

JAL, added to further losses. Deregulation
cause the yields to decline further, leaving
and high unit costs. Although
European
and U.S. markets,
trends. A prolonged
thus causing further

recession
downward

of profits,

and for the case of

and the new US bilateral, too, will likely
JAL in the midst of increased competition

its widely spread network
JAL remains
leveraged

provides exposure to the strong
to Japanese
outbound
market

in Japan has certainly
depressed
pressure on its performance.

the domestic

demand,

So far, Taiwan seems to one of few economies
that are least affected in the region
by the Asian crisis. The New Taiwan' dollar devalued only slightly when compared to
many other Asian currencies.
In this respect, CAL is relatively
better off than most
other carriers. But a poor safety record in recent years (two air crashes - one in Nagoya
(1994) and one in Taipei (1998))
has seriously
tarnished
the carrier's
image. Its
recovery would take considerable
time to materialize.
On top of this, CAL has to coupe
with increased competition
from the new entrants such as EVA Air.
In Indonesia,

the

social

unrest

and

political

uncertainty

crushed

the

investors'

confidence
in the country
and certainly affected air traffic. In 1998, passenger
load
factors reached as low as 43%. Inbound flights had experienced
near zero load factors
due to unrest. Another worrying issue is one concerning
the millennium
presently the only airline in the region which is not Y2K compliant.
The misfortune
of a temporary
closure
strike staged by the pilots' union in protest

bug. Garuda is

of PAL in September
1998 was a result of a
of the enforcement
of a contractual
term that

allows the airline's
management
to "retire pilots with 20 years experience
or 20,000
flight hours".
The system-wide
strike paralysed
operations
and amassed
losses; it
worsened PAL's condition
in midst of the crisis. After talks broke down between the
management
and
assets". Although

the union, operations
were ceased to mitigate losses and "preserve
PAL resumed operations
in October 1998, its financial
viability is
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still hangingon thebalance.It is still lookingfora whiteknightto bail thecompanyout
of thediresituation.
At thispointof time,therecessionseemstobebottomingout andAsian economies
are on the way to recover. Many of the Asia-Pacific
airlines still have a considerable
way to go before their financial problems are resolved. Suitable strategies are needed to
aid the carriers ride out the economic downturn.

IV.

CONCLUSIONS

Asia's
the region

economic boom came to an abrupt end in the middle of 1997. All airlines
have been adversely
affected in one way or the other. The main source

in
of

financial trouble in this period of economic downtum,
as experienced
by most airlines
in out study, is currency
devaluation.
This in turn created heavy financial burdens in 3
main areas: (a) foreign
exchange
losses due to transaction
exposure,
(b) inflated
operating and financing costs, and (c) decrease in demand for air travel. Airlines which
have suffered huge exchange losses include THAI, PAL, KAL, MAS and Garuda. This
group of airlines is suffering from high operating and financing costs, in particular,
in
aircraft lease payments,
debt interest payments and the erosion of the benefits that could
have been enjoyed if not for unfavourable
exchange rates. All Asia-Pacific
airlines in
our study are also affected by falling air traffic. Outbound traffic decreased
as expected
while inbound traffic took a surprising
decline.
The reasons
for the latter are the
regional haze, and social and political
unrest. Another
major factor to the overall
decline in air traffic is attributable
the Asia-Pacific
region.
There are other

issues

Some of these were already
in financial
trouble before

to the deterioration

that compounded

the effects

of Japan

as an origin

of the recession

market

in

on the airlines.

existing before the downturn - several airlines were already
the crisis started. The crisis worsened
their situation
and

made the need to resolve the prevailing
problems
more pressing.
Japan's prolonged
recession has directly affected the performance
of JAL. CAL has a poor reputation
for
safety while Garuda was plagued with institutional
burdens and the millennium
bug.
PAL was in the middle of an ambitious fleet expansion
and modernisation
plan when
the recession
system-wide
We have

struck. To make things worse, its operations
were severely affected
strike, which eventually
led to the temporary cessation of operations.
found

that the Foreign

Exchange

Gain or Loss has

a significant

by a

role

in

influencing
an airline's
performance.
Therefore
proper hedging of foreign exchange
rate risk through the use of financial instruments
is a good way to reduce exposure in
this area, especially when the economy takes a downturn. QAN has demonstrated
that it
could still reap profits despite having a high average net debt to equity ratio. Although
the Australian
dollar depreciated
against the US dollar, and that US debts make up the
majority of QAN's large debts, QAN did not seem to suffer a heavy financial blow in
this aspect. Airlines should pay more attentions on risk management,
especially during
aggressive fleet modernization
and capacity expansion.
There should be an appropriate
balance be_veen
acquiring
and leasing
aircraft,
which should be integral part of risk management
strategy for any carrier. Aggressive
capacity expansion
through acquisition
would considerably
strain an airline's
bottom
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lineduringaneconomicdownturn.Aircraftleasesdoincreasecostsin shortrun; butthe
benefitsof beingableto bettercontrolits capacityusuallyover-weighthe penaltyof
terminatingleases.The sale-and-lease-back
strategy is also a good mechanism
to
survive the financial storms.
fleet, like Thai Airways.

But this option may not be feasible

for carriers

For debt-ridden
carriers, it could consider convening
its debts
implementing
major restructuring
plans and cost-cutting measures.

with ageing

into equity/shares
by
But such an exercise

is usually a tough sale to creditors. Furthermore,
institutional
constraints,
such
foreign ownership,
may make such as rescue plan infeasible for trouble carriers.
It is clear

that the full impact

of the crisis

still has not been

fully reflected

as,

at this

point of time. A similar research could be conducted at a time when Asia's economy
has recovered so that a better picture of how the airlines are affected by the crisis could
be obtained.
In addition, since the scope of this study is limited to 11 key carriers in
Asia Pacific, a future study may be needed to have a much broader coverage of carriers
in the region.
Additional
research
is still needed in the area of airline
especially
concrete
risk management
models. New capacity
weigh in the financial risks of the aircraft ownership.

financial
planning

management,
models must
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Abstract This paper presents an integrated picture of the reform and development
air transportation
characteristics,

of China's

industry in recent twenty years. According to the difference of its
we divide the period into three states. In the first stage, the civil aviation

sector was separated from control of army so as to bring some business aspects to it. The
operating

power of air transportation

began to be separated from administrative

bureau in the

second stage. Six trunk air carriers as well as more than a dozen of small airlines were
established

to seek profit on the rapid growing market. In the third stage, the enterprises

in

the industry were given more operating power and regulation of the market was somewhat
loose. Meanwhile,

the growth of demand for air transportation

compete intensely. Faced with the tendency of deregulation
in the world, China's
competition
coming.

government

to consolidation.

slows down, and air carriers

and globalization

of the industry

begins to transfer its policy implication from pro-

A wave of merger and acquisition

in the industry of China is
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. 2

I. INTRODUCTION

As China

moves

witnessed,

from

a centrally

for the last 19 years,

planned

from central
economy

to local government.

in the

profit-seeking
industrial

either

sense

that

economic

reform

policy

some

two-thirds

Although

or more

industrial

size state-owned

enterprises

on cross-section

studies

reform,

Jefferson

however,

population

of many

Industry

are ambiguous.
available

from

This article
industry

that permit

anecdotes,

describes

sectors

the early

the

Table

in recent
the

growth

rate of all modes

modes

1980-94

world

in terms

1980,

while

by

and employing

of large-

survey

and medium-

of Chinese

the reforms

is based
enterprise

is complex:

are partial
of action;

aggregates."

the

and uneven;
and outcomes

level and transcend

statistical

the

of the Chinese

on the SOE reform

new course

while

The

average

period

of total

China's

- 4.3 times

growth

the evidence

This

transport:

suggests

average,

an

in 1994.
performed,

passenger-kilometers

ranked

aviation

behind

in China
average

ranked

with

has also
of all

8th in the

its 33th

the U.S.,

was

annual

kilometres

In 1994 China

4th, just

since

(passenger

Air transport

of passenger

compared

mode

activities

the

airline

is one of the

growing

while

in the same period.

Chinese

sector

transport

its proportion

1.7% in 1980 to 6.4%

in the

transport

rate of civil

the world

was 9.9%

reform

has been the fastest

of n°n'urban

annual

air passenger-kilometers

its domestic

enterprise

aviation

the composition

in intercity

from

and

performance.

of transportation

important

has increased

of regulatory

economy

1 shows

years.

during

more

a market

produced

sector

out: "The problem

to the enterprise

and fragile

on the industry's

20.7%

become

process

of the Chinese

1980s.

kilometers)

samples,

literature

than mandate)

power

approach.

and its impact

largest

(rather

was

of exports,

of thousands

and diverse;

must penetrate

small

is the largest

p. 50) pointed

is large

have

out to be very successful,

In a comprehensive

(1994,

enterprises

A full analysis

industry-case-study

industries.

sectors

essentially

output

and 80 percent

Most of the existing

and Rawski

of measures

turned

has been the reform

(SOEs).

of state-owned

they consist

reform

many

had become

of" national

rural reforms

to be much more difficult.

economy,

or a shift in decision-making

economy

economy, accounting
for 50 percent of total output
more than 100 million workers in 1992.

The core of China's

to a market

liberalization

By 1993 China's

units.

proved

economy

place

Russia

in
and

Japan.
TABLE
Modes

1: Modal Split in Non-Urban
1980 Ratio (%)
1985

Rail
Road

138.3
73.0

60.6
32.0

241.6
172.5

Water
Air

12.9
4.0

5.7
1.7

17.9
I 1.7

Total

228.1

Sources:
This

tremendous

economic

100.0

Transport

443.6

Transport
in China (Billion passenger-kms)
1990
1996 Ratio (%) Annual Growth 1980-96
261.3
262.1

332.5
490.9

36.4
53.7

5.6
12.7

16.1
74.8

1.8
8.2

1.4
20.2

914.3

100.0

9.1

the reform

of the industra

16.5
23.0
562.9

(I 997).
gro_,,'til

expansion.

is due

\Ve divide

to both
the

process

of the reform

into three

and

the

stages

rapid
The

national
first

stage
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started

the

early

80's

when

China's

transfered

its attention

to economic

reforming

programme

issued.

a tremendous
process
the

growth

of building

end

of

1987

International
of

1991.

airlines
large

to the

Airport

In this

the

to be built

enterprises

also

a situation

of more than
power

of air transportation
factor decreases
the imperfect

and some

regulated

these two observations

useful to study China's
transition

changes
airline

throughout
industry

the

share

75-80%

air carriers
China's

suggest

and

carrier

planned

caused

The airline

seems

draw

is to better

in

are to be formed

size of its population,

with other continents.

airline industry'.

The article

This article

is organized

as follows.

China's

air transportation.

reforms

in the air transport

industrial

sector

focusing

poIicies to enterprises"
remarks

behaviors

(194%1980)

II]-V

on
and

the

market

the

growth
Load

intensly

in

and prominent
Taken

may be particularly
process

of

of China's
major

air

structural

to deregulate/liberalize
and

international

predict

that a small

within

the next decade.
importance

of airline

markets.
number

The rapid

of its location
nerworks

little has been written

the

(5-

growth

of

in Asia,

all,

in Asia and

on theChinese

that void.

describes

impact

while

experiment.

undergoing

experts

II contains

respetively.

industry

in this period.

development

likely;

filling

and

economy.

tendency

its importance

Section

Section

organization,

II. HISTORY

Despite

is a step towards

trunk

in 1993, when

for the general

the

the pattern

Baiyun

The tremendous

of this industry

in

in the end

The

began

reform

domestic

and geopolitical

bureau

an interesting

is currently

both

the

are competing

implications

wide

point that China will likely play a key role in shaping
the linkage

offers

to a market

industry

increasingly

airlines

understand

is a world

sector.

by a historic

economy

competition

networks

industry

that an examination

There

promote

10) of global

airline

and

of the market

seems to cease

loss money,

and to further

article

growth)

Airlines

market.

fight for the rest. The third stage

in a state industry

world.

of the industry

economy,

airlines

policy.

Globalization

China's

six trunk

in aviation

the

by local governments

in which

from a centrally

and its aviation

invested

growing

to the enterprises

through

commercial-orianted,

rapid

a dozen

in this

Six

the

stimulated

stage went

civil aviation

broken.

from

which

Airlines

in the

SOE reform

objective

Southern

new air carriers

separated

Southwestern

big profit

inviroment.
changes

of China

government

the civil aviation

bureaus,

to seek

inefficient

together,

transport

other

was

(say, more than 25% of annual

of profound

Our second

monopoly

when

The second

China

central

CAAC

administrative

the stage.

the

and the

reform,

city) from the Guangzhou

was released

example

completing

during

of both

and many

entered

of preliminary

Industry of China

in 1987,

from the establishment

CAAC

of oligopoly

other air carriers
more operating

airlines,

(in Guangzhou

bagen

formed

per year

began

and ended

gave to regional

departure

period,

reform

development,

power

of 25.8%

six trunk

economic

In the period

army and some basic operating

of Air Transportation

three
The

a brief description
stages

analysis

of change
performance.

of regulatoD,

goes

with the

of government's
Section

of the history
and

of

enterprise

mathodology
regulation

VJ contains

of
and

concluding

_
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airline

needed

industry

was founded

airlines

administration,

as

trade

within

then

CAAC

was

combined

industry

independent
regulated

operation

economic
in every

entities
aspect

operations,

could

responsible

of

China's

of the traditional

central

financial

From

losses

losses.
even

after

air

services

planned

account

fourteen years, the 1968-74
million yuan (Shen, 1992).

Second,

demand

of the airline

remained

transportation

largely

in whole

various

levels

most

of governments
demand

management

and

inefficient

of airlines
and low quality

1950) for CAAC

The reform
to the

economic
through

airports

industry

economic
market

in China

2.5 times during

80"s.

decisions

and losses.
market

route

fourteen

industry.

under the old system

RPKs,

persistent
of financial

of losses

period.

by air was

Of the

totaling

intercity

traffic

The volume

less than

market

rather

rather
small.

demand.

level in the Chinese

than

360

and as a result,

of air

1% compared

for administrative

enterprises

entry,

performances

years

to the

years

was

for air travel and

had been bearing

subsidy

1,538 million

industry

entry,

its unsatisfactory

industry

operation.

and were not

The

eligibility

over th£ 1950-80

stifling

was started

The

central
to rebuild

transferring

economy

suffered

no competition

further

expected

reform,

operational

of a single

of the

was for
affairs

doing

Moreover,

for

business.

the military

in the market

and

resulted

in

In fact,

it took

24 3'ears (after

aviation

history

(Wang.

which

was mainly due

1989).

(1980-87)

reform.
and

and

The air share of domestic

state-owned

traffic

administration

consecutive

travel

created

services,

regional

in 1997. The main task of air transportation

made the airline

REFORM

economic

development

decentralized
increased

of airline

China's

large

to reach the highest

III. PRELIMINARY

States

passenger

and

The lack of commercial

I percent

in 1975 waz only

in the United

management

had witnessed

was stagnant.

the

stations,

including

suppressed

(firstly

of commend"

civil aviation

own profits

seven

"chain

and seventy-eight

government's

produced

at about

six

organization

aviation

the airline

central

industry

country

administration:

First,

government

of army

The

and even passenger

the industry

was severely

constant

that of top three airlines
government

the

period

for air services

the development
volume

system.

to 1978,

for

was a semi-military

CAAC,

important

industry

was established

policy

as a department

.4

civil

provision

pricing

its

under the umbrella

for their

air transportation

1953

taking

airport

not make

frequency, aircraft buying and leasing,
was, therefore, a CA.AC monopoly.

Prior to the reform,

bureaus,

and other regulations)

units

out

of the years.

system:

civil aviation

rights

carry

(CAAC)

for most

administration

of flight

(such as traffic

to

of China

Industry of China

1950s when the country

to 1980, the industry

Commission)

provincial

control

The lower-level

Prior

a four-level

twenty-three

the early

instrument

Administration

the Military

CA.AC

bureaus,

national

and tourism.

with the Civil Aviation
Air Force,

a

during

of Air Transportation

gradually.

a

from the end of 70's,

government
its economic

centralized
As

with an average

began

a result,
annual

structure

planning
the

to focus

growth

and regulator3,

economy

National

its attention

Income

to

a

on

system
relatively

in China

rate of 8.6°,L compared

has
with
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that of 5.8% in 70's and 4.0% in 60% (CSSB, 1992).This strongly stimulated the demand for air
transportation

and requested the reform of the industry.

On the eve of the Third Plenum of the Party Central Committee in October 1978, Mr. Deng
Xiaoping stated that civil aviation should follow a similar direction
Since 1980, The administrative
which effectively
opportunity

separated

as a modern enterprise.

structure was reformed first in 1980 and then again in 1982
civil aviation

from the army. This offered

the

industry

the

to bring back business aspects. At the beginning of 1981 the central government

adopted the policy of 'self-responsible

for losses and extra-profit retention'

towards the airline

sector. The policy was further simplified to a one-nine division of airline revenue between the
state and CAAC.
responsibility

Within

of managing

extended to twenty-three

CAAC,

six regional

their own revenues

civil aviation bureaus

and costs in 1979.

were

given the

The practice was further

provincial civil aviation bureaus a year later. Furthermore,

CA.AC in

1982 extended the profit-retention system to six regional civil aviation bureaus and gave them
more autonomy in making operational decisions.
In spite of the fact that key decisions

power were still left in central government,

preliminary reform made the industry expand from 1.8 billion passenger-kms

in 1977 to 18.2

billion passenger kms in 1987, with average annual growth reaching 25.8*/, (compared
of 8.5% from 1949-77).
1989).

The labor productivity

these

to that

increased twice from 1980 to 1984 (Wang,

Moreover, it had no opportunity to improve its competitive ability in practice, as CAAC still
held most decision power for management
competitive mechanism.

of air aviation and there was no room to form the

IV. REFORM OF RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN
ADMINISTRATIVE
ENTERPRISES
IN CIVIL AVIATION
(1987-92)

BUREAUS

AND

Reforming program
Though departing from the army, the airline industry could not meet the demands
rapid economic

expansion

in the traditional

central government

could

According

principles

to the

administrative

levels,

comprehensive

reforming

Implementation"

of

the immense

departure

simplification
program,

investment

business

of governmental
"Report

on

Civil

issued by the State Council in January

program is to separate
monopoly.

not afford

strictly centralized

the regulator

from

administration.
on developing

administration,

functions

and

Aviation

Meanwhile,
the !ndust_.
reduction

of

decentralization,

a

Reform

Measures

from also being the operator

and to break the CA.AC

administration system to a two-level system: the national administration

eastern. South-western
would be accountable

and

1987. The main goal of this reform

The major ideas in the program included : (I) simplifying the traditional

(2) establishing six state-owned

of China's

four-level

and the local bureaus.

trunk airlines (Eastern China, North China, South China, North-

and North-western)

were to establish their own airlines which graduallly

for their o_vn revenues

and costs under the "complete

responsibility

18/11/98
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(3) separating

independent
(Wang,

businesses

of trunk

aviation

Shanghai,

respectively.

Beijing)

were

in late

Airlines

(based

decides

and route entry,

the market

its flight

of these

maintain

safety and to improve

transportation,

and China

them

become

entry of the industry.

frequency

designing

independent,

strategic

foreign

its regulatory

function

regional

civil aviation

regional

airport

removing

chief

sales

in adjusting
bureaus

managers

However,

and

Northern

China

in

in Guangzhou)

selects

in

for air services
inputs

airlines,

airline

license,

issuing

(e.g.,

crew

proposes

aircraft

the main

task of

policies

no

the market.
such

approving

and negotiating

expected

and regulations

the

operator

mechanisms

Similarly,

the main
air traffic

influenced

to

air services

efficient

still kept the power

and indirectly

route entry

bilateral

longer

as coordinating

in fact, CAAC

in those trunk airlines

the other
(based

contracts),

it to focus on designing

and regulating

in

decisions.

and efficiency,

is administrative,

development.

outlets,

based

Air China

(based

commercially-oriented

was

Airlines,

responsible

and compensation

CAAC

and the new role allows

in Xi'an)

civil

in Chengdu,

"test-run,"

for five years:

for the industry,

competition

Eastern

Airlines

regional

based

and Shanghai

Southern

such as issuing

plans

countries.

China

(based

and

Shanghai

Airlines,

units and are directly

and coordination,

pricing,

with

lasted

Airlines

and their employment

and exit,

agreements

the process

in 1989,

June,

of the Chengdu

Northwestern

and

Southwestern

and makes other operational

the establishment

CA.AC is of regulation

China

are profit-seeking

flight attendants

purchase

of

air

to fulfill
mandate
control

in appointing

of
and
and

their operation.

entry
the easing

transportation.
passenger

entry
There

and cargo

second

t-ype of those

Airlines

and Sichuan

them

and making

the Chengdu

In the following

though

China

air carriers
Each

members,

With

administration

(4) easing

within

With the success

in Shenyang)

These

provision.

1987.

established,
1988,

initially

As a result,

in December

was established.

four airlines

Market

for all the airlines.

was implemented

bureaus,

was established

With

to serve

from airway

. 6

airlines

new program

1992.

operations

Industry of China

1989):

Building
The

airports

of Air Transportation

was jointly

Airlines
Province.

which

As for route

to open

routing

plans

were

41

new air carriers

established

services

in the early

of 90'5.

carriers

was funded

Airlines

was

many

airlines

owned

entD,,

carriers

of the market,

are the largest

by CAAC,

owned

CAAC

by

simplified

nex_ routes.

and CAAC

China

holds

local

of

those

government
Airlines

its approval

procedure

in consultation

meetino_.s exery

28

airlines

- Shanghai
among

or large
and

which

trunk

government

and most profitable

Eastern

Here airlines,

in China,
Besides

by local

was built and sought

corporations
Government

and

in general

route

provided

both

under

e.g.

Xiamen

Zhejiang

of Zhejiang

encouraged

proposes
entry

CA.AC,

The third type of

the

3'ear to coordinate

in air

Airlines,

them.

with airports,

profit

among

their

air
new

airlines.
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AlthoughCA.AC'sapprovalisrequired
forrouteentry,
mostof theairlines'
requests
seemed to
getapprovedwithoutmuch trouble.
Unexpected
tremendousdemand

The growth of air transportation
government

officials

was so dramatic that not only foreign experts but also China's

and experts could not expect it. In 1985, the Research

Center

for

Development of the State Council, an economic brain mast of the central government, proposed
its estimates for the capacity of the China's air transportation till the year 2000 (DRCSC,

1988):

The total tonne-kilometers

performed, the passenger-kilometers

performed and the passengers

carried in air transportation

in China in 2000 will reach 5-5.5 billions, 45-50 billions and 30-35

millions respectively, with an average annual growth rate of 13.1-13.6%, 12.9-13.5% and 1i.512.3% during the last fifteen years ofthis century.

However, the actual figure exceeded the estimate by far. The China State Statistical
(1992) reported that the actual average annual growth rate of air transportation
was nearly 20%, mainly due to the rapid economic
airline industry.

Therefore, when 'the Ten-Year
Civil Aviation' was designed

development

Bureau

during the 80's

and the deregulation

Program and the Eighth Five-Year Plan of Development

in the

for

in 1990, almost all the important indicators were lifted from the

original estimation presented five years ago (CCTA, 1992). The total volume of traffic and the
passenger traffic in air transportation

in 1995 were planned to reach 4.4 billion tonne-kms

30 million passengers, with an average annual growth of 12.0% and 12.6% respectively.

and
The

figure for 2000 was estimated as 6.5 billion torme-kms and 45 million passengers.
The revised estimate for 2000 is more than 20 percent over the original one in ! 985. However,
it can still be considered

conservative,

growth rate of air transportation

f_'cing the roaring increase during the early 90's. The

reached 30 percent in 1991 and 1992. The total volume

traffic reached 4.26 billion tonne-kilometers

of

in 1992, almost catching up the estimate for 1995.

Meanwhile, the load factor in the whole industry in that year was raised to 78.4, in which
domestic load factor being 86.9, implying that much potential demand of around
passengers failed to be served.
Market concentration
Figure 1 Distribution of Market Share in RPKs in 1991

I0 million
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.8

Others
11=/o
Northwestern

6%

Air China
36%

Northern
8%
Southwestern
8%

Eastern
Southern

15%

The

roaring

expansion

on demand

market concentration

decrease.

There

somewhat

that

often happens
the capacity

government

needs

was

productivity

in

market.

and foreign

load

factor
on some

The third thing

made

shows

It has

large

of air transportation

China's

appears to

still

especially

them cripple

and is becoming

changed

profit

were

( the

some

from

the

average

problems

economic

in the

with

the

under the CAAC
their

lower

with foreign

international

share

which

rate

worried

entities,

in competition

a critical

sector

profit

the trunk airlines

that on the most
usually

and all the

about

(1992 till now)

independent

the former

worried

the

routes

served

labor

airlines

in

both by

only one third of the market

with

cost.

seems

excess

to have

capacity

in the industry
routes

and less on airport

pushing

the reform

dropped

down

and other

since

infrastructure.

:_nd Pt_licv

1993. Some

inefficient

airlines

were

leading to heavy losses. In fact, the

from 78% in 1992 to 69% in 1994, and the

to 20%.

of investment

for_vard.

of Regulation

ceased

and low load factors,

even reduced

is that the structure

aircraft

5.1 Change

to become

quality

Survey

of air transportation

load factors

there

with

is that, after annual _ox_¢h rate of more than 25% in 80's and early 90's, the roaring

faced with high costs,
average

However,

air carriers,

lower price and higher

growth

one with

demand

the end of" 70's

growth.

to the

power

service

the growing

very fast since

not accompanied

When the government

the peak of'the growth

is that the air carrie_,

operating

and poor

The second

1990).

in history.
match

economic

to subsidize

The first thing

the international
domestic

in national

30%

had not enough

thing

profit was

AND MARKET

has developed

mode

the average

can't

OF ENTERPRISES

transportation

government.

dramatic

to order more aircraft,

The airline industry

industry

made

of air transportation

airlines were eager
have gone.
V. REFORM

16%

in 80's did not meet the demand,
All the problems

should

too much on

be solved

through
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Releasing more power to airlines

By the end of 1992, the State Council had authorized

the formation

of 55 corporate groups that

would form a vanguard of the next phase of China's economic development.
given increased
holding

freedoms

structure

China Eastern
60%,

that

held

Airlines

were among

the China

(including
operating

that

(l)

CAAC);
entity;

Eastern

imports

or

(3) to appoint

and vice presidents

al] of which

Group

advertising,

the three

and

other

domestic

is made

financial

or international

markets

subject

to maintaining

air catering,

for its staff (a discretion
governments).

normally

restricted

and

approved

stock

by

in most of

the following

s_cial

consultation

with

as an independent

legal

(4) to set pricing

a 'base price'

Board

16 subsidiaries

organization

(after

its

Air Group

on the Group

of the voting

equipment

around

to diversify

Eastern

to most of the key posts ( with the exception

conditions,

Air China,

up of

airlines were awarded

and its major subsidiaries);

airlines,

hotels and tourism,

the majority

transport

a corporate

the market

in the China

for half of the seats

of the

CEA controls

shared

through

a key opportunity

For example,

Co. - a non-banking

groups,

from

managers
of CEAG

to market demand

and exports,

aircraft

The top three

the top three airlines

remainder

Finance

money

Airlines,

freedom.

of China.

lease

companies.

(CEA) accounts

The

of corporate

(2) to borrow

overseas postings
such as provincial

Airlines

Air Group

to buy

Southern

operating

of the Bank

After the formation

subsidiary

This offered

more

in real estate,

the China Eastern

rights:

interests

of Chairman).

the headquarters
these
companies.

special rights to manage their finances

and China

them.

interests and to obtain
(CEAG),

including

These groups were

of the presidents

levels

on average;

to senior

in accordance
(5) to approve

adminis_-ative

levels

Opening domestic market

In 1994, the CAAC

announced

to allow

foreign

investors

China (less than 50% of capital share) and to make joint
(no more than 35% of capital
in the industry
to acquire

is Hainan

Airlines,

its 23% of stock

their stock in Hong

share and 25% of voting

Kong

Exchange

CAAC

raised

entry

barrier

by

hi order
speeds

mechanism

to encourage

and structure

local

up the decentralization

decentralization,

CAAC

venture

of" airport

transferred

injected

some

and China Southern

US$25
Airlines

year. The government

but the pace to open domestic

forbidding

new

entry

the CAAC

and

begin

millions
issued

prefer

market

re-examining

to change

more
of

the

its policy,

change

governments

to invest on airport
administration.

the administrative

in

stock). The first case of the joint
Aviation

qualification
of existing air carriers in 1993. This implies
from pro-competitive
policy to consolidation
policy.
Investment

or buy stock

on airport

airlines

in the following

infrastructure,

venture

of China's

into which American

foreign investment on airport and other
air transportation seems not fast.

Meanwhile,

venture

in 1995. China Eastern Airlines
Stock

to make joint

and other

infrastructure.

As an experiment
power

of the airport

CA.AC

to the efficiency
in Xiamen

of

Cit_, to
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the Xiamen

TheReform
and

municipal

government

airport and personnel.

This

46 airports in the country
or mainly

in 1988,

stimulated
were built,

from local governments.

construction,

local government

In 1993, the Hongqiao

Performance

upgraded

in Shanghai,

were

decentralized

gradually

managed

by

local

governments

from

example,

is encouraged
located

passengers
affords

in Pudong

that, CAAC

1993. Domestic
revenue.

Meanwhile,

investment
the

should

input

from

Table 2 Distribution

has

new mechanism
1992-96

and

stimulates

the investment

25.71
37.60

272
910

11.66
39.03

Firms'Capital
Fund of Construction

220
0

21.29
0

355
470

15.23
20.16

691
782

Charge on Airports
Bond

25
103

2.38
9.93

73

3.11

50
70
2331

Data sources: Transport

Concentration

The breakup

of CAAC

market

CAAC

monopoly.

The market
dozen

international

airlines,

Before

Now

participants

is 60 million

the local

government

for Civil Aviation

in

and 4-6% of international
structure

of source

half

in the

on infrastructure

of

own capital

investment

on

to grow as an

of Air Transport (million
% ! 996
%
0.92

269

4.16

261 '
7.50
1334
38.40

329
2067

5.08
31.90

19.90
22.51

1565
1330

24.14
20.52

174
N.A.

5.01

720
N.A.

I 1.I I

2.14
3.00

200
N.A.

5.76

200
N.A.

3.09

I00.00

3474

100.00

6480

100.00

.

32

include

airlines

namel._. Air China.

and the entry of new carriers

airline

industry

ten CA.AC carriers

Table

performed

airlines

1987 (the second-stage

the Chinese

carriers.

traffic)

six CAA.C trunk

100.00

into independent

structure.

non-CA.AC

A new

yuan)

(1993-97)

5.2 Market

changed

demand.

capacity

The

nearly

on Infrastructure
% 1994

266
389

1035

for

(see Table 7).

5.66

Total

government,

(see Table 2) and the sum of firm's

132

N.A.
N.A.

revenue

tax rate was reduced.

3.09

Foreign Loan
Others

were

the growing

Construction

shared

the suit.

of first period.

of Infrastructure

32

Loan from Fund.
Loan from Bank

totally

new airports

municipal

in the end of 1999,

increased

of Sources of Investment
1992
% 1993

Gov. Capital

invested

followed

while

Its designed

for the project

income

1986-92,

yuan for 46 airports'

in China,

years

so as to meet

pay the with 10% of domestic

fund

rate of 53% during

airport

Shanghai

construction.

has been changed

the

This

airport

the Fund

the corporate'

on infrastructure

infrastructure.
annual

established

airlines

inauguration.

billion)

of the

yuan.

will be in operation

yuan (US$1.3

of 4.4 billion

over the next several

is under

31 were

10

capital

on airport. During

in which

the third largest

another

region

and its first runway

the 10.7 billion

Besides

and

to build

and working

to invest

or expanded,

3 billions

Industry of China

all the fixed

local government

Other airports

airport

including

For the total investment

shared

Airport

of Air Transportation

3 shows

controlled
China

airlines

the majoriD'
Southern

reform),

the

may be characterized
(carriers

passenger

by the Chinese

airline

have si_ificantly

under

traffic
from

of the market

CA.AC)

(including

share.
together

was a

as an "oligopoly."
and
both

1992 to 1996.

and China Eastern.

industry

more
domestic

than

a

and

As can be seen, the

In 1992

the top three

had a 66%

of the total

18/I 1/98

The Reform and Performance of Air Transportation Industry of China

revenue passengers performed
remaining
airlines.

13% traffic

was supplied

The dominance

market share fell from
local, non-CAAC

while the other three trunk airlines
by four other CAAC

of the top three carriers

had 21% market share. The

carriers and more than a dozen local

was weakened

66% in 1992 to 56% in 1996.

carriers:

1I

The decline

however:

their

combined

to the growth of

is due mainly

their market share rose from 6.3% in ! 992 to ] 3.8% in 1996.

Table 3 Market Share and Market
Air Carriers
1992
Air China
32.1
Eastern
16.9
Southern
16.9
South Western
7.1
North Western
5.0
Northem
9.0
Others under CAAC
6.7
Local air carriers
6.3
Total
I00.0
R3
65.9
R6
87.0

Concentration of Air Transportation
1993
1994
1996
30.5
28.2
25.3
16.9
15.3
13.5
15.6
17.2
16.8
8.3
9.1
8.9
5.0
4.0
4.9
8.8
8.3
8. I
7.6
7.6
8.7
7.3
10.3
13.8
100.0
100.0
100.0
63.0
60.7
55.6
85.1
82.1
77.6

(% in RTKs)

Data sources:Transport (1993-97)

In fact,

the rise of local

domestic

routes

mainland

of China)

during

1992-96

in 1986

carriers

and regional

in 1987.

under

carriers. Note that services
carriers.

It is often argued
for the purpose

market

share

local

(routes

connecting

Hong

down

which

size.

much

The number

at the 30 largest
An equivalent

routes.

increased

occurred

for both the top 10 and top 20 city pairs.

Table 4: Concentration

to 2.40

at the 30 Largest

domestic

number

Chinese

City-pair

rate

for CAAC

level are more relevant

markets

at the national

city-pair

markets

2.06

is reported

firms

observations

Markets,

in China,

for each

in

route.

using each carrier's

The

suggest

routes

level.

on one of the top 30

increase).

1993
City-pair

42%

in competing

growth

index, calculated

domestic

rate reached

only for the top three CAAC

in 1994 (a 20%
These

to serve

and a city in the

growth

the

of firms

on average,

operating on busiest
1993 and 1994.

Kong

disadvantages

than

than the

Herfindahl

were,

carriers started

at the city-pair

welfare

domestic

two or three "equivalent"
carriers
declined at the route level between

and some

higher

that the markets

In 1993 there

average

routes are reserved

of firms is the inverted

on the route).

quickly,

of demand

was

and consumer

concentration

of market
number

dramatic,

on the international

of competition

order

(The equivalent

slowing

CAAC

in the airline research

Table 4 thus examines
descending

routes

has been

After entry they grew

in spite oft he

with the air carriers

in China

increase

also

that there

were

and that concentration

1993 and 1994
1994

Passengers

Equivalent
Number
of Firms

Beijing-Guangzhou

907420

2.87

Guangz.hou-Shanghai

859876

2.86

Beijing-Shanghai

742683

2.11

Beij ing-Guangzhou

969751

Equivalent
Number
of Firms
2.5__

Guangzhou-Shanghai
Beijing-Shanghai

840961
677707

3 z'_,
",
•
_. --,t_1

City-pair

Passengers
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Ouangzhou-Haikou

521693

I. 27

Guangzhou-Haikou

515944

2.15

Guangzhou-Ouilin

503810

1.05

Beijing-Xian

501146

1.61

Beijing-Xian

476154

1.62

Guangzhou-Chengdu

493649

2.66

Guangzhou-Chengdu

439011

2.12

Guangzhou-Hangzhou

450909

2.83

Guangzhou-Hangzhou

418078

2.82

Guangzhou-Chongqing

438454

3.34

Beijing-Shenzhen

379833

1.80

Beijing-Shenzhen

419293

3.19

Beijing-Chengdu

344531

1.55

Beijing-Chengdu

406779

2.25

Shanghai-Xiamen

330272

2.41

Guangzahou-Wuhan

365573

2.00

Shanghai-Shenzhen

328973

3.54

Guangzhou-Shantou

353735

1.05

Guangzhou-Shantou

315867

1.00

Nanjing-Beijing

353004

2.17

Guangzhou-Xiamen

308342

2.43

Guangzhou-Guilha

334228

1.00

Beijing-Nanjing

306411

1.82

Shanghai-Shenzhen

331711

3.81

GuangzhouChongqing

300982

3.26

Dalian-Beijing

331418

1.89

Guangzhou-Kunming

293841

1.72

Hangzhou-Beijing

331135

2.29

Guangzhou-Wuhan

281408

1.37

Guangzhou-Xiamen

321365

3.05

Beij ing-Hangzhou

269155

2.69

Guangzhou-Kunming

318955

2.21

Beijing-Dalian

257594

1.89

Shanghai-Xiamen

310201

2.70

Guangzhou-Nanjing
Shanghai-Fttzhou

252592
224252

2.44
1.61

Beijing-Shenyang

270628

1.85

Guangzhou-Nanjing

258030

2.48

Chengdu-Lhasa

210159

1.00

Shanghai-Wuhan

257096

2.84

Shanghai-Chengdu

204400

2.07

Shanghai-Fuzhou

255289

2.15

Shanghai-Xian

303165

2.41

Beijing-Untmqi

191415

1.59

Beijing-Harbin
Beijing-Wuhan

254769
240347

3.93
2.85

Beijing-Shenyang
Chengdu-Kunming

179719
177325

1.00
2.98

Chengdu-Shanghai

238830

2.19

Chengdu-Lasa

223151

1.00

Shanghai-Guilin

176606

1.86

Shanghai-Wuhan

175220

2.50

Shanghai-Xian
Haikou-Shenzhen

211704
209160

1.30
2.78

Average

353129

2.06

Average

382831

2.40

Notes:

The equivalent number of firms is the inverted Herfmdahl
carrier's market share on that route.

Sources: Transport
5.3 Airlines'

(1994,

95), Timetable

index, calculated using each

(1993, 95), OAG (1994)

Competition

Pricing and price competition
The 'base
required

price'of

airline

the approval

competition

introduced
example•
t:nder-used
demand

to sell

be sold

alld so on. It was

had

complex
at little

were

not clear

was set by CAAC,

Council.

this base price,

tickets

capaci b' on certain
Deepdiscounts

State

or below

more and more
might

in China

of China's

ticket price 20% above
As

tickets

become
discount

more than
flights.

Fares

also available
that

all airlines

Airlines

but changes

were

to take account
more

structures

intense,

allowed
of'local

however,

for individual

half the standard
also varied

for "students','teachers'
applied

the rules

base price

the vary the average
conditions'.
airlines

tickets.

fare as carriers

in response

in this

had

Offpeak

fares, for

sought

to fill up

to seasonal
various

for deciding

gradually

variations

'group
which

in

bookin?.s"
passengers
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qualifies

for discounts

described

as 'non-standard'

execution

of the CAAC's

excess

capacity

in a consistent
pricing.
pricing

of most airlines

that the average

ticket

1997. Table 5 shows

and systematic

way

In fact, with the releasing
regulation

seems

leading

to what

operating

power

to be loose

is driving the price competition

rate on domestic

flights

the price competition

is 75.9%

in a domestic

in recent

Data sources: Bulikon

in

Ave_
60
66
75
41
32

of Shanghai Airlines (1998)

was so intense

that a lot of airlines couldn't

regulation

and forbided

balance their budget.

the discounts

of ticket

CAAC

price

for all

competition

price competition,

An important
network

competitive

which

can

offer

domestic
device
more

air carriers

also fight in the domain

is a carrier's
destinations

networking
and

advantage. Although
CAAC's approval is required
seemed to get approved without much trouble

The network pattern of air transportation
linear network to a local, "
hub-and-spoke
air regions

which

1996, there

are 98 international

correspond

carriers,

in which

Besides,

the frequency

frequency

state. It is estimated

hot route in the first half of 1998.

506
477
420
162
92
1639
9.1

had to re-announce
the its price
routes bigger than 20% off.

Besides

the

of 1998:

Sched_ts

The price competition

Non-price

Therefore,

the

in 1996 and 68.9%

Table 5. Price Com__petition on the Route Link_e
Air
AirCarriers
China
Eastern
Shanghai Airlines
Nonhero
Northwestern
Total

observers

to air caners,

years.

into a cruel

in 1995, 72.4%

some

13

80 routes

convenient

linking

those

changed

The country

In particular,
has

757 domestic

ones

linking

from

a single

airlines.

in operation

Routes
Beijin - Guangz.hou*
Beijin - Shanghai*
Shanghai -Guangz.hou*
Beijin - Xi'an*
Guangzhou - Haikou
Kunming - Xishuangbanna
Guangzhou - Chongq/ng
Beijin -Chengdu*

Passengers
(thousand)
1123
918
844
616
397
575
562
513

air

those six local hubs respectively.

in 1996

Cargo

into six

for the CAAC

hubs are so high that in top ten domestic

(thousand to_
51
16
4l
9
7
3
14
10

airline,

By the end of

in 1996, six of them are linking hubs (see Table 6).

Table 6 Top Ten Domestic Routes in Air Transportation

a

a competitive

has been decomposed

bases of the six trunk

and more than 150 routes

in flight

aspects.

for route entry, most of the airlines' requests

system.

and

structure.

connections

has fundamentally

to the operational
routes

or route

of non-price

Flights
14.3
13.1
13.3
10.3
11.4
12.2
13.4
11.4

Load Factor
74.6
77.0
66.8
73.8
81.1
89.3
68.0
73.5

routes

in
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Guangz.hou - Chengdu*
_zhou

509
502

23
15

12.8
8.5

.14

72. l
72.2

Datasources: Transport(1997)
Note: The routes with star link local hubs.

By centering in its hub city, each trunk airline is a dominant carrier in its own region while
competing

with each other on routes linking major cities of different

regions.

For instance,

China Eastern, a trunk carrier, competes with China Southern, another trunk carrier, on routes
Shanghai-Guangzhou
cities).

(respective

hub cities)

and Nanjing-Xiamen

(inter-regional,

non-hub

However, China Eastern is a dominant carrier on its intra-regional Shanghai-Ninbo

route, competing only with Shanghai Airlines, a local carrier.

The inter-regional

routes which

see competition between hub carriers usually are busy routes; they cover more than half volume
of total domestic air traffic.
frequency.

Another competitive

A high flight frequency

(load factor will fall, however)

device which carriers

on a route can reduce passengers'

and thus improve service quality.

can use is flight

schedule delay costs

Other competitive

devices

include: flight scheduling, safety, aircraft type, airlines' travel agents and reservation, marketing
promotions, service quality (e.g., inflight services and meals), and flight punctuality.
Competition has played a positive role in the airlines' drive to maximize economic profits and/or
minimize costs, reflected in the improvements
Competition
competition

is good for business;
can create demand.

in their financial performance

and productivity.

apart from forcing the players to be more competitive,

Many Chinese, for example, have yet to fly an aircraft, so

flying is a noval experience for them. The entry of new local carriers in the late 1980s and early
1990s helped to fill that need especially for people living in remote areas.
Competition

also plays an important role in .airline( adopting new technology

the efficient use of technology.

and/or ensuring

This is achieved through a longer-term view of investment in

technology and the principle of fitness survival.

A necessary condition here is that the firm can

retain profit

decision.

observations
efficient

and make

its capital

purchase

In the

suggest that now each carrier has greater incentives

aircraft and to develop

efficient

delivering systems. CEA, for example,
for yield control.

compute

is considering

reservation

Chinese

airline

industry,

to acquire new and more
systems

and hub-and-spoke

to develop or license an 'expert system'

5.4 Market Performance

Table 7 shows some new characteristics

of market performance

in air transportation

China in the third stage of its reform. First. the investment on infrastructure

industry of

grows rapidly. By

the end of 1996, there are 144 airports in operation in the mainland of China, in which 35 are
new ones built in four years and most others are also upgraded or expanded
(Transport.
qualit)'.

1993-97). This has expanded

in that period

the capacitv of air transportation and raised service

18/11/98
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the load factor

of the

countries.

for

competition,

environment
technology.

Third,

the labor

productivity

Table 8, the index
Airlines

decreases

most

70%,

load

constantly

Airlines

seems

average.

are three

times

reach the lower middle of lATA average. This
airlines compete in the international
market.

reveals

Forth, the rate of flight on time decreases

to 77.6%,

suffered the delay and the service quality
competing in the international
market.

should

is helpful

firms

at an annual

Industry of China

at normal

factor

inefficient

one forth of IATA

Southern

which

normal

eliminating

grows

is almost

and China

to about

Reaching

of Air Transportation

and

rate

level compared
to form

pushing

the

of 8.7%.

of the domestic

implies

be improved.

about

This

upgrade

when

is another

of

as seen
Eastern

average

10 million

with

efficient

of China

one of the d!sadvantages

which

an

However,

The labor productivity
and twice

15

and

domestic

passengers

disadvantages

in

Table 7 Market Performance

of Air Transportation

Items
Fixed Asset
Net Fixed Asset

Unit
bi. yuan
bi. yuan

1992
34.4
29.8

1993
42.0
34.3

1994
58.1
46.5

1995
77.0
57.5

1996 ann. growth (%)
93.5
28.4
66.9
22.4

Investment on Infrastructure
Operating Income

bi. yuan
bi. yuan

1. I
16.8

2.2
22.5

3.4
32.8

4.6
41.6

6.0
48.2

52.8
30.1

Profit
Total Volume

bi. yuan
bi. ton-kms

3.0
4.28

1.7
4.75

1. I
5.24

6.3
6.28

8.3
6.94

29.0
12.8

Passenger Volume
Employee

bi. px-kms
thousand

40.6
] 10

43.4
125

48.3
132

58.2
t38

62.6
149

11.4
7.9

35

48

57

NA

NA

NA

78.4
86.9

71.8
7616

69.0
73.5

71.5
NA

69.3
72.4

-3.0
-4.5

87.4
5.4

85.1
4.9

NA
4.8

71.7
5.6

77.6
6.8

-2.9
5.9

38.59

40.92

44.32

51.92

53.94

8.7

Total Available

Seats

thousands

Load Factor
Domestic Load Factor

%
%

Rate on Time
Utilization Rate

%
hour/day

Total Volume Per Capita

thou. ton-kms/px

Data sources: Transport
Table 8 Comparison
Airlines

Industr_ in the Third Sta_e of Reform

'

(1993-97)

of Labor Productivity

of China's

Pilots and
Cabin
co-Pilots
Attendants

Airlines to Foreign Airlines (1997)

Total
Employees

Ton-Kms
Flown

Pilot Ratio CA Ratio
(%)
(%)

Productivity
(thousand

United Airlines

8289

21335

91721

(million)
21754

9.0

American Airlines.
British Airways

8326
3249

17690
14348

80842
54200

18583
13593

10.3
6.0

94 ",
-_._
21.9
26.5

Japan Airlines
Singapore Airlines

2004
1264

5366
5772

181 ]2
13549

11403
10096

I 1.1
9.3

29.6
42.6

630
745

Korean Air Lines
Cathay Pacific

1290
1444

3529
5470

17050
15747

9305
7330

7.6
9.2

20.7
34.7

546
465

Thai Ai_vays

633

3917

24186

4467

2.6

16.2

185

Malaysia Airline
System

1191

4839

23524

3783

5.1

20.6

161

Philippine Airlines
China Southern

630
947

2137
2117

13582
16622

2144
1741

4.6
57

15.7
127

158
105

1270

7 1

13.5

149

7.8

I7.3

199

China Eastern
IATA Total

607
126000

1155
278000

8539
1611000

320079

ton-kms/px)
237
230
251
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CAAC
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54

8050

Datasources:
IATA (I998)
VI. Concluding Remarks

China's

air transportation

regulatory
about.

and enterprise

International

average

industry

cost.

Shanghai,

market

traffic
for

international

reform.

is beneficial

volume

example,

the

air traffic

only one third
airlines.

domestic

airlines.

somewhat
merger

in the

industry.

has controlled

Airline,

bigger

It is sure that
deep impact

a wave

airports

in mainland

of its long distance

In the Hongqiao

price

(major

of China,

and to Hong

Airline

worries

about

CAAC

the Dragon

and China Southwestern

and low

Airport

in
and

in 1987 and
airlines

get

the foreign

of deregulation

the disadvantages

of

from pro-competition

to

is encouraging
Airlines

worries

Kong)

with

and the tendency

of

of

China's

compared

begin to transfer

new entry,

has acquired

cost

market

CA.AC

routes,

years

the ratio

International

from

and higher

implication

forbidding

China

acquisition

in Hong

Kong,

has merged

and
China

with Guizahou

are under consideration.

of merger

on the market

because

regional

in the world,

Nanjing

mergers

industry

that on most international

lower

that its policy

Air

make CAAC

in the international

Besides

Northwestern
some

with

industry

consolidation.

are still some problems

major

of both

competition

It appears

nearly twenty

was one tenth in 1978, one fifth in 1980, one forth

share

of the

through

rapidly.

survey shows

of market

globlization

for airline

data from

ratio

volume

Faced with the intense

there

is increasing

one third in 1995. However,

and

However,

For the statistical

international

has made a great development

and acquisition

structure

and firm's

in the industry
behavior

is coming,

which

will make

a

in the industry.
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I1. Change of Govemmenrs

Industry of China

18

Regulation

_992A`_£*E_f3E_i_)_a_i'_k_'A..E&b_£))_6_½ifa_B`_.-+.'A_)'A..`z`_`_*½))fa.iE_©½..E6)_½6£))¶_*½_6_
(ODNepO.½,÷'Op£(b)):i,.O)£))l_'F,1987A_i,'EY,
Distribution

p;kTkr3*½1pi"O_,iitjOtE

of Investment
on Infrastructure
1992
%
1993

Gov. Capital
Loan from Fund.
Loanfrom Bank

32
266
389

Firms'Capital
220
FundofConstruction
Chargeon Airports
Bond

25
103

1035

(million yuan)
%
1996

%

3. 09
25.71
37.60

132
272
910

5. 66
32
11.66 261
39.03 1334

0.92
7.50
38.40

269
329
2067

4.16
5.08
31.90

21.29

355
470

15.23
20.16

691
782

19.90
22.51

1565
1330

24.14
20.52

2.38
9.93

73

3. 11

174

5. 01

720

11.11

50
70

2.14
3. 00

200

5. 76

200

3.09

2331

100.00

3474

100.00

6480

100.00

Foreign Loan
Others
Total

of Air Transport
%
1994

_,.y. ½°,i£

100.00

The investment mechanism has been changed since the beginning of 90s. The fundation of construction
in air transport industry is gathered from domestic airlines (It is declared in 1993 that all domestic
airlines should present some ratio of operating income (10% of that from domestic routes and 4-6% of
that from international routes) to the foundation
the investment on infrastructure.)
It is considered that organized all behavior
the theory of industrial organization
-Structure-Conduct-Performance
STRUCTURE:
number

of sellers

product
barriers

differentiation;
to entry;

of construction in air transport

and performance

of China's

industry which use as

air transportation

industry with

Paradigm

and buyers;

vertical integration;
diversification.
CONDUCT:
pricing

strategies;
Market
SAL

Company
Formal Flights
Tickets rate
Relay Flights
Total Flights
product
research

506
60%

0
420

995
1501

strategies;

plant investment
legal tactics.
PERS"ORMANCE:
allocative
equir3, ;

420
75%

design strategies;
and innovation;

promotional

strategies;

and 'X'

progressiveness;
macroeconomic

between Beijing
Air China

efficiency;

stability.

and Shanghai
East

in Jan-June,
N-W

]998
North

477

92
32%

162
41%

549
1026

0
92

0
162

66%

Total
Flight per day
1237
6.8
1544
2781

15 4

| 8/11/98
The Reform and Performance
ENVIRONMENT
(l) MARKET:
supply side:
technology;
labor skills and organization;
legal framework;
raw material sources;
transportation
cost.
demand side:
purchase

method;

substitutability;
price elasticity;
rate of growth;
cyclicality

and seasonality.

(2)GOVERNMENT(public
taxes and subsidies;
regulation;
price controls;
antitrust;
international trade rules;
basic research;
information and education;
public ownership.

policy):

of Air Transportation

Industry of China
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The airline reform may be divided into two stages.

The first stage occurred between

1986 and the aim was to bring back business aspects to air transportation.
structure was reformed

.20

1980 and

The administrative

first in 1980 and then again in 1982 which effectively

separated

civil

aviation from the air force. Beginning

1981 the central government adopted the policy of"self-

responsible

retention"

for losses and extra-profit

further simplified

to a one-nine

towards the airline sector.

division of airline revenue between

The policy was

the state and CAAC.

Within CAAC, six regional civil aviation bureaus became basic units for recording profits and
losses in 1979.

The practice was further extended to twenty-three

provincial

civil aviation

CAAC in 1982 extended the profit-retention

system to-six

bureaus a year later.

Furthermore,

regional civil aviation

bureaus and gave them more autonomy in making operational

decisions.

During this period, however, CA.AC continued to be the operater of all flights, all airports and
the National Air Traffic Service.

IV. AIR TRANSPORT

This section examines
airline industry.

DEVELOPMENT

the impact of the reform on the growth and development

In particular,

growth and route development,

4.1. Air traffic

growth

AND COMPETITION

the following aspects of the industry will be discussed:

and route development

reform but has grown tremendously

since the reform.

in its growth prior to the airline

Tables 2 and 3 further report data on,

air traffic volume and number of routes over the 1950-94 period.

tonne-kilometers

air traffic

market structure, and airline operation and competition.

As indicated earlier, the Chinese airline industry was sta_ant

respectively,

of China's

and revenue passenger-kilometers

Both the total

performed in 1994 were about 20 iimes of

those in 1978. The total number of routes in 1994 was more than four times the number in 1980
(4.0, 4.3 and 4.7 times for domestic, regional and international routes, respectively).

*** TABLE 2 ABOUT

HERE ***

*** TABLE 3 ABOUT

HERE *'*

18/I 1198
The Reform and Performance

Table 4 shows

this recent

(l lth) in the world
compared
ranked

in terms

with its 33th

4th, behind

period

averaged

growth

place

the U.S.,

around

in the context

of revenue

(35th)

of Air Transportation

of world

aviation.

passenger-kilometers
in 1980.

Russia,

21% for both domestic

In 1994 China

Its annual

domestic
growth

and international

$th

performed,

passenger-kilometers

rate

traffic.

" 21

ranked

(total tonne-kilometers)

In 1994 China's

and Japan.

Industry of China

during

the

1980-94

This rate was 4.3 times

the world average.

*** TABLE

4 ABOUT

HERE

4.2.

structure

and route

Market

***

concentration

*** TABLE

8 ABOUT

HERE

4.3.

Airline

operation

and competition

VI.

CONCLUDING

The (former)
economies:
small
process.

incentives,

corporate

the potential

essential

to further

expansion

companies.

(almost)

improve

reforms.

been

reform

by capacity,

carriers'

This

point

reforms.

entry

in air transport

there

is enough
and

and rationalization

lessons

may

attitude

towards

is related

to the

This

expansion

has been ourweighted

however,
has

competition.

be drawn

for general

entry and competition
role

has had little adverse
for everyone.

on economic

years,

effect

Political
by the

is

of economic/output

From the above discussions,

business

of affluence

of the indu'stry

while at the same time maintaining

two

a'ansition

focusing
recent

It is no

in the

new levels

In more

the market

economy.

in China.

and regulatory

First, major

limited

expansion

competition.

with

sector

creating

reform,

stage of industrial

of respective

growth

in airline

of reform.

free

airline

economic

market

efficiency

experience

This is because

has consequently

and

more than matched

success

in the initial

that allowing

the dramatic
general

sectors

feature

of this vital economic

by its enterprise

govemence

and industry
for the

the functioning

but also

is probably

share at least one common

is one of the largest

I have described

on the Chinese

enterprise

sector

not only by China's

traval,

traffic growth

economies

to understand

In this paper

and business

entry

planned

the _'ansport

is made possible,

Based

REMARKS

centrally

challenge

***

we have seen
on state-owned

pressure

objective

to restrict
of creating
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competitive markets.

This would then build the momentum for furthering

competition

and making

it irreversible.

As capacity

becomes

.22

the shift to unlimited

more adequate,

however,

coordinated efforts may be needed to limit the entry of inefficient carriers or to allow them to be
merged with other carriers.

Second, to deepen the SOE reform we need to examine the

transitional

such as merger/competition

industrial policies

imperfect markets (e.g., imperfect
attention of enterprise

reform

financial

market).

policy in the presence

This approach

of various

will help re-focus our

from the enterprise per se to the surrounding

industrial

and

market environment.

China, with a population more than double that of the U.S. and Western
will undoubtedly play a more important role in world aviation in the future.
rate for China will depend
evolution.

The regulatory

upon its rate of economic

European combined,
The _'affic growth

growth and, in turn, on its political

regime will continue to change to reflect these trends. These trends,

and the aviation system arising from them, will contribute to bringing China and other nations
closer together.

'.

.i
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China's

Air Transportation

@ The change of China's
such as regulations,

Chubanshe,

of How

Department

Industry

air transportation

from middle of $0's to the end of 90's

degree of control, change of number and scale of airlines(sentralization

degree),

OOne paper could be organized to make a positive analysis that if the development
of China's air
transportation
industry
matches
with
the
theory
of
industrial
organization,
that
is, the pattern of
'smacture-conduct-performance,.
-market structure change, degree of centralization change from unique one to six airlines, then to 41 (
including 28 carry both passengers and cargo); and rise a tendency of merging now. entry barrier:
Building of new airlines has been barried since the end of 1994. The change of demand
-- firms' conduct: profit-seeking?
signal? profit ratio? cost?
-- market performance: service quality
In the study, we check that what is the characteristics
fit with the theory and what is not. pay close
attention to effect ofgovenment's
policy and economic reform.
This is a positive research.

O One paper could be organized to make a comparative study.Through compared to that of foreign
contries, we can find the disadvantages
of China's airlines as well as the operating mechanism of the
industry. We can slao find optimal policy and scale, etc.
The Reform
and Performance
framework of the paper
I. Introduction (I 949-80)

of Air Transportation

background of China's economy, history of China's
I1. Change of Government's
Regulation (I 980-87)
1. In 1987-92, the reform ofseperating
operating
from administration bereau (CAAC) begin.

Industry

of China

air transponation(1949-80)

units, such as airlines, airports and fuel oil suppliers

9

111.Market Structure

and Performance

(I 987-92)

three stages: first is to separate CAAC into six airlines, depart airlines,airports and fuel oil suppliers
from administrators,
market concentration decreases and a competition mechanism begin to be built.
The number of airlines increases rapidly, the scale of economy is far from reaching.
second is to raise the barrier of entry, competition of existing airlines; expansion
routes, service quality(phone call booking with free charge), etc.

of airlines, aircraft,

third is to face the situation of supply over demand, load factor decreases, price as well as profit of
airlines
airlines. decreases; government make a restriction for price reduction and encouraoe..- the merger of
substitution of other transportation
IV. Airlines' Behaviors (1992-97)
V. Change of Environment

the
of

An Analysis

of the Development

Dr. Xingquan

and Targets

of China

Civil Aviation

Industry

Xie*

Department
of Policy and Regulation
R. & D. Center of CAAC
Beijing,

China,

100028

1. INTRODUCTION
This paper discusses
the development
of China's civil aviation industry and its targets
in the future. As we have known, although
hit by both the Asian financial
crisis and
the severe summer
1998, and the tax
yuan,

which

floods, Chinese
economy
still obtained
a growth
rate of 7.8% in
collected
accordingly
achieved
an increase
of RMB 100 billion

laid

environment
in
telecommunication

a

good

foundation

for

improving

the

economic

1999.However,
when
both
the
railway
industry
speeded
up their construction,
and

operation

and
the
post
the development

&
of

China's civil aviation industry appeared
weak. Even though in 1998 the transportation
volumes of the whole industry were completed
fairly, the state owned airlines fell into
great loss with negative
growth
in the passenger
volume,
which broke the record of
keeping

profit

for 23 years,

and furthermore,

rate, loading factor, and revenue
while the operative
cost increased
What

had happened

to China's

question
clearly, this paper
for the industry since 1978

with the benefit

rate per kilometre
passenger
greatly, the situation
would
civil aviation

in recent

years?

index

of passenger

seat

decreased
continuously
be rather more serious.
In order

to answer

the

firstly gives a look backward
of the history of the reform
in brief. In no doubt, the reform and open policy over the

last twenties
years has equipped
the civil airlines industry
soar high.Then,
this paper outlines the main achievements
the industry.
The dramatic
growth
of the civil aviation

of China with the wings to
gotten in recent years by
industry
of China can be

attributed
to China's general
economic
growth now.In
the next section of the paper,
our second
objective
in this paper
is to analyze
the major
problems
in the
development
of the industry
which are most of reasons
for the great losses in the
airlines industry.Section
4 addresses
the 5 targets for the industry in the next 5 years
(that is, the 10th Five-Year
Plan of China). In other ward, these are the ways to draw
the civil aviation industry of China out of the disadvantage
Final section contains several concluding
remarks.

2. THE

DEVELOPMENT

2.1. The History
Prior

to 1978,

at present.

OF CCAI

of CCAI
China

situation

Reform

Civil Aviation

Industry

(hereafter,

abbr.

as "CCAI")

was a semi-

military
organization
with the Civil Aviation
Administration
of China (CAAC)
as a
department
of air force for most of the years. During
the period CCAI had suffered
unsatisfactorily
persistent
financial
losses,
central government's
subsidy to the industry.
Aviation

Reform

Conference

and made

whose survival
depended
In 1979, the State Council

a decision

to separate

the CCAI

mainly
on the
held the Civil
from

Force. The central government
made a policy that CCAI must be on the way
enterprise
in the market
economy,
which pushed
the civil aviation
reform
effectively.
and

The

State

Implementation"

Council

approved

in February

1987.

"Report
The

on Civil

comprehensive

Aviation

Reform

adjustment

the Air
for an
ahead

Measures
of agencies

and enterpriseswas held in the CCAI in the large scale. More specifically, the
following policy initiatives were included:(1) To separatethe regulator from also
being the operator of the CCAI;(2) To separateairport operation from airlines
operation;(3)To encouragethe otherenterprisesin the marketentry;(4)To deregulate
the airlines industry and promote competition in both domestic and international
market.Fromthenon, a newerawasopenedfor the CCAI.
2.2.The Achievementsof CCAI
Over the 20 years since the reform and opening-upin 1987, the CCAI obtained
brilliant achievementsand advancedwith surprisingly giant stridesat a speedthree
timeshigherthanthatof the ContractingStatesof ICAO consecutivelyfor years.The
annualaveragegrowth rate of China's air traffic performedapproximatelydoubled
thatof the nationaleconomy,tripled thatof thedomestictransportationandfour times
that of the world air transportindustry,and its ranking rosefrom the 37th place in
1978in theworld to the present10thplace.In1978,CCAI performeda total traffic of
299 million tonne-kilometres,while the figure of 1997 was 8.67 billion tonnekilometres.In 1978,CCAI carried2,309,100passengers,
while the figure of 1997was
56.3million passengers.
In 1978,the total lengthof air routesoperatedby CCAI was
148,900kilometres,while in 1997the figure reached1,858,700kilometres.In 1978,
CCAI had 162 domesticand internationalair routes,while In 1997 the figure was
967, including 109 internationalair routes and 7 regional air routes serving 57
international cities. In 1978, CCAI had 81 airports in use, most of which were
medium-sizedand small airports. While in 1997 the number of airports officially
servingscheduledairplanesreached141,including 14 airportsavailablefor B747and
90 airportsavailablefor B737.By the end of 1998, the CCAI performed a total traffic
of 90.92
growth

billion

mail 1.4 million
1998 were about
growth

tonne-kilometres,

rate of 18.76%,

representing

an increase

and passengers-kilometres

with

5.7million

the

with

average

17.44%,

annual
cargo

&

tons with 16.70% in the past 20 years. These numbers
performed
in
31, 24 and 21 times of that in 1978 respectively.
The average
annual

rate of the total traffic

statistics

of CCAI

was over

20%

during

the period.The

whole CCAI paid to the State a total amount of 4.09 billion yuan of taxes in 1998.
Among
the enterprises
directly
subordinate
to CAAC,
China Yunnan
Airlines
and
Xinjiang

Airlines

and Guangzhou

made

profits

Baiyun

in the year,

International

while

Airport

Beijing

maintained

Capital
fairly

International
good

profit

local airlines
achieved
relatively
good benefits.
In 1998 the units directly
CAAC accomplished
15.44 billion yuan and local authorities
accomplished
yuan respectively
in fixed assets investment,
totaling 23.64
an increase of 6.5% over the figure of the previous
year.

3. THE

PROBLEMES

3.1. To
Structure.
Such

high

Operate
growth

billion

yuan,

Airport
level;

most

owned
to
8.2 billion
representing

OF CCAI

Too

Extensively

rates

performed

and

in the past

measures,
such as to put more freight
corresponding
facilities.
The economic
regulation
of the ticket
the extensive
expansion

Neglect

the

depended

Adaptation

the

on the extensive

Industrial
expansion

capacity,
to construct
high standard
airports
and
profits of the airlines industry depended
on the

price. It's necessary
that the air services
was
when the air transport
market was a seller's

however,
was confronted
way, and the air transport

of

against
the substituting
market changed
from

competition
seller's
one

enlarged
through
one. The CCAI,

of the train and high
to buyer's.
Under
the

situation the conflict of industrialstructureof CCAI becameseriousand significant,
which wasthe resultof the extensiveoperationof the airlines.The problemreflected
as follow:(1) Thatin theair servicesthe passengers'
servicesis emphasizedmorethan
the cargoes'one causednot to fill the loss of the passengers'one which was not
satisfied. This was the main reasonfor the dramaticlossesin the CCAI in recent
years.(2)The generalaviationof Chinahasbeenstagnantsince1980,which hasbeen
out of the attentionof CAAC policy for the neartwenty years.(3)The routestructure
was mainly the trunk intercity. The feeder line aviation was too weak to supply the
abundant
passengers
to the trunk route.(4)
There was the tendency
that the extra large
and international
airport had been constructed
in most of provinces,
this was updated
too much. The reasonable
supplication
of large, media and small airports hadn't been
established

already.

Though

one or more

large

and international

airports

are necessary

for some
metropolises
opening
aboard,
but the kind of airport
was generally
constructed
in most of the media and small cities, this reflected
that considerations
were not taken into in economic
way.
3.2. To Allow Too free Entry
the Small Scale

and Be Lack

of the Competition

Capacity

with

At the present
time, there are 53 airlines
with their own legal entities
in China,
including
34 ones providing
fixed air services
and 19 ones doing general
aviation.
These airlines
have 485 airplanes
that equal to the number
of America
Northwest
Airlines' airplanes,
and are half of America
Airlines'
is, Air China, China Eastern, China Southern,
China
China

Northern,

aircraft

have

more

and time and route.

aircraft,

which

was

However,

Great

Wall Airlines,

Shanxi
Airlines
have just three
Airlines,
Guizhou Airlines,
Allied
respectively.
cost of most

has

convenient

respectively.
and Shenzhen

in adapting
Mail

the team

& Cargo

operated

operation

government
CAAC

after

the civil

and

At the same time, Chang'an
Airlines just own 5-6 aircraft

in the past. As a result, the operative
they were too weak to compete
with

with the Airline's
Market.
aviation

and authorized
1987.

in investment

Operation

as the one

The

the formation
major

(especially

controlled
by CAAC. The trunk
as an independent
legal entity.
restriction

of route

improving

service

which

was

of

Airway

Hindered

enterprise

the Reasonable

for many

years.

It was

very important
for the foundation
of the competition
market and the improvement
the economic
performance
that the CAAC policy departed
the govemment
from
airlines'

that
and

in the international
air transport
market.
The lack of the capacity
competition
was reflected
from the fact that the revenue
of the
had been falling down from 1994.

3.3. The All-Round
Interference
Competition
in the Air Transport
CAAC

aircraft
Airline

This caused the no-scale
economy
of them was very high at all time,

the foreign airlines
of the international
international
routes

flight (990). The six airlines,
Southwest,
China Northwest

entry

weapon

rights
purchasing

of the
and

trunk
labor

owned

to the local

airlines

owned

management)

to

were

airlines
couldn't take part in the market competition
Because
of the consolidation
of pricing
and the

the airlines

and perfecting

the important

decision

in flight

of the local airlines

of
the

market.

were

limited

to compete

The role of price

for market

in providing

competition

competition.Being

lack

flight,

was neglected
of competition,

most of airlines had the lower level of management.
They yet didn't in general set up
the measures
of cost and yield management,
and the category
and technique
of
marketing
in the condition
of marketing
economy,
which
were more
and more

importantfor their competition.Although
through

the policy

competition

evolved

into the "throat

cut" one

between
sustained

the air services,
to the dramatic

aviation.

In order

to convert

the price

decision

right to the government

pricing

management

and the
decline

the

present

operated
the

control

Central

regulated
regulated
airspace

air traffic

and Air Force.

the

development

into

however,

two

of CCAI,

Chinese

from

CAAC
May

was

no variance

decided

1998,

to recover

and enhanced

parts

system

the

the

under
and

civil

one

of the

the unified

Party,

the
The

air traffic

of
of

flight

is

aviation

is

whole

controlled

With

control

while

leadership

national

respectively.

of

Commission

the military

by CAAC.

to them

above

in unity,

the Military

the condition,

belong

out in the Area

is regulated

Thus,

Council

Under

that

the problems

was not Sorted

Communist

in the whole.

by the air force,
is divided

control

of the State

of

tendency,

and Air Force

by CAAC

Committee

there

was out of control.
In effect, this
performance
of the whole
civil

upward

committee

by the air force

because

market.

CAAC

China

respectively

the air traffic

in price

seller's agent
of economic

of air transport

time,

deregulated
the price of air service
since the end of 1997, the airlines'

and stop the decline

3.4. The Relationship
between
the Air Traffic Control.
At

CA.AC
discount"

of "one price, various

the

system

rapid

become

evident as follow:(1)
was not consolidated

The airspace is not utilized at its best yet because
its designation
and reasonable;(2)
The same airspace
is regulated
by one or

more

in the

parties

flight,

so that

the request

event

sometimes

of emergence

couldn't

which

be replied

needs

by them

had more

control.
regulate

Although
completely

Chinese

civil

or less affected

convenience

was
was

and

The

when

airlines

These
China

disadvantages
had
and the maximum

wanted

to found

to change

3.5. The Monopoly
Airlines'
Cost.

air traffic

control

its route

system

network,

was

had

of the

erected

especially

of Supply

situation

of

causes
very
This

air traffic

was transferred
just a start-point
a serious

to
for

barrier

"hub-and-spoke"

already
limited the development
of the airlines
of utilization
of the national
airspace
sources.

the disadvantage

state

not unified
and
very backward.

efficiency

the route
of Beijing-Guangzhou-Shenzhen
by CAAC
from the air force, this

aviation.

must be done

the

the

in time. This situation

easily to accidents;(3)
The air infrastructure
construction
outdated,
the skills for managing
the air traffic
control
situation

to change

one.

industry
of
Something

as soon as possible.

of Fuel and Equipment

Was

Harmful

to Minimize

The cost of fuel is the biggest item for international
airlines at the present time, which
is half of operative
cost, and one third of the total cost. For China, the cost of fuel
shares

two

China

Aviation

third

operative
Oil

costs,

Supply

one

fifth

Corporation

to one

forth

monopolies

of the
to

total

supply

operative

airlines

cost.

the

fuel

exclusively.
Its fuel price is higher half to one time that of foreign market. This is one
of the most important
reasons
why our airlines
have been having
a high cost and
losing
been
337)

competitive
sustaining
per

ton.

advantages.

For example,

$185

or so per ton, whilst

The

fuel

price

in

former.China
Air Flight Equipment
purchases
aircraft abroad on behalf
effect
purchase

plays

a role

directly

they therefore

of intermediate

aircraft

lose dramatic

from

in China

China

is near

market,

market

RMB

twice

(1.82

agency

with

exclusion.

factory

without

the fuel

2,800

Yuan

times)

General Company
has owned
of all of the airlines of China

the manufacture

benefits.

in Singapore

that

price

has

(about
of

$
the

to the CAAC, who
with authority.
It in

Because

airlines

intermediary

cannot
services,

The abovediscussions
reformed
civil

show that the supply system of fuel and equipment
as possible.
One of the more important
reform measures

as soon

aviation

managing

companies
market.

in the

market,

3.6. The Economic
The

stagnation

decline
billion

and

Efficiency

of economic

is to destroy
drive

the

monopolies

competitiveness

into

of CCAI

Is Relatively

Low.

efficiency

of CCAI

is mainly

the

losses

airlines'

rapidly

price

profits.
aircraft

First,
since

aircraft

because

There

are

of the impact

at least

three

above

two

fuel

and

equipment

by

the serious

the profits RMB 18.4
But airlines
incurred

of Asia

other

the

financial

reasons

crisis

and

for the decline

in

the main cause for the decline is the dramatic
increase in the supply of
1993. The sudden increase
of capacity
immediately
lowers load factors
utilization

to confront
airlines
airlines

in 1998

competition.

of

reflected

in profits. The trunk airlines owned to the CAAC made
Yuan in 1996, while up to 20.5 billion Yuan in 1997.

dramatic

and

system

should be
of China

against

rates
the

in 1993

relative

rapidly
increases.
in general
operate

and 1994.

surplus

Therefore,

of capacity.

it is the first time for CCAI
On

the

contrary,

the

cost

of

Second,
the supervising
system of cost is too weak, and
extensively.
Third, the debt factor of the airlines
is too

high, and financial
cost increase
quickly.
In principal,
the losses mainly attribute
to
the decline
of industrial
competitiveness
of aviation.
The China airlines
are not
responsive
to the change of competitive
situation of market in time.

4. THE

TARGETS

4.1. The
From
strong

Growth

FOR
of CCAI

CCAI
Should

Response

to the National

Economic

the sixth plan for 5 years, the central
government
announced
subsidiary
and support were to be paid to the transport
industry

Growth.
clearly
that the
by the national

finance
as a strategic
point for the construction
of national
economy.
As a prior
department
in transport
industry,
at the end of the 8th Five - Year plan, CCAI
sustained
to grow by the rate three times that of transport
industry.
The 9th Five Year

plan declared

that importance

was to be made a significant
primarily
with the development

was still laid on the industry,

progress
during
the
of national economy

and that the industry

period
of 1996-2010
to satisfy
in 2010. This suggested
that the

total transport,
passengers
and cargo and mail should doubled before year 2000, up to
14.0 billion ton-kilometers,
0.1 billion passengers
and 2 million
tons by the annual
average growth rate 15% or so, and that after year 2000 CCAI should sustain the rate
of 10%.

This

economy.

rate

In fact,

in principal

satisfied

the practical

situation

in the total air transport
Table
Items

1: Growth
1996

Ratio
1997

Investment

Total

(billion
increase

9.92
57

yuan)
(%)

Air transport
Total

traffic
(%)

traffic

which

of Air Transport

with
was

was

the

for CCAI

not so satisfactory

under

from

request

the line made

as the plan'

23.64

20

6.5

Total(billion
12.7
7.5

1996 to 1998

ton-kilometers)
6.3

8.05

national
schedule

in 9th Five - Year plan.

1998

18.23

by the

8.67

9.22

Passengers
carried Total (million)55.51 56.30 57.15
Increase(%) 8.5
1.3
1.5
Cargo& mail
carriedTotal
(million ton) 1.14 1.247 1.392
Increase(%) 13.1 3.4
11.6
Sources:the annualreportof CAAC in 1998
From the aboveindex,we can find that there is a declinein the developmentof the
airlines industry.The decline,however,doesn'tshow that the CCAI has completely
satisfiedwith the developmentrequestof the national economy,and that national
subsidiaryandsupportwill not necessaryfor the industry in the future. Why did the
9th five yearsplan not realizesuccessfullyat all? Except for the outsidebackground
and the interior system,this is in somedegreerelative to the inefficient policy in
practice.There are a big gap betweenthe CCAI and the requestof the national
economicgrowth. In the future, somereformsshouldbe madeto adjustthe managing
system,carry out the preferentialpolicy, andregulatethe economicstructureof civil
aviation.The scaleof the CCAI must be enlargedthroughdevelopingnew economic
growthpointsto satisfywith the requestof nationaleconomy.The CCAI shouldtake
animportantpositionin the modemsystemof transport.
4.2.To Exertto DevelopAir CargoTransportandGeneralAviation
The developmentof air cargotransportandthe expressserviceis to be regardedasthe
newtraffic growth point. Somethingshouldbe doneto acceleratethe developmentof
the air cargotransportandthe expressservice.The development,as a new economic
growth point, can overcomethe problems,in somedegrees,which havebrought by
the lower load factor of airlines andthe seriouswasteof capacity.At the sametime,
this is the major contentfor CCAI in adjustingthe structureof air transportservice.
With the developmentof economy,the air cargotransportis moreandmoreimportant
for the social request.It is proved clearly by the fact that in recentthree yearsthe
growth rate of the air cargo transportis higher than that of the total air traffic and
passengersvolume. In the air cargotransportand the expressbusiness,the growth
neededto kept through the expansionof the freights, routes and the airplanes,the
completionof the air cargoinfrastructure,perfectionof the cargoagencynetwork as
well as the interlinewith the ground transport.Generalaviation, as an importantpart
of CCAI, is now facedby badeconomicbenefitsandflight safetysituation,disorder
of the marketcompetition,deteriorationof the guaranteeingenvironment,as well as
the imperfection of the infrastructure.Since 1980, the general aviation had been
stagnant,which did not fit to the high growth of nationaleconomy.Gradually, with
the developmentof both the nationaleconomyandthe society, it is becomingthe hot
point to promote generalaviation.Themain part of the general aviation operators
needsto be constructedto adaptto the demandof the market economy.First of all,
accordingto "the Law of Enterprise"and the principle of separatinggeneralaviation
from air transportbusiness,the majorairlines,the investoror the owner,shouldsetup
the new airlines with independentoperation and business accountingto operate
generalaviationconformableto the demandsof the marketeconomy,suchas running
limited cooperationwith the local enterprisesor institutes, and setting up joint
ventureswith the foreign enterprises.Secondly,
multiple generalaviation enterprises
are encouragedto be sponsored,in another word, both the nation-ownedand the

private enterprisesand the foreign businessare encouragedto operatethe general
aviation. Lastly, the charging system of general aviation must be reformed to
regularizethe flight and the airport fee standard.To return the right of pricing to
generalaviation enterpriseshas the priority in the chargingreform. The enterprises
should determinetheir own price accordingto the situation of market demandand
provision. The airport fee standardshould be regularized,and the illegal chargeis
prohibited.

4.3.To AcceleratetheDevelopmentof China'sFeederAir TransportandForm
the "Hub-and-Spoke"System.
To develop the regional air transport is necessary for the whole industry's
development.Firstly, feeder air transport is crucial for the construction of the
completenation'sair transportnetwork. For example,in the developedcountries,air
transportid operatedin the networkcomprisedof the main,regionalandinternational
air routes.Secondly,regionalair transportis significantto the economicdevelopment.
With the improvementof the nationaleconomy,air transportplays a more andmore
important role in both the nation'sand the regional economy developmentfor its
characteristicsof high speedandlong distance.Asa result, the local governmentsare
active in operating air transport especially for the poor areaswith the abundant
tourism resourceand raw materials.However, they are hamperedby the airport
constructionwhich needlarge amountof investment,comparedwith which, regional
air transportis moreflexible with low demandon the airportdegreeto assistthelocal
economic construction.Thirdly, regional air transport is important to enlargethe
market percentagesto increasethe economicbenefits.The regional air transportis
efficient for air transport to obtain the market below 1,000 square kilometers
especiallyin therangeof 500-700squarekilometers.
The policies to supportregionalair transportneededat presentmust bemadein time.
Measuresneed to be taken in the air routesmanagement,ticket price and boarding
program,which hadrestrainedChina'sregionalair transport.
Firstly, in the air routes management,airlines should be encouragedto operatethe
regionalair transporton onehand,blind competitionmustbe preventedon the other
hand.For a certainairlinesoperatingregionalair transport,a fixed rangeis necessary
andtheprincipal of enteringtheseair routesis to guaranteethe interestof the airlines
based in this area especially for high efficient air routes, and complicated
considerationis neededin the market demandsituation,the cost receptionand the
airlinesbenefits,etc.
Secondly,in ticket price, as the competitorsof the regionalairlines are not from the
air transportindustry, but the othertransportmeasuresuchas railway andhighway, a
price standardwith high competitivenessis necessary.The airlines must strengthen
the interior managementandcur cost,andthe governmentshouldoffer somesupport
in
the other hand,for example,decreasethe tariff of import, airport fee,air routefee,
etc.
Thirdly, in boardingprogram,it is necessaryfor the airlinesto carry ort strict security
examinationand check-in progress.For example,setting up a path exclusivefor the
regional passengerfrom the main passengerto simplify the boarding program,or
usingsmall aircraft to increasethe airplanesto makethe regionalair transportbecome
theauthentic"bus in the air" so thatto attractmorepassengers.

4.4.To keepthefull competitionbetweenairlines
Comparedwith foreign air transport industry, China's airlines have the general
competitionbetweenthem,but not full, especiallylack of the way of competitionon
the basisof thepriceone.Undertheprotectionof CAAC and/orthe local government,
China'sair carriersoften exempt"from the bankrupt.As a result, the situationwould
lower the efficiency in arrangingthe airspacesourceanddecreasethe potential social
welfare. It's possiblefor CCAI that the airlines' competition would cause to the
blinded price competition,therefore,makemany airlines into bankrupt at all on one
hand.However,the competitionwould bring the societythe better carriers,the better
servicesand the preferentialprice on the other hand. Furthermore,the airspace
sourceswould be utilized at most through their competition.In particular, the price
decisionright wasperformedarbitrarily by CAAC. This situation shouldbe changed.
The airlinesshouldget the decisionright in orderto determinethe price accordingto
the passengertype, the seasonand festival. On the basisof price competition, the
carriersare encouragedto get the advantageposition in competition through the
measuresimproving the quality of their services,creatingthe famousmark, etc.It is
irreallistic for CAAC to determinethe reasonableprice of thousandsof air routesfor
every airline. It may be appropriatefor the administrationto transformthe direct fare
regulationto the market surveillance,andlet airlinesmaketheir own price according
to thesituationof supplyanddemandandits marketstrategy.
To keepthe competitionis crucial to the healthydevelopmentof China'scivil aviation
industry. Under the market economy,airlines, big or small, local or government
owned, ought to prove its right to stand in the market. The operators should be
courageousandpatientenoughto face the result of the competition,which is hardto
be attainedthroughthe executivemeasures.

4.5. To Operatein the largescaleandenhancethe capacityof competition
with theforeign carriers
Becauseof the free entry policy in someperiod, China'scarriersin generalwere too
small in the scale,therefore,too weak in the international market competition. In
addition,they hadthe higherequity-debtratio. As a result, the operating cost couldn't
often
from

cut down

successfully.

the extensive

it is necessary
and rearranged
airlines.
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operation

is one
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into the intensive

for CCAI that the structure
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compose
new
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main
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that
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reformation
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conditions,
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for CCAI
Under

of the exiting assets should be improved
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Target for CCAI at present
several corporate
groups and the scale effect in economy.

5. CONCLUDING

barriers

at present.

the planned
For a long
civil aviation

market

subject

economy

has

left

deeper

impression

on

time, both the commercialization
and the later
were not completely
resulted
in the unsettlement
status,

the lack

of the market

mind

and

However,
all the problems
were shadowed
by the rapid
and the insufficient
supply in air transport
market.
So that
ignorant

measures

at the buyer's

and the foreign

Chinese

market

air carriers.

and

the competition

It must

be proposed

the

weak

growth
of
the whole

brought

by other

that civil

aviation

industry should be basedon enhancingthe economicbenefits,targetedby benefit
maximization.Inshort, the difficulty that CCAI encounteredwas not causedby the
shrinkageof air transportmarket demands,but the lack of competitiveness.If CCAl
transformits operativeideas,carefully studythe marketandendeavorto adaptto the
market,CCAI will definitely stepout of thepredicamentandrealizethecirculationof
continuing,rapid andhealthydevelopment.
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In the past decades, Hong Kong has been successfully playing a role as a
gateway to China. It is also the most important hub between Taiwan and China
since 1988. According to the statistics, over 5 million passengers were
travelling on the link between Taipei and Hong Kong in 1997. Such a big
volume has made this link the busiest one in the world's international air links,
and contributed 1/6 of the passengers in the airport of Hong Kong, which was
the most crowded one with most international passengers in Asia before 1997.
But in the foreseeable future, Taiwan will possibly start some direct services to
China; the air link between Hong Kong and Taipei will then compete with
many links across Taiwan Strait. These changes may cause the transformation
of the market and network structure in eastern Asia. Niches of specific airlines
and airports will disappear. This paper examines the issues of possible changes
in eastern Asian air transportation market. The current market environment, the
problems for direct flights across Taiwan Strait, the future role of Hong Kong,
and the market structure in the future wilt all be discussed.
1. Introduction

been

According
to the statistics, the link between Taipei and Hong Kong has
the busiest international
route in the world since 1995 (International

Civil Aviation Organization
[ICAO] 1996). But back a decade ago, there
were only 750 thousand
people in this route in 1986 (Tourism
Bureau
1987). Nowadays
over 5.5 million people are travelling
from Taipei to Hong
Kong. Namely, the passenger volume has increased 7 times during the past,
including
some of the worst years in the world's
aviation
industries
ever
(Air Transport
World 1993). The close relationship
between
Taipei and
Hong Kong should be one of the reasons of such a big movement,
so could
the rapid growth of the economics
in eastern Asian areas during the years.
But it is widely believed that the deregulation
of travelling
between Taiwan
and China was the most important factor.
Soon after the civil war in China, the declaration
of martial law by
Taiwanese
government
has prohibited any forms of direct or indirect travels
to China since 1949. For almost 40 years, lots of Chinese
in Taiwan were
not allowed to visit their relatives and friends in China; in the other hand,
PRC govemment
did not welcome
Taiwanese
before
the 'Open
Door'
policy made in 1979, either. The martial law in Taiwan was finally lifted in
1987, and some indirect travel from Taiwan to China was then allowed with
at least one stop over. Because of the close relationships
and geographical
advantages
to both sides, Hong Kong is the most frequently
used transit hub

' Telephone: 886-2-29092854

Fax: 8S6-2-22971717 E-mail: joelshon_,ms4.hi.net.net

for peopletravellingbetweenTaiwanandChina.In 1997,thehugevolume
of cross-Straitpassengers
hascontributedmorethan 1/6of the28.3million
passengers
to the airport of Hong Kong, which is the largest one of
international
traffic in Asia, and made
Kong the busiest one in the world.

the link between

Not only Hong Kong, some other major hubs in
providing connection
flights for the passengers
across
is the biggest competitor
of Hong Kong. With her
lower fares, and much less crowded terminal,
Macau

Taipei

and Hong

eastern Asia are also
Taiwan Strait. Macau
outstanding
location,
has attracted lots of

transit passengers
from Taiwan. If the airport in Macau had not been built in
1995, the link between
Taipei and Hong Kong would have been much
busier. In addition, foreign carriers are also providing some other links for
Taiwanese
to get into China. Because of the less service frequencies
and
inconvenient
schedules
which are not designed
for cross-Taiwan
Strait
travellers
especially,
Kong or Macau.

these

foreign

hubs

are not that

important

as Hong

Although
the current network in Asia can satisfy the visitors across
Taiwan Strait, yet the indirect flight may cause several problems
to both
sides. Politically,
the sovereignty
of Hong Kong has already returned
to
China after July 1st 1997. It has lost a third party status by view of either
side of Taiwan and China. Physically,
it is highly inconvenient
to stop over
Hong
Kong,
especially
for
those
senior
citizens
from
Taiwan.
Economically,
it creates
an unnecessary
cost for travellers.
After some
peace talks between Taiwan and China in recent years, the direct services
has seemed

to be an inevitable

policy

in the coming

21 st century.

That is to

say, at least 5 million passengers
in eastern Asia will find their new ways to
fly in a restructured
network. Other travellers from America and Europe will
also find some new, probably
more efficient routes to visit China. This
change will certainly be the biggest variable to the air transportation
market
in Asia and Pacific region. Apparently,
a much more competitive
market of
air

passengers

in
2. The

Since

this
Current

area
Market

there is no other alternatives

air transportation

market

between

Taiwan

is

now

emerging.

the actual

scale of the

Environment

for travelling,
and Hong

Kong

can be evaluated

by the passenger
volume on the link. Through the statistics listed in table 1,
we can find that the traffic on this link is growing
with the number of
Taiwanese
visitors to China. Apparently,
these two numbers are moving
towards
the same direction.
The deregulation
of travelling
in 1988 has
almost doubled the passenger on the Taiwan-Hong
Kong link just in the first
year. In addition,
we can find that the passengers
from Taiwan to Hong
Kong are not only by-pass passengers.
Most of the transit passengers
have
also visited Hong Kong on the way to China or on the way back to Taiwan.
For the past 10 years, Taiwanese
the list of arrivals in Hong Kong,
the tour industry ofHong
Kong.

visitors have always been top ranked
and they have also been very generous

on
to

Table

1 : persons

travelled

between

Taiwan

and

China

since

1986*

i?_ear

1986

1996

1997

7.52111.11

13.18 18.05 23.65 42.30 56.52

73.54

541

948

947

1318

1527

1390

1532

1734

2117

1133

1345

1298

1640

1777

1665

1761

1821

1782

Taiwan-Hong
121
196
622
811 1246 1368 1747 1935 1745 1910 2135
Kong links
Passenger
Volume on
Taiwan-Hong
375
428
845 1019 1437 1549 1940 2146 1984 2154 2788
Kong links
* All listed data are one-way traffic only. Round-trip traffic should be doubled.

1987

Chinese
visited
Taiwan
Taiwanese
visited China
Taiwanese
visited

1987

1988

1989

1990

0

0

0.38

4.85

0

0

438

220

354

1094

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

Hong Kong
Taiwanese on

Source: Tourism
1997)

Bureau

(1987,

1988, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1992,

1993, 1994, 1995,

Currently
flights
between
Taipei
and Hong
Kong
carriers
together,
including
China airlines
(CI) of Taiwan
(CX)

of

specific

Hong

Kong.

countries

free

endorsement

and

CX.

Some

with
and

The

fifth

other
freedom

frequent

privileges

created

airlines.
CI and CX are now
the revenue
is estimated
600

carrying
miilion

between

Taiwan

Kong

revenue

to China

15%-20%

of the

and

Hong

revenue

10%-15%
of the revenue
for both airlines
in 19972.
much

less

Kong,

Macau

frequencies.

low-fare

alliance

designed

timetables

competing

while

products

airlines
also

this

provided
market

amazing

such

services.
shared

contributed

Pacific

have

1996
signed

to

for

both

a quarter
Kong

(Ionides

for transit-only

1997,

carriers

lots of cooperative

as competing

tools

passengers

2

link

in this
are also

from
With
by

of the

of the total passengers,
or more. Before
1996,

the Taipei-Hong

for Cathay

in table

is mostly

profits

over 84%
US dollars
have

listed

1996,

operated
by 9
Cathay
Pacific

of

the

CI
two

and
links
total

has contributed

1996).

was still earned
by these so-called
Other carriers
are competing
with
During

and China

have

services,

have

Airlines,

foreign

are
and

2777

An

estimated

'golden
links'
lower fares, but

in Taiwan,
contracts
market.
popular

Hong

to provide
Intentionally
within

these

airlines.

2 China Airlines has reported 58.33 billion NT dollars revenue in 1997. The estu'nated
revenue on Hong Kong links was around t0 billion, which accounted for 17.14% of the
total revenue. In the same year, Cathay Pacific has announced a 30.65 billion H.K dollars
turnover, the revenue on Taipei-Hong Kong link should be as high as 3 billion that is 10%
of the total revenue if calculated with her market fare and passengers carried.

Table 2: Airlines

Served

China
Airlines
Year end

on the links between

Eva
airways

Cathy
Pacific

Dragonair

Routes

Weekly

Flights

Other

and Hong

Carriers

Singapore

TPE-HKG
KI-'IH-HKG TPE-HKG

TPE-HKG

Kong

includes

Airline,

Thai

Japan Asia Airline,
Garuda Indonesia

1997

Service

Taiwan

Airways

British

Airways

TPE-HKG

KHH-HKG

813

10
88
21
EachDirection
25
rMarket Share
38.13%
1.67% 46.11%
3.38%
Source: Civil Aviation Administration [CAA] (I 997)

3. Problems

for Direct

and Indirect

Flights

27
10.71%

Across

Taiwan

Strait

It is quite clear that the success of Taipei-Hong
Kong link is based
the disconnection
between Taiwan and China, but the separation
itself
created another dangerous
but interesting
fact: the hijack incidents.
In
past 6 years, there were totally 14 hijack incidents
between
Taiwan

on
has
the
and

China. 12 of the 14 incidents occurred in the peak year during April 1993 to
June 1994. Because
direct flights across Taiwan Strait is still a political
taboo to both sides, such kind of 'direct flight' is then a certain kind of
revenge

to either

side of Taiwan

or China. The purposes

of all the hijackers

in these hijack incidents
have nothing to do with terrorism,
but solely
embarrassing
their organizations
and governments,
even friends and lovers,
and then asking political refuge from the government
in other side through
these dangerous
activities. Since there was no other claims for the hijackers,
all the cases were
quickly
solved
within
hours.
The much
stronger
restrictions
for Chinese to visit Taiwan and the much better political effects
have made most of the hijack incidents initiated in China by PRC's citizens.
There are still other problems for indirect services. In the early days of
deregulation
of travelling,
most. of the travellers were senior citizens from
Taiwan to visit their real old friends and relatives in China. These people
were not familiar with the complex procedures
of air travelling.
The transfer
facilities in Kai Tak airport were also not that good as they are now in Chek
Lap Kok of Hong Kong. So in the beginning of 1990s, it was very easy to
find lots of Taiwanese
who missed their connecting
flights slept in the
comers
always

around the airport of Hong Kong. Since then,
been
expected
to be a total solution
for

Unfortunately,

there

are

also

some

technical

direct linkage has
all these
chaos.

problems

for

both

sides.

Although the PRC government
has promote their direct-link
policy towards
Taiwan for over 20 years since its first announcement
in 1979, a guiding
principle was not yet made until 1991. Even though, this principle was still
unacceptable
by Taiwan because the legitimacy of all the aircraft and flight
attendants'
licenses issued in Taiwan can not be admitted in China for their
political beliefs.
into

Moreover,
Taiwan has also made some restrictions
for direct flights
China. In Taiwanese
government's
point of view, direct
flight is

Ilothing

more

than

a

political

trap

set

by

China

So

basically,

the

governmentin

Taiwan has never taken positive attitude
towards
direct
flights. Nowadays
policy makers in Taiwan are trying to make this issue as
a bargaining
chip when negotiating
with China. Different
parties
and
interest groups with different claims have also added much complexity
to
this sensitive issue.
4. Progress

Made in the Past Years

Although
the difficulties
for direct service across Taiwan Strait have
not been removed, yet there are still some progress made in the past 5 years.
First of all, some aircraft have already flown directly across Taiwan Strait.
During the peak years of hijack incidents, Taiwan has asked all the captains
of hijacked aircraft to stop over Hong Kong or Macau when flying back to
China. Although not confirmed,
it is believed that the nearest 2 to 3 cases of
the 15 hijacked aircraft have flown directly across Taiwan Strait and back to
China directly. Taiwan did not made any complaint on these cases for they
think they have already asked the pilot to go back indirectly.
So practically,
direct flights seemed to be allowed under such circumstances.
The opening
of Macau
airport
and Air Macau
in 1995 was the
milestone
for direct flights. Air Macau has operated flights from Macau to
both Taiwan and China, it can easily use a same aircraft to provide service
from Taiwan to Macau, then to China. This convenience
has created a niche
for Air Macau to compete
with Hong Kong. With less congestion
in the
airport and better-arranged
transfer time to 50 minutes.

schedule, Air Macau has shortened
its minimum
The same aircraft service is even more attractive

to the transit passengers.
With changing flight numbers, passengers
can just
take the same aircraft from Taiwan to their destinations
in China. Although
not a purely non-stop
direct flight, this indirect service
can actually
be
viewed
as a format of one stop direct flight. Soon after Air Macau's
successful
policy testing, another regional airline that has both links from
Hong Kong to Taiwan
and China, the Dragonair,
also started its same
aircraft operation.
This is a big step of the direct service policy.
Moreover,
Air Macau is a joint venture of China and Macau. With over
51% shares owned by China, Air Macau is by all means a Chinese airline
registered
in Macau. This is also the first Chinese airline that can fly into
Taiwan's
territory,
except those hijacks. Soon after Air Macau had started
operation,
Cathay Pacific transferred
her shares of Dragonair
to the same
Chinese group which holds the major shares of Air Macau. Thanks to the
experience
of Air Macau, Dragonair
is still operating
her services to both
Taiwan and China. It means that a Chinese airline, at least a Chinese owned
airline
China.

based

in an autonomic

zone, is freely

to travel

between

Taiwan

and

The most interesting
fact is that the Macau airport which was newly
built in 1995 is located in Guangzhou
Flight Information
Region (FIR) of
China. Aircraft land or take-off in Macau will fly over Guangzhou
FIR of
China, and guided by or receiving
flight information
from this FIR. It is
certainly a format of first freedom. Currently there are 2 Taiwanese
airlines

servedin the links betweenTaiwanandMacau;both of
the services
of Guangzhou
between Taiwan and China.

them are enjoying
FIR, but there is not any single agreement
This is certainly a big movement.

Researchers
have also contributed
cons around direct services
through
issues are already
under discussions
transport,

the

regulations

of

the

themselves
in exploring the pros and
their researches.
Lots of important
now. The conflicts
of laws of air
quasi-international

flights,

the

future

network structure, and the roles ofTaiwan,
Hong Kong and China played in
direct service market have all been analysed academically
and practically.
These researches
are of much help for solving the technical
problems
of
direct services.

direct

Finally, the direct sailing across
flights. The so-called 'offshore

Taiwan Strait is also encouraging
the
trans-shipment
centre' which allowed

ships of foreign countries and Flag of Convenience
(F.O.C), the ship belong
to Taiwan or China but registered in a third country, to sail directly across
Taiwan
Strait, has started
operation
at K.aohsiung
in 1996. Before
its
operation,

all the ships were also asked

for one stop over

in Hong

Kong

or

other ports in a third place. Since ships and containers can now sail directly,
it should not be too difficult for aircraft and passengers to fly directly in the
future.

5. The Future

Role of Hong Kong

As a major hub in eastern Asia, the future role of Hong Kong in air
transportation
industry is highly concerned
by different parties.
Many of
them are predicting
a considerable
loss of traffic when the direct links
between
Taiwan
and China are connected
(International
Air Transport
Association
[IATA]
1997; Wong 1997; Mackey
1997, 1998). This is just
what we can expect
in the future. Through
the analysis
of possible
cormection(Shon,
Chen, and Wong 1997), we can find that the first 4 prior
connections
have linked to thedemand
nodes that account for 1/3 of the
total travel demand.
on the link between

That is to say, at least 1/3 of the cross-Strait
passengers
Taiwan and Hong Kong will mostly switch to direct

services, unless these passengers
are also intending to visit Hong Kong.
Moreover,
connected
airports can also providing
services to other demand
nodes with much more frequencies
and much lower fares via domestic
links
in China.

These

potential

competitions

would

change

the

behaviour-of

travellers to other destinations,
too. Even if the service frequencies
of future
Taiwan-Hong
Kong links can stay at the same level that is not likely to
happen, a simple market share indicator which uses only service frequencies
in table 5 has also suggested a 33.3% loss of the current Taiwan-Hong
Kong
market. The much lower domestic
fare will probably
attract even more
traffic on these links.

Table3: EstimatedDemandShiftFromHongKongto DirectLinks
Fuzhou
Directservice
nodes
XiamenShanghaiBe_mg Guanzhou
Estimated
Round
TripPublished
Fares 334.21 333.56 369.47 33.34441.32
Reduction
fromDirectService:
USD
Weekly
transfer
service
frequencies
to 10
317
248 112
majordemand
nodes
97
196
(HongKong:50; Macau:
14)
Estimated
demand
shiftfromHongKong* 4.32% 6.74% 8.70% 9.59% 3.84%'
IATA's forecastingarearguingthatthelossof Taiwanesetravellersin
Hong Kong will be 'largely offset by the emergence of the large Chinese
outgoing travel market which is still in its infancy.'(IATA
possibilities
could be very negative to the outbound traffic

1997) But other
from China. First

of all, the PRC government
is trying very hard to extend her global flying
network, major airlines in China are also starting alliance partnership
with
foreign airlines. It's very possible for Chinese travellers
to travel abroad
from their own residing
cities in a very near future. Secondly,
the links
between Taiwan and China can also provide services for Chinese travellers
to the destinations
around the world. If direct links finally get connected,
a
great number of cross-Pacific
Chinese passengers
who currently transfer in
Tokyo and Hong Kong may switch to Taipei because of the attractive
fares
and frequencies
provided there.
The success of Macau has also proved that the hub position of Hong
Kong is substitutable.
Thanks to the better arrangement
of the same aircraft
operation
and considerate
flight schedule,
more and more Taiwanese
are
now using Macau as a gateway to China. The passenger
volume between
Taiwan and Macau has grown 5.45 times in the past 20 months. In 1997,
Taiwan-Macau
link has served over one million passengers.
Currently
there
are 16 scheduled
links from Macau to China, less than 21 links provided by
Hong Kong. But Macau has already served most of the cities with heavy
travel demands
across Taiwan Strait. The cities connected
and frequencies
provided by both Hong Kong and Macau are listed in table 6. With lower
fares and expending
network, Macau has become a very strong competitor
in this market. The changes of load factor and passenger
volume of TaiwanMacau link since 1996 is presented in figure 2. Although unstable, the trend
of growing passenger
volume is obvious.
A sudden strong growth in traffic volume of Taiwan-Macau
link can be
easily found after July 1998. The fast growing
passengers
were mostly
shifted from Hong Kong because of the chaos of the new Chek Lap Kok
airport starting operation.
More or less, it has shown that hubs can be easily
• This percentage was calculated by a/b, where
a = the possible passenger volume shifted from Hong Kong = travellers to the node +
travellers to other major nodes transferred m the node (transfer sen'ice frequency in the
node / transfer sen'ice frequency in all nodes * transfer demaad)
b= total traffic volume berween Taiwan and Hong Kong

substituted
advantages.

if they are not doing well, or if they have

Table 4: Current
Transit

Links From Hong Kong and Macau to China and Taiwan

Service Cities in
Taiwan

Airport
Hong Kong

lost their comparative

Service

Cities in China

(Weekly

Flights)
(Weekly Flights)
Taipei(205)
Beijing(45) Changsha(3)
Chengdu(10)
Kaohsiung(46)
Chongqing(7)
Dalian(10) Fuzhou(22)
Guanzhou(36)
Guiling(7) Haiko(7)
Hangzhou(14)
Kunming(9)
Ningbo(8)
Nanjing(7) Qingdao(7)
Shenyang(6)
Shantou(14)
Shanghai(49)
Tianjin(7)
Wuhan(1) Xian(6) Xiamen(21)

Macau

Taipei(85)
Kaohsiung(35)

Beijing(7) Chcngsha(2)
Chongqing(4)
Dalian(1) Fuzhou(12) Guilin(5) Haiko(1)
Nanjing(2) Ninbo(2) Qingdao(2)
Shanghai(14)
Sanya(1) Wengzhou(1)
Xiamen(14) Xian(4) Zhenzhou(2)
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It is quite clear that the future role of Hong Kong will be heavily
affectedby thedirect servicebetweenTaiwanandChina.Airlines basedin
Hong Kong will be shockedfirstly anddirectly. Dragonair,the regional
airlinethathasmostlinks from HongKongto both China andTaiwanand
servedmainly for the passengers
acrossTaiwan Strait, will be hit most
seriously.In 1996Dragonair has flown 2.2 billion kilometres on the routes
between Hong Kong and China, roughly 67% of the total kilometres
flew by
the airline. 68.3% of total traffic revenue and 83% of the operating revenue
in Dragonair
can be accounted
for Chinese market. Taiwanese
travellers,
in
particular,
have contributed
16.7% of the total revenue
(Mackey
1998).
Heavily relying on the service between Taiwan and China, Dragonair
will
face a big problem of recession after direct services start.
For Cathay Pacific, the major international
carrier in Hong Kong, some
losses will also occur after direct links get connected.
Obviously,
the most
profitable link between Taiwan and Hong Kong will mostly be affected. In
addition to this golden
link, drops of load factors in some international
routes can be expected,
too. With a fairly good constructed
international
network to over 50 destinations
in the world, Taiwan can be a very good
competitor
as a gateway to China. Travellers
to China can access transfer
services easily in Taiwan, especially
for those travellers
from rest of Asia
and U.S that accounted
for almost 75% of the total travellers
to China in
1996 (National
1997).

Tourism

6. The Market
Since
is prepared

Administration

Share

of the People's

of the Biggest

Pie in the Asian

the traffic on the busiest international
to shift,

one interesting

issue

Republic

air travel

would

of China

Air

link of the world

then be the future

market

share of the direct service market. As described above, currently both China
airlines and Cathay Pacific have created amazing profit on the link between
Hong Kong and Taipei. But the biggest winner in the transfer passenger
market is the China National Aviation Corp, which is known as CNAC in
this area. CNAC is a Chinese based business group who holds major shares
of both Dragonair
and Air Macau. These two airlines are enjoying a high net
profit margin because they can operate both links to Taiwan and China from
Hong Kong and Macau. However,
the niches of the two airlines will soon
disappear
after
restructured.

direct

service

start.

Obviously,

this market

is going

to be

The key issue to the future market share is the definition
of the routes.
If the links between Taiwan and China is defined as a domestic
link, or area
link as they are now defining

in Hong

Kong

and Macau,

then only airlines

based in Taiwan and China can provide such services.
That is to say, both
Air Macau and Dragonair
are out of this game. In the other hand, if the
routes are defined as intemational
routes, some foreig_a airlines may have
the chance to compete.
The policy of direct links on both sides and the
experiences

found

will be the case.

in Hong
There

Kong

and Macau

will be ve_

are showing

little chance

for airlines

that the area link
in Hong

Kong

or Macauto
get

the

fifth

Taiwan

share this market, nor will it be possible for foreign
freedom
on these links (Rao 1994). If so, some

and China will be the biggest winner

in the competition

nations
airlines

to
in

of the direct

service
market.
If the estimated
4 prior airports:
Beijing,
Shanghai,
Guanzhou
and Xieman in China are going to be connected, airlines based in
these
airports
including
Air China,
China Eastern,
Shanghai,
China
Southern, and a much smaller Xiamen airlines of the local government
will
be the best candidates
to provide direct services. In Taiwan's
side, the China
Airlines group who controls China airlines, Mandarin Airlines, and Formosa
Airlines, together with the Evergreen group who owns major shares of Eva
Airways
and Uni Airlines,
and the American
International
Group (AIG)
who holds major shares of Far Eastem Airlines and TransAsia
Airlines will
be the most important players in the market. However, those airlines based
in China will probably dominate the cross-Strait market for they can provide
domestic extension
services to other destinations
in China, while airlines of
Taiwan can attract
a global hub.

some outgoing

passengers

from China by using Taipei

as

Although
foreign
airlines
and entrepreneurs
may have very little
chance to participate
in this market, they are still trying to make some
earnings indirectly.
The most famous case is the investment
of AIG group,
an American
life insurance
company,
to the airline industry
in Taiwan.
Currently
AIG is the major stockholder
of both two of Taiwan's
best
regional
carriers.
They
shares of China Airlines

are also considering
which is the biggest

buying the public
released
one of the two international

carriers in Taiwan
(South China Morning
Post 1998). As a professional
investor, AIG feels confident
for the return of cross-Strait
links, they also
believe the future of these Taiwanese airlines (Paisley 1997).
Singapore
Airlines is the second foreigner that moves for her interests
in the cross-Strait
market. Recently Singapore
Airlines and China Airlines
have announced
a forge strategic alliance
of Understanding
for
a long
term,
relationships
reinvestment,
two partners

plan and signed
multidimensional

a Memorandum
co-operative

which
includes
stock
exchange,
business
operations,
and flight safety (China Airlines' Home Page 1998). These
will try to exchange 5% of the equity stake to cross hold each

other's shares in the first stage, and the ratio of cross-holding
equity stake
may increase
to 25% in the long run. This is just another format for
foreigners
to share this market.
It is believed that competitions
among the airlines can be very intense,
but the market size is also big enough to accept most of the competitors.
There were 2.1 million
Taiwanese
visited China in 1997, with natural
growth rate from a simple regression model, the passenger volume can be as
high as 2.5 million in 2000 in prediction 3. This is just the case of current
indirect

operated

3A regression

model

flights.
can

Apparently,

be reached

has suggested
an annual
growth
Taiwanese
passengers
travelting

using

some
the statistical

trips will
data

listed

rate of 7%, which predicted
2.16,
to China in L99S, 1999 and 2000.

be induced
in table
2.33,

1. The

and 2.49

by the
model
million

lower fares and convenience
of direct services. Moreover,
the small amount
of 73 thousand
Chinese
citizens visited Taiwan in 1997 has also shown
some potential of this market. Further deregulation
of travelling
and touring
activities
will fill the Chinese passengers
on the major links across Taiwan
Strait. Even if the strict regulation
for Chinese to visit Taiwan can not be
removed,
a certain number of curios Chinese travellers
going abroad will
still try to find their transit in Taipei. Under such circumstances,
transit
would be the only chance for Chinese to visit this island which should
belong to them in their beliefs. If curiosity can easily
traffic on the link will still grow for many times.

lift up the volume,

the

7. Conclusions
Issues around direct flights across Taiwan Strait are always one of the
hottest topics in eastern Asia transport
market. Although
the direct links
have not been connected
yet, they are still highly concerned
by different
disciplines
of politics, laws, and management.
Airlines and related business
also watch closely to these issues for policy changes will easily affect their
interests
in Chinese
market which the future of the air transportation
in
eastern Asia is heavily depending
on. In the past decades, Hong Kong was
the most important hub in this market; it will still be an important
one in the
future. It is proved, however, traffic on the link between Hong Kong and
Taiwan can be shifted to the link between Macau and Taiwan, so can it be
shifted to the links across Taiwan Strait. Moreover,
outgoing passengers
from China transferred
in Hong Kong can also find transit services
in
Taiwan. These movements
will possibly cause a big change in eastern Asian
air transport
system for there are millions of passengers
travelling in this
area.

The uncertainties
of direct links across Taiwan Strait are still leaving
some problems
unsolved.
Whether
the direct
links will be defined
as
international
routes or domestic
routes are not clear; the selection
of hubs
and airlines to provide direct services are not yet made; even the type of
freedoms
and bilateral agreements
can also change the market and network
quite a lot.
travelling
made. All
continuous

A much bigger volume of passengers
can also be found if further
deregulation
for Chinese to travel across Taiwan
Strait can be
these variables
are making issues around direct flights worthy of
observant.
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